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We are living in an age of uncertainty. While uncertainty can originate from multiple 
sources, the most prominent ones include economic policies and geopolitical conditions. Over 
the past two decades, geopolitical and economic policy uncertainties have risen dramatically 
around the globe, raising concerns among policymakers and financial market participants about 
the cross-country and cross-market transmission effects of these uncertainties. Consequently, 
a growing body of literature has emerged around the measurement of uncertainty, the cross-
country transmission of uncertainty, and the spillover effects of a given uncertainty for 
financial markets. By offering several advantages over other measures of uncertainty, news-
based uncertainty indicators have become increasingly popular since the seminal work by 
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). As the transmission of geopolitical uncertainty across 
countries and that of economic policy uncertainty to financial markets carry important 
implications for risk-management and policy-making decisions, it is crucial to understand and 
explain the behavior of these transmission mechanisms. By relying on news-based indicators 
of geopolitical and economic policy uncertainty, this thesis contributes to the literature by 
exploring the potential determinants of uncertainty transmission to stock markets as well as 
across countries.    
The first essay estimates and explains the cross-country transmission of geopolitical 
uncertainty (GPU). Using the news-based GPU indices for a sample of emerging economies 
along with the United States, the spillover models are employed to measure the pairwise and 
system-wide transmission of GPU. A substantial amount of GPU transmission is found across 
the sample countries, with some countries and geographical clusters are being more prominent 




utilized to explain the pairwise transmission of GPU, which reveals that bilateral linkages and 
country-specific factors play an essential role in driving the transmission of GPU. The overall 
findings continue to hold even after considering the short- and long-term time horizons. The 
findings of this essay may help predict the trajectory of GPU from one country to another, 
which is an essential input for the assessment of cross-border investment appraisals as well as 
international stability initiatives.     
A bulk of the literature has examined the impact of US uncertainty on international 
stock markets without paying much attention to the correlation between the US and the other 
stock markets. Motivated by this void in the extant literature, the second essay examines the 
role of US uncertainty in driving the US stock market’s spillovers to global stock markets, after 
controlling for the stock market correlation. To this end, I consider a wide range of stock 
markets around the world, as well as three news-based uncertainties from the US, namely 
economic policy uncertainty, equity market uncertainty, and equity market volatility. I find that 
the US uncertainties significantly cause the spillovers from the US to global stock markets. 
This causality from US uncertainties depends upon certain country-characteristics. 
Specifically, the US uncertainties explain better the spillovers between US and target countries, 
when those countries have a higher degree of financial openness, trade linkage with the US, 
and vulnerable fiscal position. Improved levels of stock market development in the target 
countries, however, mitigate their stock markets’ vulnerability to the US uncertainty shocks. 
The essay offers potential insights and implications for investors and policymakers.  
Inspired by the concerns that small open economies may well be more vulnerable to 
foreign uncertainty than to local uncertainty, the third essay focuses on New Zealand, which is 
a small open economy. This essay introduces a weekly index of economic policy uncertainty 




and US EPU on the aggregate (NZSE) and sectoral indices of New Zealand stock market. 
Overall, the findings suggest that NZ equity sectors and NZSE receive stronger and more 
pronounced spillover effects from US EPU compared to the local counterpart. While the return 
spillovers from both EPUs are somewhat similar yet limited to just a few sectors, the volatility 
spillovers from US EPU on NZ sectors outstrip those from the NZ EPU. For volatility 
spillovers, the domestically oriented sectors are relatively more vulnerable to NZ EPU, while 
those having export/import concentration with the US are mainly susceptible to US EPU. The 
findings of this essay may be useful to investors seeking sectoral diversification opportunities 
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1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of the three essays included in the thesis. In 
particular, it explains the motivation and the significant contribution each essay makes to the 
current body of knowledge on the spillover effects of geopolitical and economic policy 
uncertainties. The chapter concludes by outlining a roadmap for the balance of the thesis. 
1.1 Introduction  
Over the last two decades, uncertainties resulting from economic and geopolitical 
conditions have increased significantly around the globe. Consider the case of geopolitical 
uncertainty (hereinafter GPU)1 first. Several geopolitical events such as the Gulf War, the 2003 
Iraq invasion and 9/11 in 2001, the more recently occurring Ukraine/Russia crisis, the terrorist 
attacks in Paris, the ongoing escalation of the Syrian conflict, the US-North Korea tensions 
over nuclear proliferation, the Qatar–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict, the US’s recognition of 
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the US’s cancellation of Iran’s nuclear deal, and the most recent 
killing of an Iranian commander by the US and the prompt Iranian revenge2 indicate towards a 
heightened GPU in the recent years. Realizing the gravity of this situation, several international 
agencies, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, have 
 
1 In order to achieve consistency in this thesis, I prefer to use the term ‘geopolitical uncertainty’ instead of 
‘geopolitical risk’, as doing so resonates well with the other uncertainty concepts used in the thesis and makes all 
the chapter more coherent. I understand that though the concepts of ‘geopolitical uncertainty’ and ‘geopolitical 
risk’ are closely related and hence can be used interchangeably, they could still be distinct in some respects.   
2 While this is the most recent example of a geopolitical event that almost led to a war between Iran and the US 
in 2019, we list it only to emphasise the heightened level of GPU. We understand that, unlike the other geopolitical 
events listed here, although this event is fresh in the memories of people living through these times, it would be a 




frequently published reports3 that highlight growing concerns among policymakers, investors, 
and corporate managers about the contagious nature of GPU.  
As with GPU, concerns about rising economic policy uncertainty (hereinafter EPU) 
have intensified in recent years. Several economic and political events, such as partisan 
policy disputes in the US, serial crises in Europe, the 2007-2008 global financial crisis (GFC), 
and Brexit, have raised serious concerns among investors, financial analysts, and regulators 
across the world (as noted by Baker, Bloom, & Davis, 2016). These economic agents are 
particularly worried about how changes in US EPU are transmitted to domestic stock markets. 
A perfect example was the US President Donald Trump's decision in June 2018 to increase 
tariffs on imports from Canada, the European Union, and China in particular. The uncertainty 
generated by this policy decision triggered an immediate response from local investors and 
international market participants. Consequently, a tremendous amount of volatility was seen 
around that time in many financial markets across the world, including China, Japan, Europe, 
and the US. This example underscores the importance of US EPU and the spillover effects that 
it may exert on international stock markets. That is why the IMF has repeatedly warned about 
the threat of another financial crisis that may arise from the expansionary policies followed by 
major economies4 over the recent decade.  
Motivated by the examples listed above, which show that understanding the 
transmission effects of EPU and GPU is of paramount importance to the economic agents, a 
wide variety of literature has emerged over the past two decades. For both types of 
uncertainties, the literature ranges from developing an appropriate measure for a given 
 
3 See Suárez-de Vivero and Mateos (2017) for a good collection of such reports. 
4See, for instance, World Economic Outlook (2011) and Foreign Financial Stability Report (2012) published by 




uncertainty to the macro-financial effects of the uncertainty. More specifically, the strands of 
literature that have drawn considerable attention from the academic community include the 
measurement of uncertainty using news articles, the cross-country transmission of uncertainty, 
and the spillover effects of a given uncertainty for financial markets – in particular, stock 
market.  
As far as the measurement of uncertainty is concerned, the literature suggests three 
approaches5 to measure uncertainty (see Bloom, 2014; Bontempi et al., 2016; Moore, 2016). 
However, the text-based approach is the most contemporary one which has gained enormous 
currency recently (see, Bontempi et al., 2016; Dzielinski, 2012; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010; 
Hoberg & Phillips, 2010; Boudoukh et al., 2013; Alexopoulos & Cohen, 2015; and Baker, 
Bloom, & Davis, 2016). Text-based measures offer several appealing features, including 
consistency, broad coverage, and a clear indication of the uncertainty sources (Alexopoulos & 
Cohen, 2009), and are therefore considered reliable barometers of uncertainty. Among text-
based measures, uncertainty indicators computed from news articles have topped the list. In 
particular, the EPU index created by Baker et al. (2016) and GPU index developed by Caldara 
and Iacoviello (2018) are the most extensively used news-based indicators of uncertainty. 
Because of the attractiveness of the text-based measures, this thesis mainly relies on these two 
news-based indicators for the empirical investigation6.    
As for the cross-country transmission of uncertainty, much of the literature supports the 
existence of EPU spillovers across a wide range of countries (Klößner & Sekkel, 2014; Yin & 
Han, 2014; Kang & Yoon, 2019). In today’s economically integrated world, the possibility of 
 
5 I will explain the measurement approaches in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4.   
6 Although the second essay (Chapter 3) makes use of two additional indicators of uncertainty, which are also 




cross-country transmission of EPU is much more plausible. Studies have found that the 
existence of trade and financial linkages among world economies determines the transmission 
of EPU concerns from one country to another (Balli, Uddin, Mudassar, & Yoon, 2017). 
Similarly, the transmission of GPU concerns may well be explained by the bilateral linkages, 
as the construction of the GPU index, just like the EPU index, is based on news stories that are 
transmitted equally across countries. However, only a little attention has been paid to the cross-
country transmission of GPU, even though the further understanding of GPU transmission is 
no less critical for the economic agents’ decision-making process – as I highlight above. 
Provided that news stories featuring geopolitical conflicts contain information about GPU 
associated with those conflicts (Caldara & Iacoviello, 2018), estimating GPU transmission 
using indicators that are driven from news articles seems natural.  
Given the importance of GPU for economic agents’ decision making along with the 
paucity of literature around GPU transmission, the first essay relies on the conflict contagion 
literature. It uses the news-based indicators of GPU, developed by Caldara and Iacoviello 
(2018), for emerging economies and the United States. The conflict contagion literature often 
documents that the flow of media information is responsible for carrying geopolitical conflicts 
across countries (Beiser, 2013; Hill & Rothchild, 1986; Weidmann, 2015). Accordingly, it 
examines the cross-country transmission of GPU across a set of 19 countries (18 emerging 
economies and the US) and explores the underlying determinants of this transmission. In this 
way, the first essay relates not only to the literature on conflict contagion but also to the 
literature on uncertainty transmission. 
As far as the nexus between uncertainty and the stock market is concerned, there is an 
abundance of literature addressing this issue. Most studies assess the effect of EPU on the 




theoretical foundations for the potential effects of EPU on the returns and volatility of the stock 
market. On a domestic front, EPU tends to decrease return and increase the volatility of the 
stock market fear via investor sentiment when economic policies are hard to anticipate among 
market participants. Higher uncertainty around economic policies also raises stock market fear 
through the stochastic discount factor, which shoots up risk-premia and, thereby, volatility in 
stock markets (Pástor & Veronesi, 2012). Most of this literature, however, examines the 
relationship between EPU and stock market performance within the context of US (Pástor & 
Veronesi, 2012 & 2013; Antonakakis, Chatziantoniou, & Filis, 2013; Brogaard & Detzel, 2015; 
Bijsterbosch & Guerin, 2013; Liu & Zhang, 2015). Apart from these domestic effects, US EPU 
carries a significant potential to cause return and volatility spillovers on several international 
stock markets (Dakhlaoui & Aloui, 2016; Ko & Lee, 2015). 
In this strand of literature, two issues, however, remain reasonably unexplored. The first 
issue that seems to prevail throughout the uncertainty-stock market literature is that, most often, 
the attempts have been made to establish a direct connection between US EPU and the 
performance of global stock markets – where stock market performance is typically measured 
in terms of return or volatility of the stock markets (e.g., Chuliá et al., 2017, Ko & Lee, 2015, 
Lam & Zhang, 2014; Phan, Sharma, & Tran, 2018; and Su, Fang, & Yin, 2019). The underlying 
assumption is that a country’s stock market performance is directly affected by external 
uncertainties, especially if the uncertainty shocks are originated from a major economy like the 
US. This assumption, however, may not withstand once we account for the fact that most 
international stock markets tend to co-move with the US market (Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, 
& Siegel, 2011). It follows then that international stock markets may well be more responsive 
to the changes from the US stock market than those from the US uncertainties. Accordingly, 




the US stock market, which then makes the other stock markets move. Hence, their 
performance appears to be affected by US uncertainties. Consequently, the US uncertainties 
may lead the co-movement (or spillovers) between the US and international stock markets, and, 
therefore, may serve as a driver for stock market spillovers. Accordingly, the second examines 
the role of US uncertainty in driving the US stock markets spillover to global stock markets, 
after controlling for the stock market correlation, which has been largely ignored in the 
previous literature.  
 The second issue partly relates to the overwhelming emphasis that has been put on the 
spillover effects of US EPU for the aggregate stock markets of various regions. The issue also 
concerns the simultaneous examination of the EPU spillovers emanating from the local and the 
international landscape on the various sectors of a small-open economy’s stock market, which 
has received little attention in the literature. It has been argued that EPU spillovers for 
international stock markets may even be stronger if the EPU shocks are emanating from a large 
economy (Sum, 2013), such as the US, and more so if the target country happens to be a small 
open economy (Stockammar & Österholm, 2016). In order to fill this void in the literature, the 
third essay considers the EPU spillovers from local and foreign landscapes on the aggregate 
and sectoral indices of New Zealand – a textbook small open economy. 
1.2 Essay one 
The first essay estimates and explains the cross-country transmission of geopolitical 
risk (GPU). Using news-based GPU indices for a sample of emerging economies along with 
the United States, the spillover models are employed to measure the pairwise and system-wide 
transmission of GPU. A substantial amount of GPU transmission is found across the sample 




cross-sectional analysis, motivated by a gravity model framework, is further utilized to explain 
the pairwise GPU transmission, which reveals that certain bilateral linkages and country-
specific factors play an essential role in driving the transmission of GPUs. The overall findings 
continue to hold even after considering the short- and long-term time horizons. This essay may 
help predict the trajectory of GPU, which is an essential input for the assessment of cross-
border investment appraisals as well as international stability initiatives. 
By contributing to the literature, the first essay proposes another perspective by 
studying the transmission of GPU which takes place in the form of information flows 
associated with geopolitical conflicts, and this is in contrast to the previous studies that regard 
information flows as one of the factors responsible for physically spreading the conflicts across 
borders (Beiser, 2013; Hill & Rothchild, 1986; Weidmann, 2015). Furthermore, contrary to the 
previous studies that aimed to predict wars by relying on a measure of geopolitical tensions 
(Chadefaux, 2014), this essay points towards bilateral linkages and country-specific factors 
that explain GPU transmission.  
1.3 Essay two 
Studies in the extant literature have examined the impact of US uncertainty on 
international stock markets without paying much attention to the correlation between the US 
and the stock markets. I examine the role of US uncertainty in driving the US stock markets 
spillover to global stock markets, after controlling for the stock market correlation. To this end, 
I consider a wide range of stock markets around the world, as well as three news-based 
uncertainties from the US, namely EPU, equity market uncertainty (EMU), and equity market 
volatility (EMV). I find that the US uncertainties significantly cause the spillovers from the US 




characteristics. Specifically, the US uncertainties better explain the spillovers between US and 
target countries, when those countries have a higher degree of financial openness, trade linkage 
with the US, and vulnerable fiscal position. Improved levels of stock market development in 
the target countries, however, mitigate their stock markets’ vulnerability to the US uncertainty 
shocks. The essay offers potential insights and implications for investors and policymakers.  
This essay contributes to the broader debate linking foreign and local uncertainties to 
domestic stock markets (see, e.g., Boutchkova et al., 2012; Pástor & Veronesi, 2012 & 2013; 
and Smales, 2016). The main contribution of this essay is that it suggests that US uncertainties 
affect global stock markets, even after controlling for the time-varying correlation between the 
US and a given stock market. Only a little evidence was present on the topic previously (Li & 
Peng, 2017). Moreover, this essay provides global evidence on how US uncertainties drive 
spillovers between the US and other stock markets, going beyond individual markets and 
specific regions. Finally, and most importantly, this essay moves the US uncertainty-global 
stock market nexus literature (for instance, Phan et al., 2018) one-step further by indicating the 
potential factors that explain this nexus.  
1.4 Essay three 
The third essay introduces a weekly index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) for 
New Zealand, and examines the return and volatility spillovers from New Zealand (local) and 
US (foreign) EPU on aggregate (NZSE) and sectoral indices of New Zealand stock market. 
The multivariate VAR (1)-BEKK-GARCH model is employed for this purpose. Overall, the 
findings suggest that NZ equity sectors and NZSE receive much stronger and more pronounced 
spillover effects from US EPU compared to the local counterpart (NZ EPU). While the return 




spillovers from US EPU on NZ sectors outstrip those from the NZ EPU. For volatility 
spillovers, the domestically oriented sectors are relatively more vulnerable to NZ EPU, while 
those having export/import concentration with the US are mainly susceptible to US EPU. These 
findings may be useful to investors seeking sectoral diversification opportunities across New 
Zealand and the US.  
This essay contributes explicitly to the EPU measurement literature by introducing a 
weekly EPU index for New Zealand. Unlike the previous research (e.g., Greig, Rice, Vehbi, & 
Wong, 2018; Armelius, Hull, & Köhler, 2017; Stockammar & Österholm, 2016; and Kamber, 
Karagedikli, Ryan, & Vehbi, 2016) that pays little attention to the relationship between local 
EPU and equity sectors of small open economies, this essay considers New Zealand as a 
representative small open economy, and simultaneously examine the local and foreign EPU 
spillovers for the equity sectors of New Zealand. In this respect, the contribution provided by 
the third essay joins with the ongoing debate on the EPU-equity sector nexus and is linked 
closely to the current research in the area (Yu et al., 2018; Yu et al., 2017). 
1.5 The research output of the thesis 
1.5.1 Essay one 
The first essay included in this thesis is under review at The Annals of Regional 
Science. To date, this essay has been presented at the following forums:  
a) Mudassar Hasan, Faruk Balli, Hatice-Ozer Balli, and Russell Gregory-Allen 
(2018), “Bilateral and country-specific drivers of geopolitical risk 




Zealand, 17-19 December 2018. The Auckland Centre for Financial Research 
hosted the meeting at the Faculty of Business, Economics and Law, Auckland 
University of Technology. 
b) Mudassar Hasan, Faruk Balli, Hatice-Ozer Balli, and Russell Gregory-Allen 
(2019), “Bilateral and country-specific drivers of geopolitical risk 
transmission,” 23rd Annual New Zealand Finance Colloquium, Lincoln, New 
Zealand, 13-15 February 2019. The colloquium was hosted by the Faculty of 
Agribusiness and Commerce at Lincoln University in Lincoln, Canterbury. 
1.5.2 Essay two 
The second essay included in is under review at the International Review of Economics 
and Finance.  
1.5.3 Essay three 
The third essay included in this thesis is published in the Journal of Economics and 
Finance.   
In connection to this essay, I created an EPU index for New Zealand with two 
frequencies, i.e., weekly and monthly. The weekly EPU index has been used in this essay, while 
the monthly EPU index has been used in the following two publications:  
a) Balli, F., Uddin, G. S., Mudassar, H., & Yoon, S. M. (2017). Cross-country 





b) Tsui, W. H. K., Balli, F., Tan, D. T. W., Lau, O., & Hasan, M. (2018). New 
Zealand business tourism: exploring the impact of economic policy 
uncertainties. Tourism Economics, 24(4), 386-417.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The balance of the thesis is structured as follows. The first essay, which examines the 
transmission of GPU and its potential determinants, is presented in Chapter 2. The second essay 
which examines the role of US uncertainty is causing the US stock markets spillover to global 
stock markets, after controlling for the stock market correlation, and which further explores the 
underlying determinants of this causality is presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the third 
essay which introduces a weekly EPU index for New Zealand and examines the return and 
volatility spillovers from New Zealand (local) and US (foreign) EPU on aggregate and sectoral 
indices of New Zealand stock market. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by including key findings 




2 CHAPTER 2 ESSAY ONE 
Cross-country transmission of geopolitical uncertainty and its drivers  
The first essay estimates and explains the cross-country transmission of GPU. Using 
GPU indices of Caldara and Iacoviello (2018), the spillover models are employed to estimate 
the pairwise and system-wide transmission of GPU. A substantial amount of GPU transmission 
is found across sample countries, with some countries and geographical clusters are being more 
prominent than others. Motivated by a gravity model framework, a cross-sectional regression 
is utilized to explain the pairwise transmission of GPU, which reveals that bilateral linkages 
and country-specific factors play an essential role in driving the transmission of GPU from one 
country to another. The overall findings continue to hold even after considering the short- and 
long-term time horizons. The findings of this essay may help predict the trajectory of GPU, 
which is an essential input for the assessment of cross-border investment appraisals as well as 




2.1 Introduction  
This research investigates whether and why the transmission7 of GPU occurs across 
countries. Caldara and Iacoviello (2018) show that news stories featuring geopolitical conflicts 
contain information about the GPU associated with the conflicts. Primary examples of such 
geopolitical conflicts include wars, terrorist acts, ethnic and political violence, and geopolitical 
tensions. On the other hand, conflict contagion literature considers the role of information flows 
in spreading individual conflicts across borders. It is argued that media information associated 
with a domestic conflict flows across borders, increasing the likelihood of similar conflict there 
(Beiser, 2011). More specific instances in which the flow of media information carried 
geopolitical conflicts across countries include political conflict, armed civil conflict, and ethnic 
conflicts (Beiser, 2013; Hill & Rothchild, 1986; Weidmann, 2015). Since the media 
information about each of those conflicts essentially reflects GPU about the conflict, one may 
argue that the flow of media information does not merely cause the spread of physical conflicts, 
but rather carries GPU of that conflict from country to another. A theoretical expectation, thus, 
exists about the transmission of GPU occurring in the form of information flow. This essay 
thus asks whether the transmission of GPU occurs in the form of information flows.  
The essay further asks why the transmission of GPU may occur. In this case, the essay 
relies on another stream of conflict contagion literature where a disease-conflict analogy is 
often employed to explain the cross-country transmission of the geopolitical conflicts. 
Instances, where this analogy has been explicitly used, include the spread of political violence 
(Braithwaite, 2010; Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008) and terrorism (Blomberg & Rosendorff, 2006). 
This analogy proposes that the magnitude of conflict spread varies with the extent of social 
 
7Instead of distinguishing between contagion, spillover, diffusion, and spread, we view the phenomenon as 




interaction between two countries (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008) and that a gravity model 
framework successfully captures this kind of interaction. As GPU transmission is expected to 
happen via information flow, one needs to appreciate whether the gravity model framework 
works for information flows. Literature suggests this framework has been successfully 
employed to explain other forms of information transmission such as economic reforms 
(Fidrmuc & Karaja, 2013), stock market volatilities (Balli, Balli, Louis, & Vo, 2015), and 
economic policy uncertainties (Balli, Uddin, Mudassar, & Yoon, 2017). Therefore, this essay 
uses this framework to explain the cross-country transmission of GPU. In this way, this essay 
aims to deepen the understanding of investors, corporate managers, and policymakers about 
the contagious nature of GPU from a global perspective.  
Possible justifications for GPU transmission to happen through the mechanism of 
information flows follow. In today’s predominantly globalized world, countries are becoming 
increasingly interdependent. Global information flows also reflect increasing international 
interdependence (Mowlana, 1997). As global information flows are likely to surge even future 
(Beiser, 2011), so are those of GPU. Besides, advances in information technology, mainly the 
internet and, recently, social media networks, such as Twitter, Facebook, and You-Tube, have 
contributed to the speed and scale of information transmission. These technological 
developments would also contribute to expediting GPU transmission. Another mechanism 
suggested in the literature is emulation; that is, people learn from the information about foreign 
conflicts and try to emulate those conflicts in their own countries (Hill & Rothchild, 1986; Hill, 
Rothchild, & Cameron, 1998). The process of emulation generates more GPU in national 
territories and tends to amplify GPU transmission. There is also a fear or concern mechanism. 
People tend to become increasingly concerned or fearful after receiving information about 




conflicts with wider repercussions (Kuran, 1998), which further amplifies the transmission of 
GPU.  
Ascertaining and explaining GPU transmission is crucial for a practical reason: that is, 
to devise international risk management strategies and national security policies. Several 
geopolitical events and international reports8 repeatedly highlight the concerns among 
policymakers, investors, and corporate managers about the contagious nature of GPU. Suárez-
de Vivero and Mateos (2017) offers a good collection of such reports that emphasize on this 
issue. By summarizing these documents, the authors caution that GPU concerns are set to grow 
in the future, with much broader ramifications for countries, businesses, and individuals. In 
particular, the following trends of widespread and long-term nature are emerging about GPU. 
First, international governance is becoming weaker, and power is shifting from traditional state 
actors to non-state actors; this may lead to a global crisis. Second, increasing national sentiment 
is fueling extremism among the public. Third, the internal and external threats are mounting 
due to the spread of extremist ideologies. Finally, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction is changing the geopolitical landscape of the world. These trends, which are 
associated with GPU, are destined to increase GPU transmission on a global scale. Suárez-de 
Vivero and Mateos (2017) also note the growing importance of cross-country consequences of 
GPU for investors, corporate managers, and policymakers. In particular, financial corporations 
and insurance sectors make use of the GPU information in their analytical forecasts. Central 
banks, business investors, and newspapers also regard GPU as an essential ingredient9 of 
investment and policy decisions (Caldara & Iacoviello, 2018). Therefore, understanding cross-
 
8 See Global Risks Reports of 2018 and 2019; World Economic Outlook, October 2017, and Economic Bulletin, 
March 2016, published by the World Economic Forum, International Monetary Fund, and European Central Bank, 
respectively. These reports highlight the growing importance of GPU and its transmission.  
9Caldara and Iacoviello (2018) refers to two separate surveys, one conducted by Bank of England and another by 





country links of GPU is vital to investors, corporate managers, and policymakers for mainly 
predicting, and as a result, managing, and avoiding geopolitical surprises. In this way, 
businesses take steps to manage their credit risk, build resilient supply chains, develop crisis 
response plans, and secure credit and political risk insurance to protect their assets better. 
Understanding the transmission GPU is also necessary to fill a theoretical void, for the 
topic has received limited attention in the geopolitical conflict literature. While GPU is an 
essential attribute of geopolitical conflicts, this literature generally overlooks the role of GPU 
when explaining or predicting the spread of such conflicts. Studies often explain how a 
geopolitical conflict undergoes a spread, diffusion, or contagion in its physical form (Blomberg 
& Rosendorff, 2006; Braithwaite, 2010; Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 
2006). Other hold flows of media information responsible for those physically transmitted 
conflicts (Beiser, 2013; Hill & Rothchild, 1986; Weidmann, 2015). Many also aim to predict 
single geopolitical conflicts such as interstate wars (Beck, King, & Zeng, 2000; Ward, 
Siverson, & Cao, 2007), civil wars (Ward, Greenhill, & Bakke, 2010), geopolitical tensions 
(Chadefaux, 2014) or other political unrests like state failures, human rights violations, ethnic 
conflict, genocide, political instability (De Mesquita, 2010; Gleditsch & Ward, 2013; 
Schneider, Gleditsch, & Carey, 2010). Some focus on predicting the evolution of a specific 
conflict (Pevehouse & Goldstein, 1999; Schrodt & Gerner, 2000).  
The previous studies also come with some other limitations. First, while explaining the 
spread of geopolitical conflict, the studies generally look at the physical spread of a conflict 
occurring in the form of events, not in the form of information. They often rely on event-based 
data, which works well in hindsight but contains a limited predictive value. Second, they 
typically rely on single or individual conflicts while ignoring the possibility of multiple 




simultaneously and are often interlinked. Studies aiming to predict geopolitical conflicts also 
ignore this possibility. Finally, the studies that rely upon news-based measures for conflict 
prediction often end up providing dichotomous or probabilistic forecasts about a single conflict 
under study. Binary predictions are criticized for producing black-and-white forecasts on 
geopolitical conflicts, which are otherwise continuously occurring phenomenon. Probabilistic 
predictions (Chadefaux, 2014), on the other hand, are fraught with imperfections in datasets 
that they are based on. 
Some studies emphasize only on specific regions, like Central Africa, and use historical 
analysis of the regional geography (for instance, Huff & Lutz, 1974). This kind of analysis is 
highly subjective and calls for an appeal to a robust statistical method. Furthermore, Central 
Africa may have been critical in the 1970s; lately, however, GPU concerns have become 
progressively rampant across many regions of the world, and this trend is not likely to subside 
soon. Studying GPU transmission, with a robust statistical appeal, for those regions thus has 
become more relevant now.  
This essay invokes a statistically sophisticated approach, the spillover model of Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2012), for examining GPU transmission across 19 countries. Total and pairwise 
GPU transmissions are estimated using this approach. The spillover framework of Barunik and 
Krehlik (2018) is further used to explore if the results hold for short- and long-term GPU 
transmissions. Diebold and Yilmaz (2012)’s model has several advantages. First, the method 
is simple to compute as the results of variance decomposition do not hinge on the sequence of 
variables. Second, the measure is tractable as it allows for the measurement of spillovers across 
multiple data series and therefore captures the GPU spillovers from one country to multiple 
countries and vice versa. The application of the model shows a substantial amount of total and 




experiencing more pronounced GPU transmission than others. A graphic description of the 
pairwise GPU transmission results using spring graphs is made from Gephi, which is an open-
source, highly interactive, and user-friendly software that allows for discovering and 
visualizing network patterns among data. From this graph, there emerges a clear geographical 
clustering amongst our sample countries, which further invites us to explain the GPU 
transmissions between a pair of countries. Motivated by a gravity model framework, these 
pairwise GPU transmissions are subjected to a cross-sectional regression. Bilateral factors, 
such as bilateral trade, border sharing, and common distance, play an essential role in 
transmitting GPU shocks from one country to another. The pairwise GPU transmission is 
positively associated with both countries’ debt burdens and the transmitting country’s fiscal 
imbalance and geographical size. The essay subsequently uses the spillover model of Barunik 
and Krehlik (2018) and find that, overall, short- and long-term transmissions of GPU behave 
in a somewhat similar way. However, this exercise unveils following additional features: 1) the 
total and pairwise amounts of short-term GPU transmission is remarkably higher than that of 
its long-term counterpart but smaller than the overall GPU transmission computed earlier, 
implying that GPU transmission becomes weaker from overall to short-term to long-term; 2) 
the role of bilateral and country-specific factors also become less critical with the weakening 
level of GPU transmission; 3) while geographical proximity (border sharing and common 
distance) proves to be an essential determinant of overall and short-term GPU transmissions, it 
turns out to play no role in driving their long-term counterpart.  
This essay offers the following contributions to the literature. First, the essay proposes 
another perspective by studying the transmission of GPU in the form of information flows that 
are associated with geopolitical conflicts, which is in contrast to the previous studies that have 




2013; Hill & Rothchild, 1986; Weidmann, 2015). In other words, the essay specifically views 
this information content to carry GPU across borders. Second, since the primary focus of the 
essay remains on the factors that can determine the amount of GPU transmission, one may be 
tempted to use these factors to forecast the course of GPU from one country to another. While 
the factors pointed out in this essay might prove helpful in such forecasting endeavors, a caution 
is in place that the factors may not be useful in making predictions about actual, physical 
conflicts. This objective may be better achieved by referring to the interstate-conflict literature 
that offers dichotomous or probabilistic predictions about specific conflicts, and, sometimes, 
aims to drive conditions that are most conducive to the conflicts (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Glaser, 
2000; Huth, 2009; Powell, 2004). Third, instead of using a latent variable such as cross-country 
events that could denote information transmission, this essay involves actual information flows 
by involving news-based GPU indices introduced by Caldara and Iacoviello (2018). By 
overcoming the data imperfections found in Chadefaux (2014), the GPU indices ought to 
improve the reliability of GPU transmission. Furthermore, in contrast to the previous study, 
which aimed to predict wars by relying on a measure of geopolitical tensions, this essay 
indicates bilateral linkages and country-specific factors that may help to explain GPU 
transmission. Fourth, this essay builds upon Huff and Lutz (1974) by applying a robust 
statistical analysis to a sample of 19 countries, other than Central Africa. Finally, the essay 
points towards a new type of informational spillover, i.e., GPU spillover, apart from the ones 
already introduced by literature (Balli et al., 2015; Balli et al., 2017; Fidrmuc & Karaja, 2013).  
This essay includes the following sections: Section 2.2 lays out the methodological 




2.2 Data and methodology 
2.2.1 Dataset  
As mentioned above, the monthly series of the newly constructed GPU indices (Caldara 
& Iacoviello, 2018) for 19 countries are used in this investigation. The GPU index data are 
obtained from the economic policy uncertainty website10 over a period from January 1985 to 
December 2017. Based on the availability of data, the following countries are included in our 
sample: Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, the United States, 
and Venezuela. Data on bilateral and country-specific factors, considered as potential 
determinants of pairwise GPU transmission, are also collected over the same period. The 
bilateral factors include bilateral trade, colonial ties, contiguity, common language, and 
geographical distance between the two countries. The country-specific factors are the central 
government’s debt, budget deficit, stock market capitalization, and the geographical area of 
each country. The appendix (Table 2-7) provided at the end of the essay describes these 
variables along with their data sources. 
The choice of GPU indices is made for the following reason. Existing GPU proxies lack 
certain features that a GPU indicator should have in order to be used for the measurement of 
GPU transmission. A GPU index equipped with these features broadens the scope of GPU 
transmission by enabling us to capture geographically broad, historically long, and sufficiently 
frequent interactions among GPUs of multiple countries.  In general, other indicators that may 
 
10 The website, http://www.policyuncertainty.com, contains other component indices for the US such as 
GPU_threat, GPU_act, GPU_narrow, GPU_broad, GPU_nuclearthreat etc. However, we used the ‘benchmark’ 




have served as a proxy for GPU are fraught with limitations of geographic scale, history, and 
coverage. Besides, these proxies are hard to quantify and rely on single wars or hindsight and 
thus fail to capture equally important instances when peace prevailed instead of war (Leetaru, 
2011). Besides, while some indicators are less frequent and thereby fail to track or anticipate 
mounting tensions and conflict outbreaks in shorter periods (Beck et al., 2000; Beck, King, & 
Zeng, 2004; De Marchi, Gelpi, & Grynaviski, 2004; Gleditsch & Ward, 2013), others are 
merely not standardized, which makes them incomparable across countries. Another critical 
issue with the existing GPU proxies (such as political unrest, war, conflict) is that they reflect 
a rather narrow view of GPU. In contrast, GPU is a concept with a much broader scope 
surrounding all sorts of geopolitical conflicts. Thus, a GPU measure capable of overcoming 
these limitations would enable us to capture the dynamics of cross-country GPU transmission 
better.  
The GPU11 measure of Caldara and Iacoviello (2018) is the one that overcomes these 
shortcomings. The GPU index is constructed from news information12 generated by the fast 
and accurate coverage of GPU-related stories around the world, meaning the index is an 
accurate and rapidly up-to-date measure of GPU. The index also avoids the problem of 
hindsight by reflecting the most recently published news content. Since newspapers have a 
significant advantage over the event-based data, they can report GPU even when no actual 
events take place. The GPU index is, thus, not only a robust measure of GPU but also carries a 
better predictive content. This index is sufficiently broad in terms of geographic and historical 
coverage as it offers more-frequent, long term, GPU-series for many countries; the monthly 
GPU series is available for 19 countries from 1985 to date. The more the data on GPU available, 
 
11 The GPU index is constructed by counting the occurrence of words related to GPU in leading international 
newspapers (Caldara & Iacoviello, 2018). 
12 Since the media content carries useful signals on cross-country conflicts (Deutsch, 1957; George, 1956; Hunt, 




the better it becomes to capture GPU transmission. The index is also a sufficiently broad 
measure of GPU because rather than tracking a single or a certain kind of conflict, it captures 
news information on multiple conflicts at the same time. Thus, the GPU indices used in this 
essay broaden the scope of GPU transmission by allowing for fluctuations in GPU within and 
across countries, and hence ensuring reliable inferences and better insights into the (cross-
country) effects exerted-a point that is owed to Caldara and Iacoviello (2018).  
Tables 2-1 reports the descriptive statistics of monthly GPU indices. The skewness and 
kurtosis values indicate that most of the GPR indices are negatively (positively) skewed and 
fat-tailed. Moreover, the results of the Augmented Dicky Fuller unit roots test suggest that all 
the GPU series are stationary at level. In contrast, the Jarque-Bera test statistics indicate that 
all the GPU index series are not normally distributed. 
Table 2-1 Descriptive statistics of GPU series 
 
  Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. J.B. ADF 
Argentina 111.85 104.23 371.01 36.40 43.62 1.43 7.03 432.96*** -8.267*** 
Brazil 103.94 100.35 221.41 43.02 29.99 1.01 4.59 116.99*** -6.379*** 
China 105.60 98.21 251.23 56.53 29.84 1.40 5.40 240.54*** -5.032*** 
Colombia 80.31 77.84 171.85 22.78 28.53 0.53 3.31 21.70*** -4.651*** 
India 93.58 85.36 247.40 45.01 29.44 2.17 9.69 1126.15*** -4.987*** 
Indonesia 74.52 68.64 275.94 20.20 31.86 1.49 7.34 491.68*** -3.197*** 
Israel 84.52 80.74 179.20 45.78 22.79 1.16 4.59 140.45*** -4.231*** 
South Korea 108.73 101.23 274.42 38.70 38.79 1.50 6.51 378.73*** -8.798*** 
Malaysia 90.11 84.17 278.88 17.49 35.12 1.68 8.34 706.90*** -7.454*** 
Mexico 99.08 92.55 214.35 55.03 26.08 1.20 4.74 156.12*** -5.035*** 
Philippines 99.28 92.50 215.54 35.25 35.52 0.81 3.35 48.67*** -4.450*** 
Russia 105.86 100.15 241.38 47.68 29.05 1.18 4.92 164.71*** -7.409*** 
Saudi Arabia 93.11 87.79 210.64 33.18 33.35 0.76 3.47 45.30*** -5.644*** 
South Africa 111.52 100.50 301.71 35.66 46.52 0.99 3.82 81.72*** -2.826* 
Thailand 94.46 85.99 296.19 35.44 38.89 1.79 7.77 631.41*** -12.107*** 
Turkey 111.56 102.74 320.26 32.63 43.41 1.28 5.41 218.56*** -7.294*** 
Ukraine 127.38 109.84 382.87 22.18 64.83 0.99 3.70 78.79*** -3.392** 
USA 85.42 66.18 545.09 23.70 63.29 3.03 16.77 4018.16*** -7.806*** 
Venezuela 86.28 81.92 233.48 16.38 38.83 0.90 4.29 86.85*** -4.157*** 
Notes: Table 2-1 shows the descriptive statistics of the GPU series (level) for emerging economies and the US. Std. Dev. stands for 
standard deviation, while probability corresponds to the Jarque-Bera (J.B.) test of normality. Mean, Std denotes the monthly average, 
standard deviation, and kurtosis. Dev., Skew., and Kurt., respectively. ADF is the empirical statistic for the Augmented Dickey and 





2.2.2 GPU transmissions using Diebold and Yilmaz (2012)  
As our primary analysis, the spillover model of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) is applied 
to measure the total and pairwise transmission of GPU across our sample countries. To further 
explore the short- and long-term aspects of GPU transmission, the essay relies upon the recently 
introduced spillover (connectedness) framework of Brunik and Krehlik (2018). Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2012)’s model is widely used in academic literature mainly because of the simplicity 
and efficiency of its estimates (see, Bubák, Kočenda, & Žikeš, 2011; Demirer, Diebold, Liu, & 
Yilmaz, 2018; Yilmaz, 2010). It allows for the identification of directional spillover effects 
across a wide range of time series, 19 GPU series in our case.  With a robust statistical approach 
that accommodates several country-based GPU indicators across continents, the spillover 
model of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) also overcomes the limitations of geographical 
examination of Huff and Lutz (1974). The generalized spillover index of  Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012) lets us define spillovers as the fractions of the 𝐻-step-ahead error variances in 
forecasting 𝑥𝑖 that is due to shocks to 𝑥𝑗 (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) for 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑁. Where 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 represent 
the rates of change of GPU series i and j, and N is the total number of GPU series (which are 
19 in our case)13. They measure spillovers in a generalized VAR framework.14  
 
13 Although the GPU indices are stationary at level, we convert them into rate-of-change in order to use in the 
analysis.   
14 In a simple VAR framework, the results of variance decomposition and therefore spillovers are driven by 
Cholesky factor orthogonalization and are potentially order-dependent. However, the spillover measures based on 
a generalized VAR framework, the results are not order-dependent. For more details, see Koop, Pesaran, and 





Consider a covariance stationary 𝑁-variable VAR(𝑝), 𝑥𝑡 = ∑ 𝜙𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑡, where 𝑥𝑖 
is the 𝑁 × 1 vector of the endogenous variables,  ~ (0, 𝛴) is a vector of independently and 
identically distributed disturbances. The moving average representation is written as 𝑥𝑡 =
∑ 𝐴𝑗
∞
𝑗=0 𝑡−𝑗, where the  𝑁 × 𝑁 coefficient matrices 𝐴𝑗 obey a recursion of the form 𝐴𝑗 =
∑ 𝜙𝑗𝐴𝑗−𝑝
𝑝
𝑗=1 , with 𝐴0 being an 𝑁 × 𝑁 identity matrix and 𝐴𝑗 = 0 for 𝑗 < 0.  
The spillovers can be defined by generalized forecast error variance decompositions of 
the moving average representation of the VAR model. The 𝐻-step-ahead generalized forecast 












 ,                                                                                        (1)  
where Σ is the variance matrix of the vector of errors . 𝜎𝑗𝑗  is the standard deviation of 
the error term of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ equation, and 𝑒𝑖 and 𝑒𝑗 are selection vector with a value of one for the 
𝑖𝑡ℎ and 𝑗𝑡ℎelements, respectively, and zero otherwise. 𝐴ℎ stands for 𝑁 × 𝑁 matrix of moving 
average coefficients corresponding to lag h.  
Since own- and cross-variable variance contribution shares do not sum to one under the 
generalized decomposition, each entry of the variance decomposition matrix is normalized by 






,                                                                                                      (2) 
By construction, ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝐻)
𝑁
𝑗=1 = 1 and ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝐻)
𝑁

















× 100 .                                              (3) 
This index measures the average contribution of spillovers from shocks to all (other) 
GPUs to the total forecast error variance. Similarly, the directional spillovers (𝐷𝑆) transmitted 













× 100 .                                       (4) 
The results of total and pairwise GPU transmissions are shown in Table 2-1.  
2.2.3 GPU transmissions using Barunik and Krehlik (2018)  
This section lays out the details of the spillover framework recently introduced by 
Barunik and Krehlik (2018). This model is applied to check if the results of GPU transmission 
continue to hold once short- and long-term horizons are considered. It should be noted that 
when Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) quantifies transmissions (spillovers) across a set of variables 
‒ be it pairwise or total transmission ‒ and aggregates information through frequencies, and, 
therefore, they completely ignore the possibility of heterogeneous frequency responses to 
shocks. However, one may argue that in an economic, social, and geopolitical phenomenon, of 
which GPU is one case, it could be of interest to assess short-, medium- or long-term 
transmissions rather than the transmission seen at a single frequency. Hence, the GPU 
transmission results may differ depending upon the frequency band at which they are 




spillover model of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). It might, therefore, seem more appropriate to 
work with frequency bands. The connectedness framework of Barunik and Krehlik (2018) can 
be used to perform this task.  
Within this framework, the term connectedness is just another name for transmissions 
or spillovers. By introducing the spectral representation of variance decomposition (e.g., 
Stiassny, 1996; Dew-Becker & Giglio, 2016), this approach is the expansion of Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2012). The unique feature of the Barunik and Krehlik (2018)’s approach is its potential 
to capture the transmission among a set of variables (over time and) across different 
frequencies. 
In Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), generalized forecast error variance decompositions are 
of central importance to ascertaining the transmissions in the time domain. Similarly, in order 
to estimate transmissions in the frequency domain, it becomes crucial to use a spectral 
representation of the variance decomposition based on frequency responses. In this case, 
spectral decomposition methods are employed to capture the transmission relationships within 
the frequency domain; and this is achieved by making use of the approaches introduced by 
Stiassny (1996) and Dew-Becker and Giglio (2016). The frequency response function plays a 
central role in this framework, which can be obtained as the Fourier transform of the 
coefficients 𝐴ℎ , with =  √−1 , can be defined as: 
𝐴(𝑒−𝑖ℎ𝜔) =  ∑ 𝑒−𝑖ℎ𝜔∞ℎ=0 𝐴ℎ                                           (5) 




As a next step, the power spectrum 𝑆𝑥 (𝜔), which indicates how the variance of 𝑥𝑡 is 
distributed over the frequency components 𝜔 , is computed as: 
𝑆𝑥 (𝜔) =  ∑ 𝐸(𝑥𝑡 𝑥𝑡−ℎ )
∞
ℎ=0 𝑒
−𝑖ℎ𝜔 =  𝐴(𝑒−𝑖ℎ𝜔) ∑ 𝐴(𝑒𝑖ℎ𝜔)                                       (6) 
According to Barunik and Krehlik (2018), the frequency response functions can be used 
to obtain the generalized variance decompositions in the frequency domain. More specifically, 












 ,                                                                              (7) 
Where at a given frequency 𝜔, 𝜃𝑖𝑗(𝜔) denotes the share of the spectrum of the variable 
i that can be attributed to shocks in the variable j. The forecast horizon H does play a limited 
role in this context.  






 ,                                                                                (8) 
Importantly, ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝜔) measures pairwise connectedness from i to j at a given frequency 
𝜔 and, therefore, it can be interpreted as a within-frequency causality indicator. In contrast, the 
above mentioned ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝐻) reflects pairwise connectedness from i to j for a given horizon H, so 
that it can be viewed as an indicator of the strength of causality exclusively in the same domain. 




focus on information aggregated through frequencies, while the possible heterogeneous 
frequency response to shocks is entirely ignored.  
In economic and financial applications, it can be interesting to assess short-, medium- 
or long-term transmission rather than transmission at a single frequency. Hence, it seems more 
appropriate to work with frequency bands. In this setting, the accumulative transmission at an 
arbitrary frequency band d = (a, b) can be obtained as: 
?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝑑) =  ∫ ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝜔)𝑑𝜔
𝑏
𝑎
 ,                                                                                (9)    
From here, it is possible to define a variety of transmission measures in the frequency 
domain, which are inspired by the indicators introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) for the 
time domain. For example, the overall or system-wide transmission within the frequency band 











                                                                           (10) 
Note that 𝐶𝑑 close to unity implies strong transmission within the frequency band d. 
However, the weight of this spectral band within the aggregate transmission might be 
extremely low. Hence, these measures are called within measures as they describe only the 
transmission within a given frequency band.  
According to Barunik and Krehlik (2018), to get an indicator of the contribution of a 




the contribution of the frequency band d to the overall or system-wide transmission can be 
obtained as: 
?̃?𝑑 = 𝐶𝑑 . 𝛤(𝑑)                                                                                        (11) 




𝑖=1⁄ =  ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗(𝑑)
𝑛
𝑖𝑗=1 𝑛⁄  reflects 
the contribution of the frequency band d to the whole VAR system, while 𝐶𝑑 is the total 
transmission measure corresponding to the spectral band d computed according to Eq.(10). 
Lastly, it should be mentioned that the sum of all frequency transmission measures over 
disjointed intervals is equal to the original total transmission measure proposed by Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2012), i.e., 𝐶 =  ∑ ?̃?𝑑𝑑 . 
The results of short- and long-term GPU transmission obtained through Barunik and 
Krehlik (2018) are given in Tables 2-3 and 2-4, respectively.  
2.2.4 Graphic description  
Figures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3 provide graphic descriptions of the results shown in Tables 2-
1, 2-3, and 2-4, respectively. These figures have been created with the aid of Gephi 
(https://gephi.github.io/), which is open-source software for network visualization.  
2.2.5 Cross-sectional determinants  
Once the pairwise GPU transmissions have been computed, the next task is to explain 
them. This is achieved by resorting to the gravity model framework. The gravity model, which 




Ries, 2010), has recently been successful in explaining the cross-country transmission of 
conflict and information. The basic principle of the gravity model is that the movement of 
people and goods between two countries is directly proportional to their respective economic 
masses (or income levels) and inversely proportional to their distance (Morley, Rosselló, & 
Santana-Gallego, 2014). Studies that have used the gravity model framework for explaining 
the spread of conflict are typically hinged upon an analogy between infectious disease and the 
spread of a conflict (Blomberg & Rosendorff, 2006; Braithwaite, 2010; Buhaug & Gleditsch, 
2008). This analogy suggests that the spread of conflict varies with the degree of interaction 
between interacting units (usually countries). The gravity model framework captures this 
dyadic interaction between a pair of countries by involving each country’s size and the bilateral 
distance between them. Assuming the same set of constraints shape the information 
transmission (in our case GPU transmission) associated with a conflict, one would expect 
closer countries to experience a higher level of the transmission than the distant ones.  
The meaning of size and distance may differ depending upon the context in which they 
are used in a gravity model (Fidrmuc & Karaja, 2013). The distance may be interpreted as how 
farther or closer two countries are in terms of their bilateral linkages such as geographical 
proximity, cultural and historical similarity, or economic ties. Size may also refer to economic, 
geographic, or public (population) mass of a country.  
The economic distance is measured through bilateral trade; the magnitude of bilateral 
trade captures how distant or close the countries are in economic terms. In literature, there is 
mixed evidence on the role of bilateral trade in the spread or eruption of geopolitical conflicts 
(see Barbieri, 1996), for a summary of the debate). Most studies support the pacific benefit of 
trade; that is, bilateral trade promotes peace or reduces conflict between states (Hegre, Oneal, 




2004; Kim & Rousseau, 2005). Some also argue that higher trade or extensive economic 
interdependence increases the likelihood of interstate conflict (Barbieri, 1996; Choucri & 
North, 1989; Waltz, 1979). Many consider trade as irrelevant or less critical to interstate 
conflicts (Blanchard & Ripsman, 1994; Buzan, 1984; Levy, 1989).  
The aim of this essay is not to explain the spread of physical conflict, but to see whether 
the pairwise GPU transmission occurring in the form of transnational information flows is 
affected by bilateral trade. Bilateral trade is likely to increase the transmission of GPU between 
the two countries. The underlying argument is that cross-border concerns among the public, 
businesses, and governments tend to rise when bilateral trade between the two countries 
increases. People immediately become concerned about geopolitical events or conflicts 
happening in the countries where lie their or their governments’ economic interests. Because 
of strong trade ties between two countries, a hike in external GPU would cause concerns in the 
local public, increasing the GPU in the home country. In other words, GPU will transmit across 
trading partners because of underlying concerns (Kuran, 1998) that emerge from the 
recognition of mutual benefits of bilateral trade. Therefore, other things equal, one would 
expect a positive association between bilateral trade and pairwise GPU transmission. Bilateral 
trade may also foster a learning mechanism by improving the inter-state linkages, which 
remove the communication barriers, facilitate the flow of information, and hence lends learning 
to become easier. This social learning mechanism will likely stimulate the local public who 
will emulate foreign geopolitical conflict in the home country (Hill & Rothchild, 1986; Hill et 
al., 1998).  
In this theoretical framework, contiguity (or border sharing) and bilateral distance 
represent the extent of geographical distance (or proximity) between two countries. Previously, 




boundaries. For instance, Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) find that proximity to a conflict 
explains the spillover effect on the probability of domestic conflict onset. Similarly, Hegre et 
al. (2010) find that while contiguity tends to increase the spread of conflict, distance has the 
opposite effect. That is, the extent of proximity explains the scale of conflict spread. 
Furthermore, Blomberg and Rosendorff (2006) show that distance and border 
significantly explain the transnational terrorism flows. Due to their significance, earlier works 
have proposed that both contiguity and distance between capitals cities of the two states may 
be used in inter-state conflict analyses (Oneal & Russett, 1999). The underlying reasons for 
that are simple. States sharing a border are especially vulnerable to conflicts, and non-
contiguous states sharing the same region are more prone to fight than more distant states. 
Notably, there is no perfect correlation between distance and any dichotomous predictor 
contiguity. Following this literature, the variables of border sharing and bilateral distance are 
also included in the model. Accordingly, one would expect contiguity to increase and distance 
to decrease the pairwise GPU transmission. Contiguity and distance are also included in the 
information transmission models of Fidrmuc and Karaja (2013) and Balli et al. (2017).  
Common language, colony, and common colony are used to capture the cultural and 
historical distance between a pair of countries. The fear or concern (Kuran, 1998) and 
emulation through social learning (Hill & Rothchild, 1986; Hill et al., 1998) effects may be 
invoked here. Accordingly, one may argue that linguistic and historical ties contribute to 
concern and learning, thus facilitate the transmission process. This argument is indeed plausible 
since Blomberg and Rosendorff (2006) found the role of common language in transmitting 
terrorism across countries. Thus, one would expect a positive association between pairwise 




Geographically large countries can exert their influence not only from a long distance 
but also across many countries simultaneously. Along with having more neighbors, such 
countries typically carry much broader economic and political interests. Therefore, the size of 
a country reflects both their ability to participate in a conflict. Literature shows that just like 
proximity, countries’ sizes influence the likelihood of interstate conflicts (Bearce & Fisher, 
2002; Hegre, 2008; Kenneth, 1962; Werner, 1999; Xiang, Xu, & Keteku, 2007). In this 
literature, GDP per capita or just GDP, population size, and geographical area are orthodox 
candidates for country size (Braithwaite, 2010; Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; and Hegre et al., 
2010). However, only two are considered due to their relevance. The inclusion of geographical 
area is because GPU is intrinsically a geographic attribute of conflict, and therefore the area is 
vital to this examination. Following Blomberg and Rosendorff (2006), therefore, the 
geographical area of each country is included in the model. To represent the economic size, 
however, the stock market capitalization of each country is used. This is because essentially, 
the essay measures the information transmission of GPU, and studies have shown that stock 
market capitalization is more relevant when it comes to such information transmission 
processes (i.e., Balli et al., 2017). Economic size may also be interpreted as state capacity to 
deal with vexing issues. Larger economies have the resources to cope with problems. Studies 
also suggest that state capacity diminishes the likelihood with which states will experience new 
conflict (Braithwaite, 2010), implying a negative association between GPU transmission and 
economic size ((stock market capitalization). One would expect a positive (negative) 
association between area (stock market capitalization) and GPU transmission.  
Finally, some studies have also associated the spread of conflict to a so-called ‘bad 
neighborhood’ effect (Iqbal & Starr, 2008). These studies typically argue that the state 




their neighboring states. Countries experiencing economic problems often do poorly while 
managing fiscal balance and foreign debt. Alongside, Balli et al. (2017) find that fiscal 
imbalances and financial liabilities of the countries are responsible for cross-country 
information spillovers associated with economic policy uncertainties. Combining these two 
notions, one may argue that fiscal imbalance and foreign debt of each country increases the 
pairwise GPU transmission. That is why the central government’s debt and fiscal imbalance 
(i.e., budget deficit) are added in the model. 
Considering the abovementioned factors as possible determinants of pairwise GPU 
transmission, this essay hypothesizes that this transmission is determined by bilateral factors 
such as bilateral trade, common language, colonial ties, and geographical proximity, and 
country-specific factors, namely fiscal imbalances, debt burdens, stock market 
capitalizations15. The following cross-sectional regression may express this relationship; 
 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑜 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗) + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 +
𝛼4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 +
𝜖𝑖𝑗                     (12) 
where 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 represents the amount of GPU spillover from 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 to 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 . 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗) is an indicator of bilateral trade between country i and country 
j. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑗  is a dummy variable representing whether or not two countries share borders. 
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 are two dummies indicating colonial dependence and 
whether both countries have remained under the same colonial power, respectively. 
 
15 Some of these factors such as common language and geographical proximity were also suggested by the 
Emerging Risk Report (2016), produced by LLOYD’S, in their ‘framework for understanding the emergence and 




𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 is a dummy variable for common language and 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗) is the 
logarithm of the distance between the capital cities of two countries. 𝑋𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗  contains country-
specific factors, namely budget deficit, central government debt, geographical area, and stock 
market capitalization of both countries. The results of the crossectional regression (Eq. (12)) 
are presented in Table 2-2.   
2.3 Results and discussion 
2.3.1 Total and pairwise GPU transmission  
The results obtained through the spillover model of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) are 
presented in Table 2-2. The table provides the estimates of GPU spillovers each country 
receives from (rows) and transmits to (columns) another country. The table also shows the total 
GPU spillovers each country transmits to all other countries (to others), as well as those each 
country receives from all other countries (from others). Finally, the table also includes the 
amounts of the total (or system-wide) mean spillovers.  
Table 2-2 offers several key features of the GPU transmissions. First, the table indicates 
that the total mean spillover is about 39%. Second, in general, countries that transmit more 
spillovers to others are also the ones that receive more, while the amounts of transmission are 
slightly higher than those of reception. In particular, the US (69), Russia (55), Brazil (56), 
China (57), and Saudi Arabia (48) are amongst the highest contributors to the forecast error 
variance of the remaining countries. In contrast, the US (57), Russia (49), Brazil (50), China 
(53), and Saudi Arabia (50) are also the leading receivers of forecast error variance from the 




the highest amount of GPU spillovers. Note that the countries listed above are also the ones 





 Table 2-2 Total directional spillovers of GPU 
 










Argentina 55.93 9.16 1.35 4.15 1.57 0.70 0.73 1.76 1.23 3.21 0.44 1.44 2.19 6.43 0.09 1.29 1.10 3.44 3.81 44.07 
Brazil 9.45 49.64 3.61 3.66 2.38 1.40 0.78 4.92 2.46 5.10 0.82 1.62 2.89 2.22 0.44 2.20 0.28 3.01 3.12 50.36 
China 1.35 4.35 47.38 0.63 5.55 0.19 1.58 8.55 1.99 4.69 1.85 7.32 2.47 0.54 1.96 2.85 0.32 6.40 0.04 52.62 
Colombia 3.84 6.14 0.55 72.75 1.45 0.34 0.15 0.20 0.20 4.46 0.91 0.78 1.04 0.53 0.16 0.32 0.13 0.94 5.11 27.25 
India 0.54 1.96 5.67 0.47 63.23 1.29 2.62 0.20 1.79 2.19 2.24 4.69 1.80 1.06 1.64 0.85 0.02 6.77 1.00 36.77 
Indonesia 1.07 1.75 0.18 0.57 2.68 62.43 0.45 0.94 9.72 1.52 2.89 0.76 0.72 0.49 6.30 0.46 1.39 1.40 4.25 37.57 
Israel 0.91 0.97 1.46 0.23 2.61 0.29 59.31 0.36 0.73 1.33 0.76 5.23 8.09 0.69 0.07 6.48 1.01 8.86 0.60 40.69 
Korea 1.92 5.78 10.54 0.18 0.18 0.88 0.35 66.36 1.69 2.16 0.94 1.29 0.26 3.09 1.90 0.15 1.01 1.07 0.24 33.64 
Malaysia 1.03 2.94 2.19 0.34 2.14 8.87 0.69 2.03 57.97 1.98 3.95 1.17 2.44 1.24 5.32 0.86 0.29 3.59 0.96 42.03 
Mexico 3.11 4.48 4.78 3.10 2.69 1.59 0.95 2.03 1.78 56.20 1.22 3.07 2.79 0.96 2.20 2.71 0.53 3.04 2.75 43.80 
Philippines 0.81 1.15 2.19 1.14 2.24 3.82 0.78 1.48 3.06 1.41 67.20 0.83 0.70 2.56 6.52 0.49 0.03 3.02 0.57 32.80 
Russia 1.09 1.34 7.79 0.59 5.54 0.83 3.50 1.01 1.13 2.36 0.24 51.17 3.14 0.28 1.29 4.20 5.78 7.73 1.00 48.83 
Saudi Arabia 1.90 3.26 2.83 0.62 2.51 0.43 8.66 0.80 2.10 4.19 0.30 4.53 50.38 0.57 0.11 6.57 0.04 8.82 1.40 49.62 
South Africa 6.02 2.81 0.56 0.09 1.84 0.06 0.97 4.01 0.53 1.40 2.92 0.46 1.71 71.65 0.60 0.44 1.51 1.63 0.79 28.35 
Thailand 0.13 0.58 3.02 0.42 2.26 6.14 0.21 1.87 7.05 2.36 6.08 1.19 0.54 0.71 66.41 0.27 0.26 0.41 0.10 33.59 
Turkey 1.15 2.07 2.99 0.07 0.76 0.53 5.36 0.44 0.98 2.53 0.12 5.50 7.04 0.83 0.54 61.16 0.61 7.22 0.12 38.84 
Ukraine 0.78 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.88 1.05 1.53 0.82 0.31 0.80 0.13 8.49 0.46 1.70 0.42 0.82 78.35 0.26 1.10 21.65 
United States 2.86 2.82 6.16 0.47 5.41 1.25 6.56 0.92 3.11 2.79 2.16 7.34 7.47 1.00 0.47 5.45 0.11 42.71 0.93 57.29 
Venezuela 5.09 3.69 0.06 4.36 1.80 3.74 0.32 0.69 1.37 4.05 0.61 0.08 1.96 0.68 0.28 0.04 0.31 1.29 69.60 30.40 
To Others 43.07 55.93 56.61 21.80 44.48 33.39 36.20 33.02 41.22 48.50 28.59 55.77 47.73 25.57 30.33 36.43 14.75 68.92 27.88 39.48% 
Notes: The spillover model of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) has been used to calculate these GPU spillovers, without considering any frequency bands. The sample is from January 1985 through December 2016, and the predictive horizon is 12 
months. The ij-th entry of the upper-left 19 × 19 country submatrix gives the ij-th pairwise directional spillover, i.e., the percent of 100-months-ahead forecast error variance in GPU of country i due to shocks from GPU in country j. The rightmost 
(From Others) column gives total directional spillover (from); i.e., row sums (from all others to i). The bottom (To Others) row gives total directional spillover (to); i.e., column sums (to all others from j). The bottom-right element (in boldface) 




Figure 2-1Total pairwise directional spillovers of GPU (Spring Graph) 
 
Notes: The Spring Graph presented in Figure 8-1 shows the total pairwise (static) GPU spillovers among sample countries presented in Table 2-1. The colors of nodes (circles) 
are in the following order: green (25th percentile), yellow (50th percentile), orange (75th percentile), and red (> 75th percentile). There are two aspects to the pairwise “To Others” 




Fourth, a higher amount of spillover is observed among countries that are situated in 
the same geographical region, with some exceptions, of course. For neighboring countries 
(which share borders), the amount of GPU transmission is even higher. In general, the closer 
(farther) the countries, the higher (lower) the amount of spillover amongst them. Interestingly, 
however, India has higher spillover with USA compared with China; similar is the case for 
Israel and the USA. This perhaps boils down to the stronger geopolitical linkages between the 
US and India (Brazil). This finding might be driven by the overwhelming exposure of those 
countries’ geopolitics to US GPU which seem to matter more for those countries’ GPU. This 
could be particularly true for Israel, whose geopolitical synchronicity or close linkages with 
the US are well known. As the key allies of the US in South East Asia and the Middle East, 
India and Israel are potentially more vulnerable to GPU with the US. Another reason might be 
that both India and Israel have a considerably higher degree of bilateral trade with the USA as 
compared with China. Studies suggest that the presence of trade and geopolitical linkages 
between countries generate familiarity among their publics and thereby induce newspapers to 
follow stories of countries where the general public is interested (Hill & Rothchild, 1986; Hill, 
Rothchild, & Cameron, 1998). That might be the reason why trading partners in our sample 
have a higher magnitude of pairwise spillovers between them.  
Figure 2-1 exhibits a graphic description of the critical observations taken from Table 
2-1. The figure shows a static (full sample) network graph of mean spillovers. It is evident from 
the figure that most of the countries in the same geographical region are clustered around each 
other, meaning there is a higher amount of GPU transmission amongst them. It is typically the 
case for Southeast Asia, Latin America, East Asia, Gulf, and East European Plain. However, 
the number of countries and the extent of transmission (i.e., the closeness) within a cluster 




(Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela) in Latin America to two (Russia and 
Ukraine) in East European Plain; and the countries in the Middle East  (Israel, Turkey16, and 
Saudi Arabia) are much closer than the ones in Latin America. Also, a country with the largest 
geographical size within each region usually is the leading participant of GPU spillovers in that 
region. For instance, in Latin America, the East European Plain, and South Asia, where the 
leading countries, shown in ‘Red’ nodes, are Brazil, Russia, and China, respectively. Finally, 
the US is the highest participant in GPU transmission across the sample countries, as can be 
noted from its central location in the figure.  
In passing, note that the geographic clustering is seemingly ubiquitous in the GPU 
transmission. It is not clear, however, whether this clustering is explained only by geographic 
factors or some other bilateral and country-specific factors also determine it. To this end, this 
essay proceeds further and digs deeper into the cross-country GPU transmissions. As motivated 
earlier, bilateral and country-specific factors can explain this transmission. The pairwise GPU 
transmissions are therefore subjected to a cross-sectional regression based on the gravity model 
framework. 
2.3.2 Determinants of GPU transmission  
Table 2-3 includes the coefficient estimates of the determinants of pairwise GPU 
transmission, 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗. Notice that GPU spillover from a 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 to another 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 , 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 , in 
Eq.(4) is the dependent variable in Eq. (12). Note also that while 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 is the transmitter 
of GPU shocks, 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  is the receiver of those shocks. Column (1) of Table 2-3 includes 
estimates of the gravity model with bilateral linkages, while column (2) shows estimates of the 
 
16 For the sake of grouping, we consider Turkey as part of Gulf region, because being a Muslim country it may be 




gravity model (extended), which incorporates country-specific variables. As motivated in the 
abovementioned methodology section, it is conjectured that bilateral linkages and country-
specific factors included in the Eq. (5) maybe the possible determinants of 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗. 
Table 2-3 Determinants of pairwise GPU transmissions (DS_ij)- estimated using Diebold and Yilmaz(2012) 
Column (1) and (2) show that bilateral trade and geographical proximity (contiguity 
and bilateral distance) significantly explain the pairwise transmission of GPU. In column (1), 
bilateral trade is a significant determinant of the pairwise GPU transmission at the 1% level. A 
 Variable 
Gravity Model Gravity Model (Extended) 
(1) (2) 










































  0.213 
 R2 30.30% 37.67% 
Total Observations 342 342 
Notes: The table reports the results of cross-sectional estimation with HAC standard errors in parentheses. 




1 % increases in 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 increases 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 by 0.0027%
17. This impact increases 
slightly to 0.0038 % in column (2). Economically, this finding implies that bilateral trade 
between the two countries is a significant and positive driver of GPU transmission between 
them. Contrary to the pacific advantages of trade documented by some interstate conflict 
studies, this finding suggests that bilateral trade increases the transmission of GPU between 
trading partners. One possible explanation of this phenomenon may be attributed to the 
familiarity effect suggested by some earlier studies, according to which the general public of 
the trading partners becomes more acquainted with each other's countries. Accordingly, the 
public becomes more informed about geopolitical affairs by closely watching each other, and 
thus the newspapers begin to report cross-country news, leading to the transmission of GPU 
across trading partners. Border sharing is also a significant driver of 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗. In column (1), the 
coefficient of 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑗  implies that at 1% level of significance and on average, a 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 
that shares a border with another 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  transmits 1.7240% higher amount of 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 to the 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  than a comparable country that does not share a border. This coefficient reduces 
slightly to 1.5410% in column (2) at 5% significance level. Bilateral distance is negatively 
associated with 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗  at 1% significance level. A 1% increase in 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 decreases 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 by 
0.0082% in column (1) and by 0.0050% in column (2). 
These findings suggest that the extent of economic distance (bilateral trade) and 
geographical proximity (bilateral distance and border sharing) mainly determines the 
magnitude of GPU transmission between the two countries. The finding that bilateral trade 
causes GPU to transmit across countries confirms the previous finding that trade or extensive 
economic interdependence increases the likelihood of interstate conflict (Barbieri, 1996; 
Choucri & North, 1989; Waltz, 1979). The increased GPU transmission because bilateral trade 
 




reflects this increased likelihood of conflict between trading partners. Higher bilateral trade 
also implies more substantial economic interdependence between states. This interdependence 
may cause violence or unrest in one country to spill over to the countries' stronger trade ties. It 
may destabilize trade and economic relations, provoke distressed migrations, and lead to 
complex humanitarian disasters in the other country. These are all various forms of geopolitical 
conflicts that lead to GPU. This was obvious when GPU emerging from Syria spread to 
neighboring countries such as Turkey, causing or multiplying disruptions in those countries’ 
geopolitical landscape. Hence, the finding on bilateral does not support the pacific benefit of 
trade – which means that bilateral trade promotes peace by reduces conflict (Hegre et al., 2010). 
However, cultural and historical distance (colonial ties and language similarity) are not found 
relevant to this transmission. That may be because of sample limitations. Only a few countries 
in our sample have similar languages. Even a smaller number of countries have colonial tries. 
It is thus not clear as to whether these factors explain GPU transmission. Although one would 
still expect the relationship, a different dataset, such as Europe, may help to capture this 
relationship.  
Our findings on geographical proximity confirm Blomberg and Rosendorff (2006), 
which provides evidence that distance and border significantly explain the transnational 
terrorism flows. These findings also corroborate with those on the spread of a physical conflict 
(Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; Hegre et al., 2010; Oneal & Russett, 1999). As expected, 
contiguity increases while distance decreases the pairwise GPU transmission. Considering 
GPU transmission happening via information flows, the reader should find these results 
supporting Balli et al. (2015), Balli et al. (2017), and Fidrmuc and Karaja (2013). Overall, it 




findings contradict the view of Virilio (1986), who suggested that territory has lost its 
significance and that speed has become more critical in geopolitics than the place.  
 Column (2) shows that country-specific (or domestic) attributes also play an important 
role in the pairwise GPU transmission. At a 10% significance level, the budget deficit (or say 
fiscal imbalance) of 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 is an important factor in explaining 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗. Keeping other factors 
constant, a 1%18 increase in the country’s budget deficit increases 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 from 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 to 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  by 0.1020%. This indicates that a transmitter country’s widening fiscal imbalance 
increases the GPU transmission from this country. However, the relationship between a 
receiving country’s fiscal imbalance, i.e., 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 , and GPU transmission is not found 
significant. Central government’s debts of both countries also appear to be an important factor 
in the pairwise GPU transmission. A 1% (as a percentage of GDP) rise in 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖 produces an 
increment of 0.017% in 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 at a 5% significance level. Likewise, a 1% increase in 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗 
increase 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 by 0.016% at 5% level. This suggests that both countries’ rising debt levels not 
only increase the transmission of GPU shocks from them but also the reception of the shocks 
coming towards them.  
The results on fiscal imbalance, as well as central government debt, indicate the 
existence of the bad-neighborhood effect, which is consistently found in the interstate conflict 
literature; see Iqbal and Starr (2008), for instance. Consistent with their argument, the findings 
of this essay suggest that states undergoing economic problems will likely be contagious to 
their neighbors. Although these findings pertain to information spillover of GPU, they might 
also be considered supporting Balli et al. (2017) that fiscal imbalances and financial liabilities 
 
18 Note that budget deficit, debt (central government debt), and market capitalization of each country have been 




of the countries are responsible for cross-country information spillovers of economic policy 
uncertainty. 
 Since the notion of geopolitics, and therefore GPU, is inherently linked to geography, 
the results on geographical size (area) shown in Column (2) are of critical importance. See that 
geographical size of country i, denoted by 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖), significantly determine the pairwise 
GPU transmission. The coefficient of 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖) in column (2) means that a 1% rise in 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 
produces an increment of 0.02% in 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 at 5% significance level. This suggests larger the 
geographical size of a 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖, the higher the amount of GPU shocks transmitted from the 
country to another. The primary examples of geographically large countries include Russia, 
Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and the US. The dominant role of these geographically larger countries 
is also evident from both Fig 2-1 and Table 2-1. In general, our findings on area corroborates 
with the consistent finding that countries’ size influences the likelihood of interstate conflicts 
(Bearce & Fisher, 2002; Hegre, 2008; Kenneth, 1962; Werner, 1999; Xiang et al., 2007).  
In summary, the results reveal a substantial amount of GPU transmission across the 
sample countries. Bilateral factors such as bilateral trade, border sharing, and common distance 
play an essential role in transmitting GPU shocks from one country to another. While increases 
in debt burden, geographical size, and fiscal imbalance of a transmitting country tend to 
increase the pairwise GPU transmission, a rising debt burden of the receiving country appears 
to exert a similar effect.  
2.3.3 Short-and long-term GPU transmission effects 
Although the results presented so far may seem intuitive and broadly acceptable to the 




like Russia, Saudi Arabia, Israel, China, and the United States have experienced or caused long-
run effects of GPU, whereas, for other countries, GPU could be a relatively short-term 
phenomenon. The recent attempt of the coup in Turkey in 2016 and the military intervention 
in Thailand in 2014 are two examples leading to heightened GPU of the countries in the short-
run. Consequently, the transmission or spillovers of GPUs for those countries may have only 
lasted for 1–3 months. 
On the other hand, GPUs resulted from events like 9/11 in the United States, Russian 
Invasion in Afghanistan, and Israel and Palestine's conflict have prevailed over the long-run-in 
fact over decades. It may be plausible to test the transmission of GPU in the short- and long-
term. That would enable us to see whether the character of GPU transmission and hence the 
factors affecting it change when different time horizons are considered. In other words, this 
will provide us a way to test our results for the short- and long-term nature of GPU.  
To do this, Barunik and Krehlik (2018) offer a spillover model that allows us to estimate 
short- and long-term GPU transmissions. This model works with frequency bands that 
correspond to short-, medium-, and long-term transmissions. Considering the nature of GPU 
as well as the monthly frequency of the GPU series, only two frequency hands are chosen that 
correspond to short- and long-term GPU transmissions, respectively. The short-term spectral 
band refers to movements up to 3 months, while the one representing long-term corresponds to 
movements from 3 to more months. Antonakakis, Gabauer, Gupta, and Plakandaras (2018) and 
Kang, Tiwari, Albulescu, and Yoon (2019) make similar choices regarding frequency bands 
while working with monthly data. Following Yin & Han (2014), the static version of the model 
is applied by using a forecast horizon of 12 months, and the lag lengths are chosen according 




transmission are presented in Table 2-4 and Table 2-5, while their graphic diagrams are 





Table 2-4 Short term directional spillovers of GPU 
 










Argentina 47.34 7.29 1.11 3.75 1.55 0.53 0.55 1.48 0.95 2.68 0.36 1.32 1.75 5.83 0.08 1.14 1.05 2.68 3.04 37.14 
Brazil 8.07 41.35 3.16 2.82 2.23 1.28 0.49 4.44 2.06 4.48 0.62 1.46 2.30 1.89 0.37 1.99 0.26 2.20 2.66 42.79 
China 1.16 3.97 38.61 0.61 4.97 0.16 1.46 7.24 1.67 4.15 1.58 6.11 2.07 0.51 1.23 2.50 0.18 5.22 0.04 44.84 
Colombia 3.29 5.54 0.51 64.17 1.43 0.31 0.13 0.19 0.18 3.95 0.75 0.76 0.94 0.52 0.15 0.30 0.13 0.87 4.52 24.48 
India 0.36 1.52 4.39 0.32 51.78 0.87 2.25 0.18 1.21 1.72 1.61 3.41 1.16 0.74 1.21 0.76 0.02 4.93 0.64 27.29 
Indonesia 0.80 1.25 0.13 0.44 2.60 53.85 0.41 0.77 8.45 1.18 2.40 0.74 0.50 0.49 5.80 0.42 1.19 0.97 3.23 31.77 
Israel 0.64 0.83 1.18 0.22 2.33 0.22 48.62 0.29 0.53 1.18 0.63 4.62 6.14 0.55 0.04 5.68 0.74 7.08 0.48 33.36 
Korea 1.41 4.93 8.47 0.17 0.15 0.65 0.27 55.31 1.31 1.81 0.65 0.90 0.19 2.50 1.22 0.09 0.97 0.72 0.15 26.55 
Malaysia 0.94 2.51 1.76 0.34 2.08 7.46 0.52 1.86 48.62 1.55 3.63 0.97 1.75 1.22 4.68 0.72 0.29 2.59 0.71 35.55 
Mexico 2.58 3.45 4.19 2.53 2.51 1.43 0.64 1.86 1.38 48.03 0.89 2.70 2.11 0.78 1.90 2.40 0.41 2.30 2.23 36.26 
Philippines 0.75 0.92 1.71 0.96 1.80 3.30 0.55 1.39 2.27 1.04 56.04 0.64 0.49 2.14 5.52 0.40 0.02 2.26 0.38 26.53 
Russia 0.68 1.03 6.56 0.46 5.11 0.68 2.59 0.77 0.74 1.61 0.15 42.36 2.30 0.25 0.85 3.18 4.77 5.41 0.90 38.04 
Saudi Arabia 1.48 2.77 2.51 0.49 2.42 0.31 7.80 0.79 1.72 3.90 0.27 4.20 42.76 0.44 0.09 5.66 0.03 7.43 1.04 43.36 
South Africa 4.71 2.15 0.51 0.07 1.79 0.05 0.69 3.61 0.47 1.22 2.55 0.41 1.31 60.09 0.55 0.42 1.39 1.37 0.68 23.92 
Thailand 0.09 0.35 2.72 0.42 2.02 5.44 0.19 1.69 6.40 1.74 4.88 0.95 0.54 0.45 54.48 0.26 0.15 0.33 0.08 28.70 
Turkey 0.78 1.39 2.03 0.06 0.51 0.47 4.03 0.34 0.61 1.82 0.07 4.48 5.31 0.81 0.44 49.95 0.49 4.88 0.11 28.64 
Ukraine 0.57 0.51 0.68 0.68 0.84 1.04 1.23 0.55 0.28 0.60 0.10 6.87 0.45 1.57 0.27 0.66 65.11 0.22 1.09 18.20 
United States 2.01 2.08 4.99 0.33 4.51 0.80 4.91 0.80 2.05 2.18 1.51 5.77 5.32 0.74 0.33 4.10 0.08 32.50 0.57 43.09 
Venezuela 4.21 2.70 0.06 3.21 1.72 2.89 0.31 0.67 1.03 3.49 0.48 0.07 1.57 0.55 0.25 0.04 0.29 1.00 58.28 24.55 
To Others 34.55 45.18 46.65 17.88 40.55 27.89 29.02 28.91 33.30 40.29 23.11 46.39 36.19 21.99 24.98 30.72 12.46 52.44 22.55 32.37% 
Notes: The spillover model of Barunik and Krehlik (2018) has been used to calculate these short-term GPU spillovers. The short-term spillovers correspond to the frequency band of less than 3 months. The sample is from January 1985 
through December 2016, and the forecast horizon is 12 months. The ij-th entry of the upper-left 19 × 19 country submatrix gives the ij-th pairwise directional spillover, i.e., the percent of 12-months-ahead forecast error variance in GPU of 
country i due to shocks from GPU in country j. The rightmost (From Others) column gives total directional spillover (from); i.e., row sums (from all others to i). The bottom (To Others) row gives total directional spillover (to); i.e., column 




 Table 2-5 Long term directional spillovers of GPU 
 










Argentina 8.59 1.87 0.24 0.39 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.28 0.28 0.53 0.08 0.12 0.44 0.59 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.76 0.77 6.93 
Brazil 1.39 8.28 0.45 0.84 0.16 0.12 0.29 0.48 0.40 0.62 0.20 0.16 0.59 0.34 0.07 0.21 0.01 0.81 0.45 7.57 
China 0.19 0.38 8.77 0.02 0.58 0.03 0.12 1.31 0.31 0.54 0.26 1.21 0.40 0.03 0.73 0.34 0.14 1.18 0.00 7.78 
Colombia 0.55 0.60 0.05 8.59 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.50 0.16 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.58 2.76 
India 0.18 0.44 1.27 0.15 11.45 0.42 0.37 0.02 0.58 0.47 0.63 1.27 0.64 0.32 0.43 0.09 0.00 1.84 0.36 9.49 
Indonesia 0.27 0.50 0.05 0.13 0.09 8.58 0.04 0.17 1.27 0.34 0.49 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.51 0.04 0.21 0.44 1.02 5.80 
Israel 0.26 0.14 0.28 0.01 0.28 0.07 10.68 0.07 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.61 1.95 0.14 0.03 0.80 0.26 1.78 0.12 7.33 
Korea 0.51 0.85 2.07 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.08 11.05 0.37 0.35 0.29 0.39 0.08 0.59 0.69 0.06 0.04 0.36 0.08 7.08 
Malaysia 0.09 0.44 0.43 0.00 0.06 1.41 0.17 0.17 9.35 0.43 0.33 0.20 0.69 0.02 0.64 0.13 0.00 1.01 0.25 6.48 
Mexico 0.53 1.03 0.60 0.58 0.19 0.16 0.32 0.17 0.40 8.17 0.33 0.37 0.69 0.18 0.29 0.31 0.12 0.74 0.52 7.54 
Philippines 0.06 0.23 0.48 0.17 0.44 0.52 0.23 0.09 0.79 0.37 11.15 0.19 0.21 0.43 1.01 0.09 0.01 0.77 0.18 6.27 
Russia 0.41 0.31 1.23 0.13 0.42 0.15 0.90 0.24 0.39 0.75 0.10 8.81 0.83 0.02 0.43 1.03 1.01 2.32 0.10 10.80 
Saudi Arabia 0.42 0.49 0.32 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.86 0.01 0.38 0.29 0.02 0.33 7.62 0.12 0.02 0.91 0.00 1.39 0.36 6.26 
South Africa 1.31 0.66 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.29 0.40 0.06 0.18 0.37 0.05 0.40 11.56 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.26 0.11 4.43 
Thailand 0.04 0.23 0.30 0.00 0.24 0.71 0.02 0.17 0.65 0.62 1.21 0.24 0.00 0.26 11.93 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.02 4.89 
Turkey 0.37 0.68 0.96 0.00 0.25 0.06 1.33 0.10 0.37 0.71 0.05 1.01 1.74 0.02 0.11 11.21 0.13 2.34 0.01 10.21 
Ukraine 0.21 0.17 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.29 0.26 0.03 0.20 0.03 1.62 0.00 0.13 0.15 0.16 13.24 0.04 0.01 3.44 
United 
States 
0.85 0.74 1.16 0.14 0.90 0.45 1.65 0.12 1.06 0.60 0.65 1.57 2.15 0.26 0.14 1.35 0.03 10.22 0.36 14.19 
Venezuela 0.88 0.98 0.00 1.14 0.08 0.85 0.01 0.01 0.33 0.56 0.13 0.01 0.39 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.30 11.32 5.86 
To Others 8.52 10.75 9.96 3.92 3.93 5.51 7.18 4.11 7.91 8.20 5.48 9.38 11.53 3.58 5.35 5.71 2.29 16.48 5.32 7.11% 
Notes:  The spillover model of Barunik and Krehlik (2018) has been used to calculate these long-term GPU spillovers. The long-term spillovers correspond to a frequency band of more than 3 months. The sample is from January 1985 through 
December 2016, and the forecast horizon is 12 months. The ij-th entry of the upper-left 19 × 19 country submatrix gives the ij-th pairwise directional spillover, i.e., the percent of 12-months-ahead forecast error variance in GPU of country i 
due to shocks from GPU in country j. The rightmost (From Others) column gives total directional spillover (from); i.e., row sums (from all others to i). The bottom (To Others) row gives total directional spillover (to); i.e., column sums (to all 






































Notes: The Spring Graph presented in Figure 2-2 shows the pairwise (static) short-term GPU spillovers among sample countries presented in Table 2-3. The colors of nodes 
(circles) are in the following order: green (25th percentile), yellow (50th percentile), orange (75th percentile), and red (> 75th percentile). There are two aspects to the pairwise 






































Notes: The Spring Graph presented in Figure 2-3 shows the long-term pairwise (static) GPU spillovers among sample countries presented in Table 2-4. The colors of nodes 
(circles) are in the following order: green (25th percentile), yellow (50th percentile), orange (75th percentile), and red (> 75th percentile). There are two aspects to the pairwise 




In general, the key features of the short- and long-term GPU transmission that emerged 
from Table 2-4 and 2-5 are not much different from the ones seen in Table 2-2. Interestingly, 
total short-term GPU transmission (32%) in Table 2-4 is substantially larger than its long-term 
counterpart in Table 2-5 (7%). Also, note that the sum of these two transmissions is equal to 
the total GPU transmission (39%) shown earlier in Table 2-2. A higher amount of short-term 
GPU transmission reflects that fluctuations in GPU over 1-3 months have substantially 
displayed stronger contagious character compared to the movements beyond three months. 
Like Table 2-2, Tables 2-4 and 2-5 show that the countries that transmit more GPU spillovers 
to other countries are also the ones that receive more, while the amounts of transmission are 
slightly higher than those of reception. Concentrating on Table 2-4, for instance, the US (52%), 
Russia (46%), Brazil (45%), China (47%), Mexico (40%) are amongst the highest contributors 
to the forecast error variance of the remaining countries. Likewise, the US (43%), Russia 
(38%), Brazil (43%), China (45%), and Saudi Arabia (43%) are also the leading receivers of 
forecast error variance from the remaining countries. With a reduction in magnitude, a similar 
pattern is depicted in Table 2-5. Just like Table 2-2, both the tables show that countries that are 
bigger in geographical size are the ones with greater participation in GPU spillovers. Once 
again, with a few exceptions, a higher amount of spillover is generally observed among 
countries that are located within the same geographical region. Furthermore, the apparent 
patterns amongst countries for border sharing, bilateral distance, and trading behavior are also 
not very different from ones observed from Table 2-2. 
Finally, the geographical clustering presented in Figures 2-2 and 2-3 also resembles the 
one depicted earlier in Figure 2-1. Overall, from the patterns shown in Tables (Figures) 2-4 (2-
2) and 2-5 (2-3), one may be tempted to conclude that while the total amount of short-term 




both transmissions remain seemingly unchanged. Nevertheless, I still need to ascertain whether 
this is indeed the case. The results are obtained by resorting to the cross-sectional regression 
described earlier by Eq. (12) and are presented in Tables 2-6 and 2-7.  
Table 2-6 Determinants of pairwise GPU transmissions (DS_ij)- estimated using Diebold and Yilmaz(2012) 
 
 Variable 
Gravity Model Gravity Model (Extended) 
(1) (2) 










































  0.178 
 R2 30.11% 36.16% 
Total Observations 342 342 
Notes: The table reports the results of cross-sectional estimation with HAC standard errors in 






















































 R2 23.63% 36.30% 
Total Observations 342 342 
Notes: The table reports the results of cross-sectional estimation with HAC standard errors in parentheses. 




Like Table 2-3, Tables 2-6 and 2-7 include the coefficients of the determinants of 
pairwise GPU transmission. While the independent variables – bilateral and country-specific 
factors shown in Eq. (12) – remain the same in both the tables, the dependent variable – the 
pairwise GPU transmission (𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗) – is substituted by short-term 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 and long-term 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 
separately in the equation. In Table 2-6, the results for the short-term  𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 are presented, while 
Table 2-7 contains the results for the long-term  𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗. With no change in interpretations, 
column (1) of Tables 2-6 and 2-7 show that the coefficients of 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗), 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑗 , 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗), 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖, 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗, and 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖) are not only significant but 
also carry the same signs as those in column (1) of Table 2-3. Besides, these coefficients have 
become slightly weaker this time, with 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖 completely losing its significance. 
For example, a comparison of column (1) of Table 2-3 and Tables 2-6 and 2-7 shows that the 
coefficient of 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗) reduces marginally from 0.0027 % (Table 2-2) to 
0.0021 % (Table 2-5) to 0.0006 % (Table 2-7). Likewise, the coefficient of 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑗  also 
show a slight reduction, from 1.5410% (Table 2-3) to 1.4910% (Table 2-6) to 0.2330% (Table 
2-7). The coefficients of most other (significant) determinants exhibit a similar tendency. The 
reduction in coefficient size is also evident from columns (1) and (2) of Table 2-7.  
To put things in perspective, notice that the total and pairwise GPU transmissions 
become weaker from Table 2-2 to Table 2-4 to Table 2-5; that is, from overall to short-term to 
long-term GPU transmission. Once coupled with the coefficient reduction, this may lead to the 
conclusion that the role of bilateral and country-specific factors becomes weaker with the 
lessening strength of the GPU transmission. 
In column (2) of Tables 2-6 and 2-7, surprisingly, while 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗) 




their relevance. Besides, while the coefficient of  𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖 gains significance this time, 
a new factor, namely 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑗), is found to be relevant. Other country-specific factors 
namely, 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖, 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗, and 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖) also continue to be important for the long-term 
transmission of GPU, although with the same coefficient signs as were found in Table 2-3. 
Overall, the main conclusion from these findings is that the geographical proximity (border 
sharing and common distance) is an essential driver of overall and short-term transmission of 
GPU. In contrast, it plays no role in the long-term transmission of GPU. As mentioned earlier, 
this finding supplements Blomberg and Rosendorff (2006). Via this robustness exercise, the 
essay confirms that while geographical proximity drives the overall and short-term 
transmission of GPU, this driving vanishes for the long-term transmission of GPU. This finding 
also contributes to the debate on the spread of a physical conflict (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; 
Hegre et al., 2010; Oneal & Russett, 1999), by supporting Virilio (1986) who viewed that 
territory has lost its significance, and that speed has become more critical in geopolitics than 
space.  
To sum up, the spillover model of Barunik and Krehlik (2018) was employed to 
investigate further by splitting the overall transmission of GPR – computed through from 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) – into the short- and long-term components of GPU transmission. 
This exercise revealed that the basic features of GPU transmission, namely the geographical 
clustering and the pivotal role played by individual countries, continue to hold for both short- 
and long-term transmissions of GPU. However, the exercise also unveiled some additional 
features of GPU transmission, which are as follows: 1) the total and pairwise amounts of short-
term GPU transmission is remarkably higher than that of its long-term counterpart but smaller 
than the overall GPU transmission computed earlier, meaning that the amount of GPU 




and country-specific factors also become weaker with the reduction in the amount of GPU 
transmission; 3) while geographical proximity (border sharing and common distance) is an 
essential determinant of overall and short-term GPU transmissions, it does not seem to drive 
the long-term transmission of GPU. In this way, the investigation exercise not only confirms 
our primary findings on the GPU transmission but also deepens our understating of this 
phenomenon by considering the short- and long-term aspects of GPU transmission.  
2.4 Concluding remarks 
This essay quantifies GPU transmission across 19 countries. It explores whether 
bilateral and country-specific factors drive this transmission while using 19 news-based GPU 
indices of Caldara and Iacoviello (2018) for this purpose. After employing the spillover model 
of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), a considerable amount of GPU transmission is found across the 
sample countries. A graphic description of these results depicts a geographical clustering 
among GPUs and highlights the countries that are the leading players in this transmission.  A 
gravity model framework unveils that bilateral and country-specific factors explain the 
pairwise transmission of GPU. The results also hold for short- and long-term GPU 
transmissions, which are computed using Barunik and Krehlik (2018). Investors, managers, 
and governments may find it useful to incorporate these results in their decision-making 
processes.  
Institutional investors and multinational corporations are often concerned with making 
assessments and predictions about GPUs that arise from the local and international arena. For 
them, the bilateral linkages and country-specific indicators suggested in this essay may be 
useful in predicting the course of GPU transmission between the two countries. These factors 




external GPU shocks. Furthermore, since international investments are usually spread across 
several geographical regions, the GPU’s geographic clustering improves the understanding of 
the GPU concentrated regions as well as on the role of each country’s GPU within those 
regions. In this way, this essay provides a broader picture to help to devise risk management 
strategies (perhaps by buying political violence and/or terrorism insurance) and to evaluate 
investment appraisals. Policymakers may also refer to this research when developing national 
security and counter-terrorism policies. The findings suggest that governments stay attentive, 
particularly to the geopolitical events occurring in their neighborhood and the ones involving 
their trading partners. That is because GPUs caused by those events may have adverse 
consequences for the national geopolitical landscape. Since shirking bilateral trade and 
exploiting geographical factors is not possible, improving fiscal imbalances, lowering debt 
burdens, and strengthening the domestic economy are few steps that may foster countries’ 
resilience against external GPU shocks.  
Although the essay tries to estimate GPU transmission, these estimations are primarily 
cross-sectional, static, and based on news information flows. Several questions remain and 
demand further investigations. For instance, future research may be aimed at investigating the 
dynamics of GPU transmission in terms of speed, volume, or time. In particular, researchers 
may examine the time-varying behavior of pairwise and total GPU transmissions. That could 
be achieved by applying the time-varying spillover models of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) and 
Barunik and Krehlik (2018). Moreover, this research has strictly relied on the gravity model 
framework and the factors specific to this framework. There is, however, an exhaustive list of 
factors and approaches that might explain this phenomenon better.  
This essay neither identifies a transmission medium such as the internet, phone calls, 




conflicts whence a country’s GPU emanates. The first question may be answered by extending 
the investigation of Weidmann (2015), which linked conflict spread to transnational phone 
calls. The second question may be answered by creating news-based indices that can capture 
the GPU of individual conflicts, and then by using those narrow indices along with the approach 




Table 2-8 Appendix: details of data and sources 
Variable name Definition Source 
Exportsij  Share of the total exports of origin country i to 
country j relative to the total exports of country i. It 
is averaged for the period between 1985 and 2016. 
OECD STAN Bilateral Trade 
Database 
  
Importsij Share of the total imports of origin country i from 
country j relative to the total imports of country i. It 
is averaged for the period between 1985 and 2016. 
OECD STAN Bilateral Trade 
Database 
  
Contiguousij A binary variable that takes 1 if origin country i 
and country j are sharing a border, and 0 otherwise. 
CEPII 
  
Colonyij A binary variable that takes 1 if origin country i has 
been a colony of country j, and 0 otherwise. 
CEPII 
  
Common Colonyij A binary variable that takes 1 if origin country i 
and country j have remained under the influence of 





A binary variable that takes 1 if origin country i 
and country j share at least one common language, 
and 0 otherwise. 
CEPII 
  
Distanceij Physical distance (in kilometers) between origin 
country i and country j. 
CEPII 
  
Budget Deficiti Budget deficit (surplus) of country i as a 
percentage of its GDP. The figure is averaged for 
the period between 1985 and 2016. 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
  
Budget Deficitj Budget deficit (surplus) of country j as a 
percentage of its GDP. The figure is averaged for 
the period between 1985 and 2016. 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
  
Debti Central government debt of country i as a 
percentage of its GDP. The figure is averaged for 
the period between 1985 and 2016. 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
  
Debtj Central government debt of country j as a 
percentage of its GDP. The figure is averaged for 
the period between 1985 and 2016. 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
  
Areai Geographical area (in squared kilometers) of 
country i. The figure is averaged for the period 
between 1985 and 2016. 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
  
Areaj Geographical area (in squared kilometers) of 
country j. The figure is averaged for the period 
between 1985 and 2016. 





Stock market capitalization of country i as a 
percentage of its GDP. The figure is averaged for 
the period between 1985 and 2016. 





Stock market capitalization of country j as a 
percentage of its GDP. The figure is averaged for 
the period between 1985 and 2016. 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
  
DS_ij Directional mean spillover (in percent) of GPU 
transmitted by origin country i to country j. 
These amounts are calculated by 
authors by applying the spillover 
model of Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012) on 19 GPU series of 
Caldara and Iacoviello (2017). 
These series are available on 





3 CHAPTER 3 ESSAY TWO 
Why do U.S. uncertainties drive stock market spillovers? International evidence 
Studies in the extant literature have examined the impact of US uncertainty on 
international stock markets without paying much attention to the correlation between the US 
and the stock markets. This essay examines the role of US uncertainty in driving the US stock 
market’s spillover to global stock markets, after controlling for the stock market correlation. 
To this end, a wide range of stock markets around the world, as well as three news-based 
uncertainties from the US (EPU, EMU, EMV) are considered. The empirical analysis reveals 
that the US uncertainties significantly cause the spillovers from the US to global stock markets. 
This causality from US uncertainties depends upon certain country-characteristics. 
Specifically, the US uncertainties explain better the spillovers between the US and target 
countries, when those target countries have a higher degree of financial openness, trade linkage 
with the US, and vulnerable fiscal position. Improved levels of stock market development in 
the target countries, however, mitigate their stock markets’ vulnerability to the US uncertainty 





International financial market integration has attracted a great deal of interest from 
researchers, professionals, and policymakers around the world (Barberis et al., 2005; Bekaert 
and Harvey, 1995 & 2005; Carrieri et al., 2007). The most intriguing question that surrounds 
this field is whether and why global stock markets undergo spillover (or contagion) effects, 
which are typically defined as a higher degree of correlation across financial asset returns or 
volatilities (Forbes & Rigobon, 2002). A wide range of empirical research emphasizes the 
presence of spillover effects across international stock markets (Hamao, Masulis, & Ng, 1990; 
Solnik et al., 1996; Longin & Solnik; 2001; and Bekaert & Harvey; 2003). Given the dominant 
role of the US market among world equity markets, many studies also focus on the spillover 
effects between the US and other stock markets (Ashanapalli & Doukas,1993; Rapach, Strauss, 
& Zhou, 2013; and Boubaker, Jouini, & Lahiani, 2016). While this empirical literature 
consistently documents the existence of spillover effects from the US to other stock markets, 
the debate continues to revolve around potential drivers of such spillover effects. 
Several real-world events19, along with an emerging strand of literature (Sum, 2012 & 
2013; Colombo, 2013; and Dakhlaoui & Aloui, 2016) suggest that EPU in the US could be a 
possible driver of global stock market spillovers. This evidence so far is limited to stock 
markets of individual countries or regions only, including those of China (Li & Peng, 2017), 
Europe (Sum, 2012; Colombo, 2013), and BRIC20 (Dakhlaoui & Aloui, 2016). Over the years, 
 
19 Tsai (2017) documents several examples of such events, such as China’s stock market crash that occurred in 
June 2015. On June 12-July 9, 2015, the composite indices of two Chinese stock markets, namely the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, dropped by 35 percent and 40 percent, respectively. Just two 
months later, on August 24, 2015, a black swan event affected many stock markets around the world, and the 
stock indices of China, Japan, the United States, and European countries collapsed by huge amounts. As reported 
by the author, the financial press associated this event to the plans by the US Fed to raise interest rates, which lead 
to the panic among investors. This shows that uncertainty around US policies can be internationally contagious.  




however, stock markets around the world have become increasingly integrated with the US 
market, which, in turn, has increased the likelihood of US uncertainty flowing across borders 
– perhaps with higher speed and strength. It has thus become desirable to look at US 
uncertainties as a driving factor of stock market spillovers around the globe. To this end, this 
essay provides global evidence that spans well beyond regions or individual markets. It thus 
broadens the spectrum with which previous studies have not been able to address this issue. 
This global evidence exhibits a great deal of variation with regards to US uncertainties’ 
spillover vulnerability for international stock markets, which asks for taking the following, 
more critical step: what are the determinants of stock market vulnerability to the US 
uncertainties? 
Another issue that seems to prevail throughout the uncertainty-stock market literature 
is that, most often, this literature attempts to establish a direct connection between US EPU and 
the performance of global stock markets – where stock market performance is typically 
measured in terms of return or volatility of the stock markets (e.g., Chuliá et al., 2017, Ko & 
Lee, 2015, Lam & Zhang, 2014; Phan, Sharma, & Tran, 2018; and Su, Fang, & Yin, 2019). 
The underlying assumption is that a country’s stock market performance is directly affected by 
external uncertainties, particularly when the uncertainty shocks originate from a major 
economy like the US. However, this assumption may not hold once one accounts for the fact 
that most international stock markets tend to co-move with the US market (Bekaert, Harvey, 
Lundblad, & Siegel, 2011). It follows then that international stock markets may well be more 
responsive to the changes from the US stock market than those from the US uncertainties. 
Accordingly, an alternative argument may be constructed that US uncertainties first lead to 
fluctuations in the US stock market, which then makes the other stock markets move. Hence, 




uncertainties may lead the co-movement (or spillovers) between the US and international stock 
markets, and, therefore, may serve as a driver for stock market spillovers. Accordingly, this 
essay examines the role of US uncertainty in driving the US stock markets spillover to global 
stock markets after controlling for the stock market correlation, which was largely ignored in 
the previous literature.  
Given that stock markets worldwide are governed by investors who regularly revise 
their decisions based on new information, one can easily relate to how US uncertainties can 
lead to spillovers in international stock markets. Uncertainties around US policies and markets 
are likely to affect the behavior of all those institutional investors who participate in both the 
US and other international stock markets. This will likely enable US uncertainties to drive the 
movements between the US and international stock markets. Besides, empirical evidence 
suggests that individual investors tend to track and mimic the investment patterns of 
institutional investors (Kim & Ii, 2002), especially while reacting to the same news (Griffin, 
Harris, & Topaloglu, 2003). As a result, they may well consider revising their trading decisions, 
thus affecting the co-movements between the US and other stock markets. This seemed evident 
from the examples listed in footnote 17. In each example, major turbulences around the US 
economy and financial markets did not just end in the US but rather spread across other 
economies and international markets. This suggests that investors vigilantly observed the 
critical happenings around the US economy and financial markets. This phenomenon was also 
quite evident during the recent financial crisis of 2007-2008 when the stock market crash in 
the US rapidly spread to the international stock markets and consequently turned into a global 
financial crisis. 
The studies cited above motivate us to investigate US uncertainties’ driving effect for 




market correlation, and to further explore the determinants of stock market spillovers due to a 
given US uncertainty. The extant literature has shown a growing interest in the transmission of 
external uncertainty shocks on the local economy (Trung, 2019; Balli, Uddin, Mudassar, & 
Yoon, 2017; Jiang, Zhu, Tian, & Nie, 2019). This strand of the literature contends that certain 
country-specific macroeconomic/financial factors, such as trade and financial openness, fiscal 
imbalance, debt burden, and level of stock market development, determine the extent to which 
global shocks influence a domestic economy. Trade openness exacerbates a domestic 
economy’s vulnerability to external shocks via dampening effects on exports, which constitute 
a large share of domestic output (Trung, 2019; Georgiadis, 2016; Giovanni & Levchenko, 
2009; Kose et al., 2003; and Sakyi et al., 2015). Likewise, financial openness could also 
theoretically amplify the adverse effects of external shocks on the domestic economy (Mishkin, 
2006), for instance, through its effects on capital flows (Aghion et al., 2004, Stiglitz, 2000). 
Excessive debt burdens and dwindling fiscal balances also worsen a country's economic 
sovereignty, thus making it more prone to foreign shocks. The extent of stock market 
development of a country, on the other hand, may serve as a deterrent against cross-border 
uncertainty shocks, and may, therefore, reduce the country’s stock market’s susceptibility to 
such shocks. 
Interestingly, similar factors are relevant to global stock market integration (Ito & 
Chinn, 2006; Balli, Balli, Louis, & Vo, 2015; Chen & Zhang, 1997). As these 
macroeconomic/financial factors are commonly associated with both stock market integration 
and uncertainty shock transmission, one may argue that those factors may well explain the 
global stock market spillovers due to US uncertainties. 
Against this backdrop, this essay begins by asking whether US uncertainties cause (or 




correlation between the US and a given stock market? The answer to this question leads us to 
capture the extent of the causal effect for each stock market, which exhibits a considerable 
variation across global stock markets. As the final step, the variation around the casual effects 
is explained by the abovementioned country-specific macroeconomic/financial factors. 
Following these objectives, this essay considers a global sample of 38 stock markets, consisting 
of developed, emerging, and frontier markets, as well as three news-based uncertainty measures 
from the US, namely EPU, EMU, and EMV. The time-varying, stock market spillovers 
between the US and each stock market are computed using the dynamic conditional correlation 
(DCC-GARCH) model of Engle (2002). The linear Granger causality test is then applied to see 
whether US uncertainties cause the spillovers between the US and other stock markets. Then 
the generalized variance decomposition analysis within the VAR framework is applied to 
capture the extent of the causal effect. Finally, a cross-sectional regression is employed to 
explain the heterogeneity that exists within the sample countries for the extent of the casual 
effect.  
The findings suggest that the US uncertainties significantly drive the spillovers from 
the US to global stock markets, after controlling for the well-known correlation. The highest 
magnitude of this causality is attributed to EMV, followed by EMU and EPU, respectively; 
while this magnitude varies significantly across our sample countries, and is explained by 
certain country-characteristics. More specifically, the US uncertainties explain better the 
spillovers between US and partner countries, when those partner countries have a higher degree 
of financial openness, trade linkage with the US, and vulnerable fiscal position. Improved 
levels of stock market development in partner countries, however, mitigate their stock markets’ 




The present essay contributes threefold to the broader debate that connects foreign and 
local uncertainties to domestic stock markets (see, e.g., Boutchkova et al., 2012; Pastor & 
Veronesi, 2012 & 2013; and Smales, 2016). First, it provides global evidence on how US 
uncertainties drive spillovers between the US and other stock markets. It suggests that US 
uncertainties affect global stock markets after controlling for the time-varying correlation 
between the US and a given stock market. The effect of US uncertainties on international stock 
markets, while controlling for the stock market correlation, has been paid little attention so far 
(Li & Peng, 2017; Sum, 2012; Colombo, 2013; Dakhlaoui & Aloui, 2016). Besides, even 
though Klößner and Sekkel (2014) and Yin and Han (2014) provide relatively broader evidence 
on EPU spillovers between the US and other economies, those works are limited to EPU 
interactions only, while also studying the spillovers related to EMU and EMV.  
The second contribution is towards the link between news-based measures of 
uncertainty and asset markets. While there are numerous studies relating news-based EPU to 
stock market returns and volatility (e.g., Hammoudeh & McAleer, 2015), and stock-bond 
market correlations (Li, Zhang, & Gao, 2015), such investigations are often conducted within 
a domestic context. Besides, even though EPU partly captures uncertainty surrounding the US 
stock market, other news-based measures of uncertainty have been recently developed in a bid 
to track US stock market uncertainty more precisely and are therefore gaining popularity. This 
essay considers two such newly developed measures, namely EMU and EMV, along with EPU, 
to provide international evidence on the power of US print for global stock markets.  
Finally, and most importantly, the essay moves the US uncertainty-global stock market 
nexus literature (for instance, Phan et al., 2018) one-step further by indicating the potential 
factors that explain this nexus. Specifically, the essay provides evidence that country-specific 




and stock market development, determine the vulnerability of global stock markets to US 
uncertainty shocks. Trung (2019) documents similar country characteristics as the determinants 
of a given economy’s vulnerability to US EPU shocks, yet the relevance of those characteristics 
for the stock market vulnerability remained unexplored. The present essay fills this gap. 
The rest of the essay is organized as follows: Section 3.2 details methodology. Section 
3.3 explains the dataset and results. Section 3.4 offers concluding remarks.  
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Dynamic conditional correlations 
The DCC-GARCH model of Engle (2002) is applied to capture the time-varying 
spillovers between the US and international stock markets. A significant advantage of using 
this model is the detection of possible changes in conditional correlations over time, which 
allows us to track dynamic investor behavior in response to news and innovations. Another 
advantage of this model is that it estimates correlation coefficients of the standardized residuals 
and so directly accounts for heteroscedasticity in the data (Chiang et al., 2007). Because this 
approach makes volatility-based adjustments, the volatility-induced biases in the time-varying 
correlations are minimized to a larger extent. Unlike the volatility-adjusted cross-market 
correlations used in Forbes and Rigobon (2002), the DCC-GARCH adjusts the correlation to 
the time-varying volatility continuously. Consequently, DCC offers a superior correlation 




The estimation of Engle's DCC-GARCH model comprises two steps: the first is the 
estimation of the univariate GARCH model, the second is the estimation of the conditional 
correlations that vary through time. 
The multivariate DCC-GARCH model is defined as follows; 
𝑥𝑡 =  𝜇𝑡 + ℎ𝑡
1/2
∈𝑡          (1) 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝑑𝑡𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡          (2) 
𝑟𝑡 =  (𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑞𝑡))
−1/2𝑞𝑡(𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑞𝑡))
−1/2      (3) 
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(√𝑙11,𝑡, √𝑙22,𝑡, … . , √𝑙𝑛𝑛,𝑡)       (4) 
Where 𝑥𝑡 = (𝑥1𝑡, 𝑥2𝑡 , … , 𝑥𝑛𝑡) is a vector of past observations, ℎ𝑡 is the multivariate 
conditional variance, 𝜇𝑡 = (𝜇1𝑡, 𝜇2𝑡, … , 𝜇𝑛𝑡) is the vector of conditional returns, ∈𝑡=
(∈1𝑡, ∈2𝑡 , … , ∈𝑛𝑡)  is the vector of standardized residuals, 𝑟𝑡 is an n×n symmetric dynamic 
correlations matrix and 𝑑𝑡 is a diagonal matrix of conditional standard deviations for return 
series, obtained from estimating a univariate GARCH model with  √𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡 on the ith diagonal, 
𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑛.  
The DCC specification is defined as follows; 
𝑞𝑡 =  (1 − 𝜑 − ℑ)?̅? +  ℑ𝑞𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝜓𝑖,𝑡−1𝜓𝑗,𝑡−1     (5) 
𝑟𝑡 =  𝑞𝑡
∗−1𝑞𝑡𝑞𝑡








?̅? is the unconditional correlations of  𝜓𝑖,𝑡𝜓𝑗,𝑡 and 𝜑 and ℑ are non-negative scalar parameters 
that satisfy 𝜑 + ℑ < 1. 𝑞𝑡
∗ =  [𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡
∗ ] =  √𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡 is the diagonal matrix with the square root of the 
ith diagonal element 𝑞𝑡 and its i
th diagonal position.  









1/2  (7) 
Where 𝑞𝑖𝑗 is the element on the i
th line jth column of the matrix𝑞𝑡. The parameters are 
estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood method (QMLE) introduced by Bollerslev et 













]𝑇𝑡=1      (8) 
 Where n is the number of equations, T is the number of observations, and 𝜗 is the 
vector of parameters to be estimated. The descriptive statistics and the stationarity-test results 
for the DCC series that are computed from the methodology explained in this section are 




3.2.2 The Granger causality test 
After computing the DCC series, the next step is to investigate if there is a short-run (or 
lead-lag) causal relationship between a given US uncertainty and each of the DCC series. This 
section describes the Granger causality test for US EPU only; the same procedure is repeated 
for EMU and EMV. Since each of the DCC series is viewed as the time-varying spillover 
between the US and the market involved, the interest is to examine the lead-lag relationship 
between US EPU and the pairwise stock market spillovers. To test the lead-lag connections, I 
consider the following equations; 
𝑆𝑃𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑃𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑖𝑆𝑃𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1 + ⋯ +
𝛽𝑖𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−𝑖 +  𝜖𝑡            (9) 
𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑖𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑃𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡−1 + ⋯ +
𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑃𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡−𝑖 +  𝜖𝑡                    (10) 
Where SPILL refers to the pairwise stock market spillover (DCC series) between the 
US and another stock market. That has been computed in the form of DCC from the above 
equation. US EPU refers to economic policy uncertainty in the US. The reported F-statistic is 
the Wald statistic for the joint hypothesis: 𝛽1 =  𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = ⋯ = 𝛽𝑖 = 0 
The null hypothesis is that EPU does not include Granger-cause SPILL in the first 
regression and that SPILL does not include Granger-cause EPU in the second regression. The 
selection of lags is based on Schwarz Information Criteria. The results of the first and second 




remainder of this essay, the spillover causality due to EPU, EMU, and EMV is called as 
EPU_causality, EMU_causality, and EMV_causality, respectively. 
3.2.3 Generalized variance decompositions  
Once the lead-lag relationship between US uncertainties and the pairwise stock market 
spillovers have been confirmed, the following step is to explore the extent of this relationship. 
Even though the Granger causality procedure informs us about a given US uncertainty’s causal 
effect on the stock market spillovers between the US and a foreign stock market, it does not 
tell us anything about the extent (magnitude) of this causal effect. Unless the magnitude of this 
causality is estimated, one will not be able to determine the factors that could explain the 
causality, which is the prime objective of this essay. To this end, a VAR framework is 
employed to capture the generalized forecast error variance decompositions (GVDs) of the 
spillover-series (or DCC series). However, the results obtained from the traditional Cholesky 
decomposition approach are sensitive to the order of variables (Cheung & Yuen, 2002), and 
are often considered to be biased. Therefore, this essay uses GVDs to avoid such biases. In our 
case, GVDs measure the contribution of variation in a spillover-series (DCC) explained by its 
own and a given US uncertainty, therefore, detect the significance of innovations in each 
spillover series. As a supplement to the traditional Granger (in-sample) causality test, GVDs 
are considered out-of-sample causality analysis. 
For each spillover series, I consider 𝑦𝑡 =  (𝑆𝑃𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑡, 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡) which can be represented by 
the following VAR (p) model; 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝜙𝑖
𝑝




Where 𝛼 is the vector of constants, p is the lag lengths selected by AIC, T is the 
observation number. 𝜙1, … , 𝜙𝑝 are the coefficient matrices. 𝑡 is a vector of well-defined 
disturbances with covariance 𝐸( 𝑡 𝑡
′) = ∑ = (𝜎𝑖𝑗)2×2. When the jth element of 𝑡 is shocked 
by an amount of 𝛿𝑗, then the responses of its own and other variables to this shock would be; 
𝐺𝐼(𝑛, 𝛿𝑗 , 𝛺𝑡−1) = 𝐸(𝑦𝑡+𝑛| 𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗 , 𝛺𝑡−1) − 𝐸(𝑦𝑡+𝑛|𝛺𝑡−1)            (12) 
where 𝛺𝑡−1 denotes the non-decreasing information set up to 𝑡 − 1. If 𝑡 has a 
multivariate normal distribution, I have; 
𝐸( 𝑡| 𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗) = (𝜎1𝑗 , 𝜎2𝑗)𝜎𝑗𝑗
−1𝛿𝑗 = ∑ 𝑒𝑗𝜎𝑗𝑗
−1𝛿𝑗             (13) 
where 𝑒𝑗 is the selection vector with unity as its j-th element and zero otherwise. By 
setting 𝛿𝑗 = √𝜎𝑗𝑗 , the generalized impulse response of the effect of this one standard deviation 





, 𝑛 = 0,1,2, …,             (14) 
where 𝐴𝑛 = 𝜙1𝐴𝑛−1 + 𝜙2𝐴𝑛−2 + ⋯ + 𝜙𝑝𝐴𝑛−𝑝 , 𝑛 = 1,2,3, … , 𝐴0 = 𝐼, 𝐴𝑛 =
0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛 < 0. 
These generalized responses can be used to calculate the forecast error variance 
decompositions, define as the proportion of the n-step ahead forecast error variance of i-th 
















 , 𝑛 = 0,1,2, …,               (15) 
The results of the generalized variance decomposition, 𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑔(𝑛), provide the optimal 
measure of the amount of variation in the i-th variable attributed by the innovations of j-th 
variable that would result from different possible orderings of the variables in VAR, thus 
according to Pesaran and Shin (1998) in general ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑔(𝑛) ≠ 1.2𝑗=1  The variance decomposition 
results are presented in Table 3-7. Throughout the rest of this essay, the variance 
decompositions due to a given US uncertainty is called spillover vulnerably (SV). More 
specifically, the spillover vulnerability due to EPU, EMU, and EMV is named as SV_EPU, 
SV_EMU, and SV_EMV, respectively. 
3.2.4 Cross-sectional determinants 
As the reader will notice later in section 3.3.5, Table 3-7 exhibits considerable 
variability across countries for each of SV_EPU, SV_EMU, and SV_EMV. Given this variation in 
SV findings, one would wonder what makes the stock market spillovers in some countries more 
prone to a given US uncertainty than in others. As indicated by the literature (Trung, 2019; 
Georgiadis, 2016; Mishkin, 2006), the variation around SV magnitude could well be explained 
by some country-characteristics. Following this literature, a set of country-specific factors as 
explanatory variables are considered and used in the following cross-sectional regression, 
while the dependent variables are the SV estimates given in Table 3-7;  
SV_𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑖 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐷𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖          (16) 




SV_𝐸𝑀𝑉_𝑖 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐷𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖          (18) 
In Eq. (16)-(18), SV_𝐸𝑃𝑈_𝑖, SV_𝐸𝑀𝑈_𝑖, and SV_𝐸𝑀𝑉_𝑖 represent spillover vulnerability due 
to EPU, EMU, and EMV, respectively. 𝑇𝑂𝑖 denotes a country’s trade openness with the US. 
𝐹𝑂𝑖, 𝐷𝐵𝑖 , 𝐹𝐼𝑖, and 𝑀𝐷𝑖 indicate the measures for financial openness, debt burden, fiscal 
imbalance, and stock market development of a country, respectively. The results of the 
regression are presented in Table 3-8. 
3.3 Dataset and results   
3.3.1 Data 
To assess the role of US uncertainties in driving the global stock market spillovers, I 
consider a broad range of stock markets. Monthly data on 38 equity markets from across the 
world are collected from the Thomson Reuter’s Datastream over a period from January 1995 
to December 201821. The equity markets are chosen based on the MSCI classification of stock 
markets, given the availability of data. Over the same period, the data on three US uncertainties 
(EPU, EMU, and EMV) are download from the economic policy uncertainty website 
(https://www.policyuncertainty.com/). Data on country-specific variables, namely trade 
openness with the US, the central government's debt, budget deficit, and stock market 
capitalization, are gathered from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. In this 
essay, the financial openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008) is also used, which is downloaded 
 
21 We use MSCI classification of stock markets and select only those markets from each class for which US dollar 
indices are available on Datasteam. The appendix (Table 3-9) provided at the end contains the full list of stock 




from their website (http://Ib.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_Ibsite.htm). The appendix (Table 3-9) 
provided at the end lists the details of the data and their sources.  
The data period covers a sufficiently long history during which many important events 
took place, and most of them had repercussions at both a regional and global scale. Such events 
include the 1997 South Asian financial crisis, the 2000 dot-com bubble in the US, the 2007 
subprime mortgage crisis, the 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the 2010 European debt 
crisis, and the 2015 stock market crash in China.  
The three different uncertainty indicators used in this essay are constructed from 
information contained in newspapers. The EPU index used in this essay is created by Baker et 
al. (2016) through an analysis of newspaper articles containing terms related to economic 
policy uncertainty. For this purpose, they select 10 large newspapers (USA Today, the Miami 
Herald, the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Boston Globe, 
the San Francisco Chronicle, the Dallas Morning News, the Houston Chronicle, and the WSJ). 
To construct the index, they perform monthly searches of each newspaper for terms related to 
economic and policy uncertainty. In particular, they search for articles containing the term 
'uncertainty' or 'uncertain', the terms 'economic' or 'economy' and one or more of the following 
terms: 'congress', 'legislation', 'white house', 'regulation', 'federal reserve', or 'deficit'. The article 
counts are further scaled, standardized, and normalized with a mean of 100 to obtain the final 
index over a period from January 1985 to the present. Following the same method, the authors 




and similarities between the three uncertainty indices can be noticed by looking at the term sets 
used to construct each index22.  
For the EMU index, the authors of Baker et al. (2016) consider a wide range of US 
newspaper and obtain daily counts of articles containing the term 'uncertainty' or 'uncertain', 
the terms 'economic' or 'economy' and one or more of the following terms: 'equity market', 
'equity price', 'stock market', or 'stock price'. A monthly series of this daily series is used in this 
analysis.  
Using the same approach, Baker, Bloom, Davis, and Kost (2019) have recently created 
a news-based EMV tracker that moves VIX and with the realized volatility of returns on the 
S&P 500. To do that, they select eleven major U.S. newspapers, namely the Boston Globe, 
Chicago Tribune, Dallas Morning News, Houston Chronicle, Los Angeles Times, Miami 
Herald, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, USA Today, Wall Street Journal, and 
Washington Post. To construct their overall EMV tracker, they specify terms in three sets as 
follows: the terms ‘economic’, ‘economy’, and ‘financial’ refer to the economy;  the terms 
‘stock market’, ‘equity’, ‘equities’, and ‘Standards & Poor’s’ (and their variants) refer to 
market; while the terms ‘volatility’, ‘volatile’, ‘uncertain’, ‘uncertainty’, ‘risk’, and ‘risky’ 
reflect volatility in the equity market.  
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 3-1 and 3-2 present the descriptive statistics for the stock market indices and the 
US uncertainties, respectively. Table 3-1 also indicates the MSCI classification of the stock 
 
22 Interested readers may refer to the economic policy uncertainty website (https://www.policyuncertainty.com/) 




markets. Note that, in general, stock markets that yield higher mean returns are also 
(unsurprisingly) the ones with higher risk. Most of the return series are negatively skewed, and 
the significant value of Jarque-Berra (J.B.) statistics in most cases indicates the series are not 
normally distributed. Finally, the results of unit root tests, namely the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (Said and Dickey, 1984) and Phillips–Perron (Phillips & Perron, 1988), indicate that the 
stock price indices are not stationary. However, they become stationary when differenced, and 
thus their return series are used in our analysis. 
On the other hand, the unit root test results given in Table 3-2 show that all three 
uncertainty-series are not only stationary at level but also when transformed into log-level 
form, suggesting that original uncertainty indexes can be used for conducting the empirical 
analysis. Also, notice that while EPU has the highest mean (116.24) value among three 
uncertainties, EMU exhibits the highest amount of standard deviation (59.47), which is 
understandable as uncertainty concerns about the stock market tend to fluctuate more than those 
about the whole economy. EMV, However, produces the lowest mean value and standard 





Table 3-1 Descriptive statistics of monthly stock market returns 
 
Classification Country Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. J.B. 
Developed 
Australia 0.43 15.77 -31.89 5.93 -0.95 6.28 176.58*** 
Austria 0.28 16.10 -42.32 6.38 -1.60 11.29 971.08*** 
Belgium 0.42 14.51 -39.80 5.64 -1.70 11.89 1112.33*** 
Canada 0.58 18.24 -31.14 5.57 -1.09 7.45 301.09*** 
Denmark 0.75 17.00 -30.87 5.50 -1.12 7.60 322.43*** 
Finland 0.52 25.93 -33.93 7.89 -0.45 5.05 61.63*** 
France 0.47 13.61 -24.68 5.68 -0.72 4.43 50.74*** 
Germany 0.36 17.42 -23.36 5.94 -0.78 4.80 69.42*** 
Hong Kong 0.43 24.82 -34.66 6.84 -0.51 6.10 131.32*** 
Ireland 0.39 17.62 -27.96 6.06 -1.17 6.49 216.23*** 
Italy 0.19 19.24 -26.92 6.66 -0.39 3.79 15.08*** 
Japan 0.01 14.36 -14.59 4.96 -0.07 3.15 0.50 
Netherland 0.36 14.68 -37.59 5.94 -1.58 9.79 690.64*** 
New Zealand 0.43 14.60 -21.09 5.61 -0.69 4.20 40.92*** 
Norway 0.44 17.02 -37.02 7.24 -1.28 8.03 392.27*** 
Poland 0.33 31.79 -40.69 9.32 -0.46 5.30 75.57*** 
Portugal 0.08 16.10 -33.35 6.22 -0.79 5.48 106.44*** 
Singapore 0.22 23.23 -30.75 6.51 -0.51 6.14 134.43*** 
South Korea 0.25 53.38 -38.87 10.01 0.21 6.92 190.94*** 
Spain 0.40 17.42 -25.99 6.41 -0.56 4.38 38.84*** 
Sweden 0.59 19.90 -30.81 6.81 -0.63 5.15 76.66*** 
Switzerland 0.58 14.31 -17.05 4.55 -0.69 4.31 44.22*** 
UK 0.27 13.35 -22.96 4.61 -0.72 5.48 101.40*** 
USA 0.66 10.61 -19.11 4.35 -0.90 4.73 76.93*** 
Advanced  
Emerging  
Brazil 0.36 32.85 -40.86 10.24 -0.65 5.05 72.56*** 
Greece -0.34 26.94 -41.37 9.94 -0.73 4.49 53.62*** 
Malaysia 0.06 37.77 -35.92 7.61 -0.24 9.28 488.24*** 
Mexico 0.47 19.31 -39.61 7.61 -1.31 7.62 347.36*** 
South Africa 0.34 17.77 -43.83 7.88 -1.13 7.18 278.19*** 
Taiwan 0.11 24.72 -25.39 7.38 -0.06 4.24 19.14*** 
Thailand 0.08 33.98 -39.91 9.69 -0.50 6.12 131.98*** 
Turkey 0.31 53.25 -52.78 13.69 -0.33 5.29 69.45*** 
Secondary  
Emerging 
Chile 0.20 16.32 -27.73 6.07 -0.67 5.62 106.33*** 
China 0.46 39.16 -31.16 9.54 0.05 4.68 35.00*** 
Indonesia 0.16 44.39 -53.33 10.99 -0.71 7.28 249.79*** 
Philippines 0.15 39.46 -31.86 7.48 -0.19 7.43 242.67*** 
Frontier 
Argentina -0.05 28.77 -37.09 10.14 -0.68 4.70 58.05*** 
Venezuela -0.58 100.29 -310.64 32.99 -4.69 41.11 18933.33*** 
Notes: The table provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for monthly returns (in percentage) of the 
equity market indices. The monthly average, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, 
and J.B. are denoted by Mean, Max., Min., Std. Dev., Skew., Kurt.,and Jerque-Berra test statistic, 
respectively. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The equity markets 




Table 3-2 Descriptive statistics of US uncertainties 
  EPU EMU EMV 
DF-GLS -2.29** -2.42** -7.92*** 
PP -8.32*** -8.26*** -9.01*** 
Mean 116.24 66.31 20.88 
Med. 106.16 46.55 18.75 
Max. 284.14 496.34 69.84 
Min. 44.78 13.11 9.57 
Std. Dev. 46.17 59.47 8.03 
Skew. 1.11 2.94 2.31 
Kurt. 4.12 15.1 11.03 
J.B. 76.22*** 2224.66*** 1055.63*** 
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Obs. 288 288 288 
Notes: The table provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for monthly series of three US uncertainties, 
namely economic policy uncertainty (EPU), equity market uncertainty (EMU), and equity market volatility 
(EMV). The monthly average, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, J.B., 
Prob., and Obs. are denoted by Mean, Med., Max., Min., Std. Dev., Skew., Kurt., Jarque-Berra test statistic, 
P-value, and number observations, respectively. Two stationarity test, DF-GLS test of Elliott, Rothenberg, 
and Stock (1996) and Phillips and Perron (1988)’s test, are adopted for testing the null hypothesis of a unit 
root in the series. The intercept is included in the testing equation, and the lag length of the unit root models 
is selected by using the Schwarz information criterion. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
3.3.3 Pairwise stock market spillovers 
As mentioned earlier in the methodology section, the estimation of the pairwise stock 
market spillovers is performed between the US and every other stock market. These spillover-
series are computed using the DCC model, which provides us 38 DCC series in total. Table 3-
3 reports the descriptive statistics for the DCC series. Note that, in general, the dynamic 
conditional correlations between the US and other developed markets are higher than those for 
emerging and frontier markets, where the strongest (weakest) correlation is found for the UK 
(Venezuela). The strength of correlations tends to decrease as we move from developed to the 
frontier markets. In other words, the magnitude of spillovers becomes weaker with decreasing 
the level of market development. With few exceptions, a similar pattern is observed for 
variation (measured by standard deviation) of the DCC series. The non-normality and negative 
skewness of the series can also be witnessed from the table. Finally, Table 3-4 shows that DF-




most of the spillover series are stationary, and therefore are suitable for the Granger causality 
test.  
Table 3-3 Descriptive statistics of pairwise stock market spillovers (DCC series) 
Region Country Mean Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. Skew. Kurt. J.B. Obs. 
Developed 
Australia 0.67 0.89 0.39 0.12 -0.10 2.11 10.18** 288.00 
Austria 0.58 0.83 0.21 0.14 -0.13 2.32 6.52** 288.00 
Belgium 0.63 0.85 0.37 0.12 -0.20 2.20 9.99** 288.00 
Canada 0.76 0.86 0.55 0.06 -0.22 2.46 5.98* 288.00 
Denmark 0.65 0.81 0.38 0.09 -0.44 2.93 9.60** 288.00 
Finland 0.67 0.81 0.47 0.08 -0.16 2.55 3.84 288.00 
France 0.73 0.91 0.31 0.11 -0.87 3.75 44.13*** 288.00 
Germany 0.74 0.90 0.02 0.13 -2.06 9.25 688.80*** 288.00 
Hong Kong 0.64 0.80 0.37 0.05 -0.78 5.47 104.95*** 288.00 
Ireland 0.68 0.90 0.21 0.12 -0.91 4.40 64.52*** 288.00 
Italy 0.63 0.89 0.32 0.13 -0.04 2.54 2.72 288.00 
Japan 0.51 0.79 0.19 0.14 -0.01 2.35 5.18* 288.00 
Netherland 0.76 0.90 0.50 0.08 -0.31 2.55 7.34** 288.00 
New Zealand 0.56 0.74 0.25 0.11 -0.25 2.44 7.03** 288.00 
Norway 0.65 0.83 0.41 0.10 -0.22 2.34 7.87** 288.00 
Poland 0.55 0.82 0.08 0.13 -0.36 3.47 9.01** 288.00 
Portugal 0.53 0.77 0.28 0.10 0.00 2.66 1.43 288.00 
Singapore 0.61 0.75 0.50 0.07 0.70 2.32 29.66*** 288.00 
South Korea 0.53 0.79 0.12 0.16 -0.45 2.50 13.13*** 288.00 
Spain 0.66 0.82 0.45 0.07 -0.54 3.59 18.44*** 288.00 
Sweden 0.74 0.89 0.43 0.09 -0.64 3.20 20.75*** 288.00 
Switzerland 0.67 0.80 0.37 0.10 -0.76 2.85 28.69*** 288.00 
UK 0.76 0.90 0.46 0.09 -0.77 3.31 30.59*** 288.00 
Advanced 
Emerging  
Brazil 0.55 0.75 0.09 0.12 -0.91 4.49 67.83*** 288.00 
Greece 0.52 0.86 0.07 0.14 -0.23 3.37 4.21 288.00 
Malaysia 0.45 0.60 0.31 0.06 0.42 2.59 10.71*** 288.00 
Mexico 0.63 0.83 0.28 0.14 -0.88 2.68 39.70*** 288.00 
South Africa 0.55 0.74 0.37 0.08 0.57 2.49 19.37*** 288.00 
Taiwan 0.55 0.74 0.29 0.11 -0.29 2.11 13.96*** 288.00 
Thailand 0.46 0.66 0.25 0.05 -0.09 5.72 91.22*** 288.00 
Turkey 0.45 0.65 0.11 0.12 -0.82 3.20 33.87*** 288.00 
Secondary 
Emerging 
Chile 0.51 0.62 0.37 0.05 -0.53 2.73 14.80*** 288.00 
China 0.41 0.76 -0.01 0.18 -0.14 2.18 9.24*** 288.00 
Indonesia 0.43 0.73 0.18 0.08 0.36 4.06 20.25*** 288.00 
Philippines 0.43 0.51 0.32 0.04 -0.06 2.53 2.93 288.00 
Frontier 
Argentina 0.41 0.61 0.26 0.06 0.35 4.12 21.31*** 288.00 
Venezuela 0.08 0.83 -0.66 0.17 0.20 7.40 240.13*** 288.00 
Notes: The table provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for dynamic conditional correlation (DCC 
series) between the US and a given stock market. The monthly average, maximum, minimum, standard 
deviation, skewness, kurtosis, J.B., and Obs. are denoted by Mean, Max., Min., Std. Dev., Skew., Kurt., 
Jerque-Berra test statistic, and number observations, respectively. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 





Table 3-4 Unit root test for the pairwise stock market spillover series (DCC series) 
  DF-GLS PP 
Region Country Intercept Intercept Intercept and trend 
Developed 
Australia -2.95*** -3.83*** -4.10*** 
Austria -2.02** -1.92 -3.83*** 
Belgium -1.90* -1.79 -3.64*** 
Canada -3.97*** -4.18*** -4.19*** 
Denmark -2.13** -2.16 -3.47*** 
Finland -2.46** -2.22 -3.20*** 
France -2.41** -2.54 -3.91*** 
Germany -3.05*** -3.06*** -3.42*** 
Hong Kong -5.40*** -6.66*** -6.68*** 
Ireland -4.39*** -4.43*** -4.42*** 
Italy -2.59*** -2.66*** -4.92*** 
Japan -2.74*** -2.77*** -3.63*** 
Netherland -2.55** -2.54 -3.14*** 
New Zealand -1.90* -1.90 -3.26*** 
Norway -2.94*** -3.13*** -3.19*** 
Poland -2.69*** -3.07*** -3.34*** 
Portugal -2.66*** -2.83*** -3.62*** 
Singapore -2.35** -2.24 -3.60*** 
South Korea -2.53** -2.55 -3.94*** 
Spain -4.59*** -4.88*** -4.88*** 
Sweden -2.45** -2.50 -3.21*** 
Switzerland -1.62 -1.61 -3.60*** 
UK -2.42** -2.68*** -4.82*** 
Advanced Emerging  
Brazil -1.09 -0.81 -0.57 
Greece -3.19*** -3.25*** -3.49*** 
Malaysia -2.23** -2.12 -4.76*** 
Mexico -2.20** -2.28 -4.25*** 
South Africa -1.95** -2.43 -3.46*** 
Taiwan -1.56 -1.75 -3.74*** 
Thailand -4.97*** -5.43*** -5.52*** 
Turkey -1.29 -1.15 -3.90*** 
Secondary Emerging 
Chile -2.50** -2.67*** -3.67*** 
China -2.15** -2.09 -3.59*** 
Indonesia -5.77*** -6.52*** -6.51*** 
Philippines -2.31** -2.36 -4.66*** 
Frontier 
Argentina -2.98*** -2.98*** -3.38*** 
Venezuela -0.96 -15.04*** -15.02*** 
Notes: The table provides a summary of the unit root tests applied to test the stationarity of dynamic 
conditional correlation (DCC series) between the US and a given stock market. Two unit-root tests, the DF-
GLS test of Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) and Phillips and Perron (1988)’s test, are adopted for testing 
the null hypothesis of a unit root in the series. The intercept is included in the testing equation, and the lag 
length of the unit root models is selected by using the Schwarz information criterion. *, **, and *** indicate 





3.3.4 Results of the Granger causality test 
Once the diagnostic checking of the spillover and the three US uncertainty series is 
confirmed, the next step is to test whether the US uncertainties lead the spillovers between the 
US and other stock markets, or the vice versa is true. The results of the Granger causality test 
are reported in Tables 3-5 and 3-6. Table 3-5 includes the results of the causality from the three 
US uncertainties to stock market spillovers (Eq.(10)), while Table 3-6 shows the results of 
causality in the opposite direction (Eq.(11)). It is evident from Table 3-5 that the three US 
uncertainties strongly lead the stock market spillovers. That is, EPU_causality, 
EMU_causality, and EMV_causality are all found to be highly significant. The causal effect is 
not only consistent for three uncertainty indicators but across countries and classification. Put 
differently, the news-based uncertainties in the US lead international stock market spillovers, 
regardless of the uncertainty type. While F-statistics does not say anything about the strength 
of causality, it should be noted that as we move from EPU to EMV, the F-statistic increases in 
scale. It could mean that EMV is much more influential in generating spillovers on the stock 
market and is preceded by EMU and EPU, respectively. Nonetheless, this conclusion should 





Table 3-5 Results of Granger-causality test 
Cause=>   EPU EMU EMV 
Class Country F-Statistic P-Value F-Statistic P-Value F-Statistic P-Value 
Developed 
Australia 14.71*** 0.00 15.21*** 0.00 30.08*** 0.00 
Austria 5.24** 0.02 10.60*** 0.00 23.97*** 0.00 
Belgium 4.94** 0.03 16.93*** 0.00 19.11*** 0.00 
Canada 15.22*** 0.00 15.64*** 0.00 31.61*** 0.00 
Denmark 8.58*** 0.00 13.77*** 0.00 18.54*** 0.00 
Finland 2.36 0.12 1.88 0.17 6.81** 0.01 
France 3.70* 0.05 12.87*** 0.00 16.41*** 0.00 
Germany 7.39** 0.01 22.60*** 0.00 21.32*** 0.00 
Hong Kong 9.95*** 0.00 7.93** 0.01 14.05*** 0.00 
Ireland 6.03** 0.01 10.88*** 0.00 16.69*** 0.00 
Italy 5.75** 0.02 13.22*** 0.00 19.40*** 0.00 
Japan 9.47*** 0.00 14.14*** 0.00 31.08*** 0.00 
Netherland 5.18** 0.02 7.92** 0.01 8.21*** 0.00 
New Zealand 9.28*** 0.00 11.35*** 0.00 21.56*** 0.00 
Norway 21.60*** 0.00 24.39*** 0.00 24.54*** 0.00 
Poland 4.36** 0.04 8.57*** 0.00 21.68*** 0.00 
Portugal 9.96*** 0.00 13.84*** 0.00 23.64*** 0.00 
Singapore 14.36*** 0.00 13.40*** 0.00 27.62*** 0.00 
South Korea 7.42** 0.01 15.27*** 0.00 22.95*** 0.00 
Spain 10.70*** 0.00 26.36*** 0.00 36.35*** 0.00 
Sweden 10.13*** 0.00 13.37*** 0.00 10.57*** 0.00 
Switzerland 7.43** 0.01 16.06*** 0.00 20.43*** 0.00 
UK 9.00*** 0.00 15.72*** 0.00 25.62*** 0.00 
Advanced 
Emerging  
Brazil 10.60*** 0.00 9.76*** 0.00 15.87*** 0.00 
Greece 14.31*** 0.00 26.24*** 0.00 31.58*** 0.00 
Malaysia 2.58 0.11 8.21*** 0.00 14.05*** 0.00 
Mexico 0.39 0.53 8.05*** 0.00 17.40*** 0.00 
South Africa 3.64* 0.06 10.25*** 0.00 21.60*** 0.00 
Taiwan 9.51*** 0.00 14.98*** 0.00 20.56*** 0.00 
Thailand 16.23*** 0.00 15.06*** 0.00 20.54*** 0.00 
Turkey 10.16*** 0.00 17.22*** 0.00 17.75*** 0.00 
Secondary 
Emerging 
Chile 12.52*** 0.00 19.61*** 0.00 28.01*** 0.00 
China 11.24*** 0.00 6.44** 0.01 17.54*** 0.00 
Indonesia 5.18** 0.02 4.25** 0.04 21.23*** 0.00 
Philippines 5.15** 0.02 6.37*** 0.01 19.17*** 0.00 
Frontier 
Argentina 11.86*** 0.00 11.01*** 0.00 22.55*** 0.00 
Venezuela 0.31 0.58 0.29 0.59 0.02 0.90 
Notes: The table provides the results of the Granger-causality test run between a given US uncertainty and the 
pairwise spillovers between the and a given stock market. Specifically, this table includes the results of Eq. 
(9). The reported F-statistics are the Wald statistics for the following null hypothesis: a given US uncertainty 
does not granger cause pairwise stock market spillover. The selection of appropriate lags is mad through 





Table 3-6 Results of Granger-causality test 
 
Caused=>  EPU EMU EMV 
Class Country F-Statistic P-Value F-Statistic P-Value F-Statistic P-Value 
Developed 
Australia 3.93 0.05 0.00 0.97 0.04 0.85 
Austria 0.29 0.59 4.08** 0.04 0.10 0.76 
Belgium 0.44 0.51 5.58** 0.02 2.01 0.16 
Canada 8.19*** 0.00 1.08 0.30 0.47 0.49 
Denmark 0.92 0.34 0.02 0.89 0.43 0.51 
Finland 0.71 0.40 0.81 0.37 0.21 0.65 
France 0.81 0.37 0.00 0.97 0.32 0.57 
Germany 0.07 0.79 0.10 0.75 1.12 0.29 
Hong Kong 3.18* 0.08 0.91 0.34 0.06 0.81 
Ireland 2.71 0.10 0.20 0.65 1.27 0.26 
Italy 0.92 0.34 0.06 0.81 0.01 0.92 
Japan 8.87*** 0.00 0.85 0.36 0.43 0.51 
Netherland 0.06 0.80 2.11 0.15 4.36** 0.04 
New Zealand 2.06 0.15 0.15 0.69 0.28 0.60 
Norway 1.18 0.28 0.37 0.54 1.76 0.19 
Poland 0.04 0.83 1.72 0.19 0.87 0.35 
Portugal 2.69 0.10 0.08 0.78 0.00 0.98 
Singapore 1.32 0.25 0.25 0.62 0.21 0.65 
South Korea 2.68 0.10 0.90 0.34 0.18 0.67 
Spain 0.58 0.45 0.02 0.88 0.58 0.44 
Sweden 0.00 0.99 0.98 0.32 2.95* 0.09 
Switzerland 1.01 0.32 6.59** 0.01 8.26*** 0.00 
UK 5.71** 0.02 1.85 0.17 0.01 0.93 
Advanced 
Emerging  
Brazil 0.05 0.81 0.00 0.95 1.09 0.30 
Greece 0.25 0.62 1.67 0.20 0.78 0.38 
Malaysia 0.00 0.97 4.10** 0.04 3.16* 0.08 
Mexico 1.00 0.32 0.65 0.42 0.23 0.63 
South Africa 0.98 0.32 0.79 0.37 0.14 0.71 
Taiwan 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.43 2.22 0.14 
Thailand 2.05 0.15 0.27 0.60 0.02 0.88 
Turkey 0.29 0.59 0.23 0.63 1.09 0.30 
Secondary 
Emerging 
Chile 0.09 0.77 0.22 0.64 1.01 0.32 
China 0.31 0.58 5.67** 0.02 1.59 0.21 
Indonesia 0.44 0.51 2.26 0.13 0.58 0.45 
Philippines 3.43* 0.06 0.01 0.91 0.04 0.85 
Frontier 
Argentina 0.29 0.59 2.83** 0.09 0.30 0.58 
Venezuela 0.67 0.41 1.21 0.27 0.90 0.34 
Notes:  The table provides the results of the Granger-causality test run between a given US uncertainty and 
the pairwise spillovers between the and a given stock market. Specifically, this table includes the results of 
Eq. (10). The reported F-statistics are Wald statistics for the following null hypothesis: a given pairwise stock 
market spillover does not granger cause US uncertainty.  The selection of appropriate lags is mad through 




Turning to the findings shown in Table 3-6, note that in the reverse direction, i.e., from 
stock market spillovers to US uncertainties, hardly any causality was found, which is consistent 
with the literature (Tsai, 2017; Liow, Liao, & Huang, 2018) as well as common understanding. 
Finally, it is reiterated that our causality results are based on F-statistic, which informs us about 
whether there is causality or not. More precisely, while it captures the existence of causality 
from the US uncertainties to the stock market spillovers, it tells nothing about the extent of this 
causality. The ultimate objective of this essay is not just to point out the existence of causality, 
but it is to uncover what determines this causality. For this purpose, there needs to be a measure 
that can provide the extent of the causality and can further help explore its determinants.  
3.3.5 Results of variance decompositions  
As outlined in the methodology section, the generalized forecast variance 
decompositions (GVD), named as SV, are used within the VAR system to capture the 
magnitude of causality from the EPU, EMU, and EMV to the international stock market 
spillovers. Accordingly, SV_EPU, SV_EMU, and SV_EMV represent the contribution of EPU, 
EMU, and EMV to the spillover variation in international stock markets, respectively. Table 3-
7 shows the results23 for SV_EPU, SV_EMU, and SV_EMV. The results support the previous 
findings that were obtained through the granger causality test. The results provided in columns 
(1)-(3) indicate that followed SV_EMU and SV_EPU; the magnitude of SV_EMV is the largest for 
the global stock markets. 
 
23 We compute the GVDs for 3,6, and 12 month forecast horizons, but obtain similar results. To achieve brevity, 
we report the results with 12 month forecast horizon only. Results with other forecast horizons may be provided 















Australia 9.43 10.77 21.02 
Austria 1.85 5.85 21.89 
Belgium 2.73 11.54 19.91 
Canada 12.11 13.39 21.73 
Denmark 6.12 13.67 18.24 
Finland 2.17 4.72 11.07 
France 2.31 12.74 18.36 
Germany 3.93 17.58 18.33 
Hong Kong 6.85 6.16 9.52 
Ireland 6.13 10.26 18.19 
Italy 2.92 10.64 17.34 
Japan 6.82 11.25 23.24 
Netherland 4.81 10.76 11.03 
New Zealand 4.44 6.85 18.68 
Norway 12.26 18.64 19.65 
Poland 2.84 8.81 19.97 
Portugal 6.42 11.41 17.73 
Singapore 7.58 6.48 16.58 
South Korea 3.60 6.88 13.06 
Spain 4.97 16.10 24.31 
Sweden 7.96 15.03 11.24 
Switzerland 4.30 13.34 18.77 
UK 5.96 12.84 22.11 
Advanced Emerging  
Brazil 5.20 12.30 17.11 
Greece 5.70 12.42 21.83 
Malaysia 0.90 3.94 11.82 
Mexico 0.14 6.32 18.35 
South Africa 1.91 7.52 17.94 
Taiwan 5.16 8.91 16.44 
Thailand 6.46 6.59 12.30 
Turkey 6.21 13.98 16.80 
Secondary Emerging 
Chile 4.44 15.03 22.88 
China 7.05 3.09 13.42 
Indonesia 3.03 1.52 13.15 
Philippines 3.84 5.71 15.92 
Frontier 
Argentina 5.54 8.25 15.28 
Venezuela 0.49 1.28 0.12 
Notes: The table shows the share of generalized variance decompositions (GVDs) of the pairwise 
spillovers (DCC series) that are due to the shocks to a given US uncertainty. Obtained from the VAR 
model, the reported magnitudes of the GVDs are computed at a 12-month forecast horizon. The selection 
of appropriate lags is mad through Schwartz Information Criteria. I also compute GVDs at a shorter 
forecast horizon but end up obtaining similar results. Although not reported due to space consideration, 
those results may be obtained on request. SV refers to spillover vulnerability, while SV_EPU, SV_EMU, and 




More specifically, the extent of SV due to EMV, given in column (3) is generally higher 
than that in column (2), indicating the SV due to EMU is the second largest, while that due to 
EPU is relatively the smallest for the stock markets around the world. However, regardless of 
the uncertainty type, the SV results show substantial variation across our sample countries. In 
general, after controlling for the stock market correlation, stock market spillovers for some 
countries appear to be more vulnerable to the US uncertainties than others. Motivated by the 
variation in SV results, I undertake the further exploration of country characteristics that can 
explain this variation.  
3.3.6 Cross-sectional regression results 
A cross-sectional regression is employed to explore the determinants of SV from US 
uncertainties (SV_EPU, SV_EMU, and SV_EMV). Inspired by the current literature on the global 
effects of EPU, a set of country-specific factors as explanatory variables are considered in the 
regression, while the dependent variable being the estimates of SV_EPU, SV_EMU, and SV_EMV 
given in Table 3-7. The country-specific explanatory variables include a country’s trade 
openness with the US (𝑇𝑂𝑖), financial openness (𝐹𝑂𝑖), debt burden (𝐷𝐵𝑖), fiscal imbalance 
(𝐹𝐼𝑖), and level of stock market development (𝑀𝐷𝑖). The results of our cross-sectional 
regression are provided in Table 3-8, where Newy-West HAC is applied to obtain robust 
standard errors that account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in data. 
The second, third, and fourth columns of Table 3-8 display the coefficients of 
explanatory variables when the dependent variables, SV_EPU, SV_EMU, and SV_EMV, that 




Table 3-8 Determinants of spillover vulnerability (SV) of the pairwise stock market spillovers 
In Table 3-8, column (1) shows that the coefficient of financial openness (𝐹𝑂𝑖) is 1.11, 
which is significant at 5 percent. It implies that a unit increase in financial openness, as 
measured by the financial openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008), increases SV_EPU by 1.11 
percent. In other words, the susceptibility of a country’s stock market to US EPU is 
significantly driven by the degree of financial openness in that country. Similarly, at 5 percent 
significance, a percentage increase in a country’s trade openness with the US (𝑇𝑂𝑖) increases 
SV_EPU by 1.59 percent. This result indicates that the more a country trades with the US, the 
more US EPU-sensitive its stock market becomes. Likewise, the rising fiscal imbalance of a 
country also makes the stock market spillovers of that country more responsive to US EPU. 
More precisely, with a 5 percent significance, a percentage24 rise in fiscal imbalance (𝐹𝐼𝑖) of a 
country increases SV_EPU by 0.14 percent. 
 








Intercept 3.60** 7.12*** 11.58*** 
 (1.47) (1.93) (2.60) 
FO_i 1.11** 1.77** 2.34*** 
 (0.40) (0.64) (0.78) 
TO_i 1.59** 2.44* 4.34*** 
 (0.68) (1.23) (1.43) 
DB_i 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
FI_i 0.14** -0.11 -0.07 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.12) 
MD_i -0.01* -0.02** -0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
R-squared 24% 27% 46% 
No. of observations 37 37 37 
Notes:  The table reports the results of cross-sectional regression, given in Eq. (16), with HAC robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. SV_EPU, SV_EMU, and SV_EMV indicate dependent variables in Eq. (16) 
repressing spillover vulnerability (SV) due to EPU, EMU, and EMV, respectively. FO_i, TO_i, DB_i, FI_i, 
MD_i, respectively denote explanatory variables, namely financial openness, trade openness with the US, 
debt burden, fiscal imbalance, and stock market development. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 




On the other hand, the level of stock market development, as measured by stock market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP, seems to hinder or mitigate SV_EPU. Note the coefficient 
of market development (𝑀𝐷𝑖) is -0.01, which is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. 
It suggests that a percentage increase in the level of a country’s stock market development leads 
to a 0.01 percent decrease in SV_EPU. In other words, improving development levels of stock 
markets in our sample countries tend to hinder the EPU shocks coming from the US to their 
stock markets.  
The results for EMU and EMV are presented respectively in columns (2) and (3) of 
Table 3-8. Notice that, while fiscal imbalance loses its significance in both the columns, the 
results for the previously significant variables – financial openness, trade openness with the 
US, and stock market development – continue to hold. Interestingly, the coefficient for EMU, 
in column (2), is stronger than before and becomes strongest for EMV. 
Overall, the results obtained through the cross-sectional regression suggest that the 
vulnerability of an international stock market from the US uncertainties depends upon certain 
country-characteristics. Higher degrees of financial openness, trade openness with the US, and 
fiscal imbalance makes the country’s stock markets more vulnerable to US uncertainties. 
Countries with improving levels of stock market development, on the other hand, are better 
prepared to mitigate their stock market’s vulnerability to US uncertainties. 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
This essay examined the role of US uncertainties in driving the spillovers between the 
US and international stock markets. A wide variety of stock markets around the world and three 




GARCH model was employed to compute the time-varying spillovers between the US and 
each stock market in our sample, which was followed by a linear Granger causality test to see 
whether US uncertainties cause these pairwise spillovers. The magnitude of this causality was 
ascertained through the generalized variance decomposition analysis within the VAR 
framework. Substantial heterogeneity was found among our variance decomposition results, 
which was explained by certain country-characteristics. I found that a higher degree of financial 
openness, trade openness with the US, and fiscal imbalance of a country exacerbate its stock 
market’s vulnerability to US uncertainties, while the more developed stock markets seem to 
mitigate their exposure to the uncertainty shocks.  
The essay offers important implications for investors and policymakers. First, several 
studies support the view that countries with a higher degree of trade openness are generally 
more likely to grow faster. However, a country’s trade openness with a specific trading partner 
could make the country’s economy, and thus its financial markets, more integrated with that of 
the trading partner. Trade openness with a given trading partner could, therefore, have 
implications for the stock of a country. In this regard, our results suggest that despite academic 
evidence of its potential gains to the economy as a whole, trade openness with a specific 
country, and particularly that with a large economy such as the US, could well amplify the 
stock market spillovers that are due to economic and financial uncertainty of the partner 
country. That would further mean that when it comes to trade openness, countries should strive 
for trade diversification as much as to avoid their bilateral trade of becoming too concentrated 
on a few trading partners. In this way, trade diversification may allow countries to preserve the 
benefits of trade openness while, at the same time, minimizing their stock markets’ exposure 




Our findings also suggest a similar amplification role played by higher levels of 
financial openness and fiscal imbalances (only significant in the case of SV_EPU) in the 
countries. Increased financial openness is related to more effective financial regulations and 
more transparent financial markets. Capital markets with such attractive features draw a large 
amount of capital flows from around the world. Empirical evidence shows that uncertainty is a 
source of volatility in global capital flows and that capital flows can act as a channel through 
which uncertainties may cause global stock market spillovers. Investors and policymakers 
should, therefore, take into account the degree of financial openness in a country's financial 
system, as well as the capital flows coming from the US to that country; since these two factors 
could well combine to potentially amplify the uncertainty-generated stock market spillovers 
from the US to the stock markets of such a country.  
Similarly, weaker fiscal imbalances reflect poor economic governance, which is more 
likely to translate into uncertainty around macro-economic policies. Consequently, stock 
markets of the countries with more uncertain macro-economic conditions are more vulnerable 
to uncertainty-generated stock market spillovers from the US. Investors and policymakers 
should, therefore, consider the exacerbating character of a host country's fiscal imbalances for 
stock market spillovers that are due to uncertainty-related shocks in the US equity market, and 
thus take appropriate actions to mitigate this impact. 
Finally, our finding that developed stock markets appear to be resilient against 
uncertainty-driven spillovers is quite intuitive. Developed stock markets typically have 
measures in place with regards to investor protection and capital controls, making them more 
immune to external uncertainty shocks. This finding further implies that while investors should 
consider investing in developed stock markets, policymakers should continue to take steps 




Overall, this essay asks international investors and policymakers to pay close attention 
to the fact that after controlling for the correlation between the US and a given country’s stock 
market, the driving effect of US uncertainties for the stock market is linked to specific features 
of the host country such as the trade openness with the US, financial openness, fiscal imbalance, 














Australia Hong Kong Portugal Brazil Chile Argentina 
Austria Ireland Singapore Greece China Venezuela 
Belgium Italy South Korea Malaysia Indonesia 
Canada Japan Spain Mexico Philippines 
Denmark Netherland SIden South Africa  
Finland New Zealand Switzerland Taiwan   
France Norway United Kingdom Thailand   
Germany Poland   Turkey     
Variables 
Indicator Measurement    Source 
Financial openness (FO) 
Financial openness index of a country 
constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008). It is the 
average for the period between 1995-2018 
http://Ib.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_Ibsite.htm 
Trade openness (TO) 
Exports plus imports with the US relative to 
the total trade of a country. It is the average 
for the period between 1995-2018 
World Development Indicators(WDI), World 
Bank 
Debt burden (DB) 
Central government debt of a country as a 
percentage of GDP. It is the average for the 
period between 1995-2018 
WDI 
Fiscal imbalance (FI) 
Budget deficit (surplus) of a country as a 
percentage of GDP. It is the average for the 
period between 1995-2018 
WDI 
Market development (MD) 
Stock market capitalization of a country as a 
percentage of GDP. It is the average for the 





4 CHAPTER 4 ESSAY THREE 
Economic Policy Uncertainty Spillover Effects on Sectoral Equity Returns: 
Evidence from New Zealand 
This essay introduces a weekly EPU index for New Zealand, and examines the return 
and volatility spillovers from New Zealand (local) and US (foreign) EPU on NZSE and sectoral 
indices of New Zealand stock market. The multivariate VAR (1)-BEKK-GARCH model is 
employed for this purpose. Overall, the findings suggest that NZ equity sectors and NZSE 
receive much stronger and more pronounced spillover effects from US EPU compared to the 
local counterpart (NZ EPU). While the return spillovers from both EPUs are somewhat similar 
yet limited to just a few sectors, the volatility spillovers from US EPU on NZ sectors outstrip 
those from the NZ EPU. For volatility spillovers, the domestically oriented sectors are mainly 
vulnerable to NZ EPU, while those having export/import concentration with the US are mainly 
susceptible to US EPU. These findings may be useful to investors seeking sectoral 





Studies – primarily performed within the US context – show that US EPU tends to 
increase (decrease) volatility (returns) of US stock market (Pástor & Veronesi, 2012 & 2013; 
Antonakakis, Chatziantoniou, & Filis, 2013; Brogaard & Detzel, 2015; Bijsterbosch & Guerin, 
2013; Liu & Zhang, 2015). Apart from these domestic effects, US EPU carries a significant 
potential to cause return and volatility spillovers on global stock markets, such as those of 
BRIC (Dakhlaoui & Aloui, 2016), while being the source of movements in several international 
stock markets (Ko & Lee, 2015). Studies further argue that EPU spillovers for international 
stock markets may even be stronger if the EPU shocks are emanating from a large economy 
(Sum, 2013), such as the US, and more so if the target country happens to be a small open 
economy (Stockammar & Österholm, 2016). Accordingly, a domestic stock market could 
experience more EPU shocks from the foreign landscape than from the local arena; this may 
be especially true for a small open economy that has stable monetary policy regimes, smaller 
size, and a higher degree of trade and capital openness. The literature also indicates that both 
the local and foreign EPUs are likely to shed negative (generally positive) spillover effects on 
the local stock market's returns (volatility). 
While the empirical literature cited above confirms the existence of EPU spillovers for 
stock markets around the world, some questions still need further investigation. First, the 
presence of EPU spillovers has been investigated rigorously for many international stock 
markets. Nevertheless, most of the analyses have been carried out at an aggregate level of the 
stock market, disregarding the possibility that various sectors of the stock market may respond 
heterogeneously to the prevailing uncertainties. It is worth noting that market aggregation may 




traditional proxy for the benchmark market portfolio, which only represents average investors 
who are concerned with its riskiness and therefore is of little use to the investors who want to 
benefit from sectoral diversification at domestic or international level. It is expected that due 
to the unique sector dynamics, each sector may be exposed to uncertainty arising from the 
domestic and international landscapes differently. It is well-known that, unlike the market 
portfolio, some sectors are cyclical while others are countercyclical, some deal in necessities 
while others in luxuries, some are more import-oriented (or export-oriented) than others while 
some other sectors are connected tightly to the global financial hubs and are therefore highly 
prone to foreign policy shocks. In other words, the equity market sectors could be extremely 
heterogeneous in their exposure to local (foreign) EPUs. Despite being possible, the literature 
in this direction is scant. The only exceptions are Yu, Fang, Zhang, and Du (2018) and Yu, 
Fang, Du, and Yan (2017), who investigated the effects of US EPU on the volatility and long-
run beta of different sectors of US stock market.  
Second, the previous studies have mainly examined EPU spillovers from the US to the 
stock markets of either BRIC countries or Europe's large economies (e.g., Dakhlaoui & Aloui, 
2016), and thus have paid little attention to small-open economies. Third, when examining the 
EPU spillovers for a local stock market, the current literature places an overwhelming emphasis 
on the EPU shocks originating from the US yet ignores those arising from the local policy 
uncertainty. Fourth, with regards to the direction of EPU spillovers, the theoretical expectation 
is that return (volatility) spillover should be negative (positive) (Pastor & Veronesi, 2012), 
whether the source being local and foreign. In the empirical literature, however, the negative 
sign of return (mean) spillover is consistently reported; the positive sign of volatility spillover, 
on the other hand, is not found consistent across countries. Despite being counterintuitive, the 




oscillate between positive and negative values (Dakhlaoui & Aloui, 2016), meaning that 
nothing can be said with absolute certainty about the direction of volatility spillovers. After all, 
EPU shocks in the US could well be received as good news in certain markets (Su, Fang, & 
Yin, 2019), and, in turn, the volatility of such markets could decrease while responding to 
higher US EPU. One may, therefore, be interested in revisiting the EPU spillovers for markets 
where the general theoretical expectation of EPU-volatility relationship may vary. 
This essay investigates the return and volatility spillovers from local (NZ) and foreign 
(US) EPU on NZSE and sectoral indices of the New Zealand stock market. Our choice to use 
US EPU as a surrogate for foreign EPU is based on current literature (Colombo, 2013; Klößner 
& Sekkel, 2014; Dakhlaoui & Aloui, 2016; Ko & Lee, 2015). This literature consistently argues 
that the US is, although to varying degrees, the source, and not the target, of uncertainty 
(volatility) in global economies (stock markets). In the context of small open economies, two 
related works, one on New Zealand and another on small-open economies, provide enough 
support to our choice. With an emphasis on New Zealand, Kamber, Karagedikli, Ryan, and 
Vehbi (2016) found asset prices dropping in the country in response to US uncertainty25. The 
study found financial and confidence linkages between New Zealand and the US as more 
critical conduits for shock transmission relative to the trade channels. The other study, 
Stockammar and Österholm (2016), concluded that US uncertainty significantly reduces GDP 
growth in five small open economies26 and affects the volatility of their stock markets. These 
two studies are much broader in scope and do not just examine EPU spillover on stock markets, 
they, nonetheless, set a potential course for such spillover effects from US EPU to the New 
Zealand stock market. Since New Zealand is a small open economy with unique features such 
 
25 Other economic indicators that also fell to US uncertainty include output, consumption, exchange rate, 
commodity prices, and investment.  





as stable monetary policy regimes, smaller size, and a higher degree of trade and financial 
openness, one would expect its economy, and hence its stock market, to respond differently to 
US EPU shocks compared to the stock markets of large European economies or emerging 
economies.  
The methodology consists of two parts. Because this essay relies on weekly data on the 
stock market (and EPU) indices to examine EPU spillovers on the New Zealand stock market, 
weekly indicators of US EPU and NZ EPU are indispensable to the analysis. A weekly EPU 
index for the US can be easily calculated from the readily available daily US EPU series, but a 
weekly EPU index for New Zealand was not available; thus, one had to be created. The first 
part of the methodology explains how the weekly EPU index for New Zealand is created by 
following Baker et al. (2016)'s news-based methodology. The second part provides details of 
the VAR (1)-BEKK-GARCH model that is employed to capture the return and volatility 
spillovers directed from NZ EPU (US EPU) to NZ equity sectors and NZSE. Overall, the 
findings suggest that NZ equity sectors and NZSE receive much stronger and more pronounced 
spillover effects from US EPU compared to the local counterpart (NZ EPU). While the return 
spillovers from both EPUs are somewhat similar yet limited to just a few sectors, the volatility 
spillovers from US EPU on NZ sectors outstrip those from the NZ EPU. For volatility 
spillovers, the domestically oriented sectors are relatively more vulnerable to NZ EPU, while 
those having export/import concentration with the US are mainly susceptible to US EPU. 
This essay contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the essay introduces 
a weekly EPU index for New Zealand that was previously unavailable. A monthly EPU index 
for the country has already been created and used by Tsui, Balli, Tan, Lau, and Hasan (2017) 
and Balli, Uddin, Mudassar, and Yoon (2017), respectively. A weekly NZ EPU index has, 




data in order to avoid noise involved in the daily data series. The essay thus contributes to the 
ongoing efforts aimed at developing the country-based EPU indices (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 
2010; Baker et al., 2016; Alexopoulos & Cohen, 2015). To the best of our knowledge, this 
research is not only the first to develop a weekly EPU index for New Zealand, but also the first 
to create a weekly EPU index for any country27. Our second contribution is to the literature that 
examines EPU spillovers on stock markets (Pástor & Veronesi, 2012 & 2013; Antonakakis, 
Chatziantoniou & Filis, 2013; Brogaard & Detzel, 2015; Bijsterbosch & Guerin, 2013; Liu & 
Zhang, 2015; Ko & Lee, 2015). Unlike most of this literature, which considers the spillover 
effects of local and foreign EPU on the domestic stock market separately, the essay 
simultaneously investigates the spillover effects of both EPUs on the stock market of a country, 
namely, New Zealand. Besides, the extant literature typically analyses EPU spillovers on the 
aggregate stock markets of certain large economies of Europe or those of few emerging 
economies. However, it remains largely unclear whether the nature of such spillover effects for 
different equity sectors of a small open economy. Considering New Zealand as our sample 
country, the essay provides evidence of EPU spillovers for the equity sectors of a small open 
economy, and thereby contribute to the literature. 
In the literature exploring the EPU-equity sector nexus, the current research is linked 
closely to Yu et al. (2018) and Yu et al. (2017). While these studies, respectively, analyze the 
effects of EPU on the return-volatility and long-run betas of various sectors, both studies take 
the US stock market as their backdrop. Also, both analyses are limited to 10 US sectors and 
US EPU only and explore the sector performance under policy uncertainty for a large economy. 
In their examinations, the authors relied on the GARCH-MIDAS framework (Engle, Ghysels 
& Sohn, 2013) and the DCC-MIDAS framework (Colacito, Engle, & Ghysels, 2011), 
 
27 A notable exception is Kamber et al. (2016) that constructs and displays various uncertainty indices for New 




respectively. This essay provides evidence further to their investigations by exploring the return 
and volatility spillovers directed from NZ EPU (US EPU) to 15 NZ equity sectors and NZSE. 
This essay thus provides a sharp contrast between how the equity sectors of two very different 
economies respond to policy uncertainty; clearly, New Zealand is a small open economy, and 
the US is a much larger economy.  
Finally, by considering NZ equity sectors, this essay is making a specific contribution 
to the literature that links US EPU with asset markets of small open economies. As mentioned 
above, two investigations have already been conducted on New Zealand's stock market from 
this perspective; they include the works by Kamber et al. (2016) and Stockammar and 
Österholm (2016). While both studies layout the foundation for the present work by setting a 
potential course of spillover effects from the US to small open economies (one of which is New 
Zealand), the focus of their analyses remained on how macroeconomic and financial variables, 
such as GDP and stock market index, in those economies responded to US EPU. Even when 
evaluating the stock market reaction to US EPU, both studies relied solely on the aggregate 
stock market index of New Zealand, with paying little attention to the sensitivity of stock 
market sectors. Besides, the effect of local EPU on the performance of the aggregate stock 
market was entirely ignored by the two reports. By analyzing New Zealand's stock market-
EPU nexus, this essay captures the sensitivity of NZ equity sectors to international (US) EPU 
and local EPU (NZ). It thus fills the gaps left out by the two studies. In other words, unlike the 
two studies, the essay not only considers the spillover effects of local EPU along with US EPU 
but also examines these effects at the disaggregated level of the New Zealand stock market, 




The essay unfolds as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the extant literature on the topic. 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 describe the dataset and empirical methodology, respectively. Section 4.5 
reports empirical findings, and section 4.6 concludes.  
4.2 Literature review 
Current research in this domain has four distinct strands of literature: first, economic 
policy uncertainty measurement; second, EPU effect on the overall economy; third, EPU 
spillovers among countries; and the fourth, the influence (or spillover effects) that a domestic 
and international EPU have on home country’s stock market. This section will address all these 
strands individually. 
4.2.1 Measurement of economic policy uncertainty  
In general, economic uncertainty exists when it is hard to predict future economic 
outcomes. Economic uncertainty is categorized into several classes such as domestic and 
foreign, general and policy-related, macro and firm-based, short and longer-term. While 
studying all categories may have exciting implications, this research confines itself to the 
definition of economic policy uncertainty given by Baker et al. (2016) as the uncertainty about 
who will make economic policy decisions, what and when these decisions would be made, and 
what would be the impact of such decisions. No matter how you define it, the fact that 
uncertainty is not directly observable makes its measurement a challengeable task. Therefore, 
current research is still searching for a better proxy (see, Bachmann et al., 2013; Bekaert et al., 
2016; Bloom, 2009; Julio & Yook, 2012; Jurado et al., 2015; Rich & Tracy, 2010; Rossi & 




Broadly, various indicators (measures) of uncertainty, devised thus far, can be 
categorized into three classes (see Bloom, 2014; Bontempi et al., 2016; Moore, 2016). First is 
the "finance-based" approach, which uses rather advanced techniques for analyzing equity 
market volatility-based financial information (see, e.g., Bekaert et al., 2013; Bloom, 2009; 
Gilchrist, Sim, & Zakrajšek, 2014; and Knotek & Khan, 2011). Despite its enormous use, this 
approach essentially provides a measure of equity market uncertainty, and hence being 
incapable of capturing the overall uncertainty in the economy. Furthermore, these measures are 
not only asymmetric28 but also connected indirectly to the overall economy (see Moore, 2016).   
The second, “forecasts-based” approach estimates uncertainty by relying on the concept 
of the economy’s predictability, and therefore measuring it using the discrepancy between 
professional forecasts (see Bachmann, Elstner, & Sims, 2013; Jurado et al., 2015; Rich & 
Tracy, 2010; Rossi & Sekhposyan, 2015; and Scotti, 2016). This approach is based on the idea 
that if uncertainty rises in an economy, this should show up in the heightened disagreement 
among professional forecasters. Similarly, any downswings in uncertainty should accompany 
less dispersion among these professionals29. Nevertheless, even though this approach produces 
indicators that represent economic conditions reasonably closely, a significant drawback of the 
approach is that the forecast dispersion and uncertainty quite distinct concepts. While the 
forecast dispersion would capture the discord — how distant the forecasters' assessments are 
from each other — the measure may not necessarily represent the general level of uncertainty. 
Every forecaster could well be incredibly precise, yet a great deal of disagreement could still 
prevail, and vice versa. There are studies in the literature arguing that due to this crucial 
 
28 Increases in the measures accompany large falls in stock prices; large gains in stock prices are less common. 




distinction, forecast dispersion might not be a good proxy for uncertainty (Rich, Song, & Tracy 
2012).  
The third is the “text-based” approach, which can either be based on news articles or 
internet searches. The idea behind the news-based approach is as follows. Newspapers publish 
news articles about the topics of significant interest to the general public (the readers). As 
readers are typically interested in the events that can potentially affect their economic health, 
newspapers will report such events in a timely fashion. Therefore, news articles will promptly 
reflect any issues related to economic events, policies, and thereby any uncertainty about such 
issues in the form of language- that is, by using specific words. Hence, the swings in economic 
policy uncertainty will be accompanied by trends in counts of the news articles which contain 
words like the economy, policy, and uncertainty (or their variants). By far, this is the intuition 
behind recently developed news-based uncertainty measures; see (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010; 
Hoberg & Phillips, 2010; Boudoukh et al., 2013; Alexopoulos & Cohen, 2015; and Baker et 
al., 2016).   
Nevertheless, remember that even though news articles are produced for the general 
public, these uncertainty measures capture and communicate the perception of the press (or 
that of journalists), not that of the general public. Therefore, news-based measures can be 
regarded as a journalist’s view of uncertainty (Bontempi et al., 2016). However, what about 
the ordinary folks who look for uncertainty themselves, and who do not read newspapers 
instead use the internet to dig for uncertainty related information. This criticism provides the 
reason to see and hence measure the uncertainty from an individual’s perspective; these are 
known as internet-search based uncertainty measures (see Bontempi et al., 2016; and 
Dzielinski, 2012). The underlying notion goes back to the field of economic psychology, which 




search for information (see, e.g., Liemieux & Peterson, 2011). Thus, it seems natural to 
measure the uncertainty of individuals by analyzing their search behavior. Today the internet 
is the primary source of information. Therefore, it seems logical to follow that internet users 
(general public) manifest their perception of uncertainty by searching, more or less, for specific 
words related to it. Consequently, internet search volumes reflect these manifestations. Thus, 
the trend in internet search volume over time can be a good representative of any movements 
in uncertainty as perceived by the general public.  
Although all approaches have their pros and cons, the text-based approaches are the 
most contemporary and popular ones, see (Bontempi et al., 2016; Dzielinski, 2012; Gentzkow 
& Shapiro, 2010; Hoberg & Phillips, 2010; Boudoukh et al., 2013; Alexopoulos & Cohen, 
2015; and Baker et al., 2016; and Caldara & Iacoviello, 2018). Text-based measures offer 
several appealing characteristics, including consistency, broad coverage, and a clear indication 
of the uncertainty sources (Alexopoulos & Cohen, 2009). Besides, the shortcomings associated 
with traditional measures (see Jurado et al., 2015) further motivate us to develop text-based 
measures for New Zealand. As highlighted by (Kamber et al., 2016), New Zealand, as a text-
book small open economy, is a developed nation with strong institutions, a long history of 
stable monetary policy, and a floating exchange rate regime; hence, New Zealand can be 
considered a test case. 
Further, there is a considerable amount of news related data available for New Zealand. 
Indeed, data is an essential consideration for our empirical strategy. Finally, and most 
importantly, as well, New Zealand does not have a text-based economic policy uncertainty 




4.2.2 EPU, spillovers, and the overall economy  
The second strand of literature focuses on the effects of economic policy uncertainty 
on the overall economy. In this domain, studies have mainly focused on US economic policy 
uncertainty to assess response patterns of macroeconomic indicators (e.g., Alexopoulos & 
Cohen, 2009; Bloom, 2009; Baker et al., 2013; Caggiano, Castelnuovo, Groshenny, 2013; 
Leduc & Liu, 2013; and Nodari, 2013)30. While the bulk of the research advocates EPU effects 
on domestic macroeconomic variables, some studies also support that domestic EPU can 
receive macroeconomic responses from other countries. Colombo (2013), for example, studies 
the effect of EPU in the US and the EU, as calculated by Baker et al. (2013), on economic 
activity in the Euro area. The study finds that shocks to US EPU have a more significant impact 
on economic activity in the euro area than the EU EPU. Also, Kim (2001) measured how 
macroeconomic policy shocks in the US can stimulate international business cycles. Lastly, the 
IMF (2013) investigates how changes in the US and EU EPUs impact the economic growth in 
other regions of the world. Overall, this literature vows in favor of the argument that economic 
policy uncertainty can easily influence the other economies, besides affecting the domestic 
economy.  
4.2.3 Cross-country EPU spillovers 
The third strand of literature attempts to answer the following questions: while domestic 
and international macroeconomic responses have been made evident, how about EPU in one 
country affecting EPU in another country? If there exists any, what could be the direction of 
such an effect? The literature in this area is somewhat sparse and at the inception stage. A study 
 
30 The seminal works addressing the policy uncertainty effects on the economy include Marcus (1981), Bernanke 




by Klößner & Sekkel (2014), which is a notable exception, reports that spillover effects 
contribute just over one-fourth to the EPU dynamics in 11 countries, with this contribution 
rising to half during the GFC. Since the onset of GFC, however, the US and the UK account 
for a large proportion of the spillovers, while the other countries remain recipients of EPU 
shocks during- and post-GFC period. The literature also sheds some light on the channels of 
policy spillovers. 
A study by Gauvin, McLoughlin, and Reinhardt (2014) is a good example, which 
explores the degree to which uncertainty about developed countries ' macroeconomic policies 
spills over to emerging market economies through equity-and-bond flows. In this study, the 
effect of EPU fluctuations on equity flows differs noticeably as EPU changes shift from the US 
States to the EU. The inflows of both equity and bond portfolios into the EMEs abate when 
EPU in the US increases. In comparison, an increase in EU EPU reduces bond inflows but 
raises equity inflows to EMEs. The magnitude and direction of these EPU spillovers depend 
on the global risk level, with increased EU EPU only reducing bond inflows to EMEs when 
there is a high level of global risk. The extent and direction of country-specific sovereign 
default risk play a vital role around non-linearities involved in equity inflows; that is, increased 
EU EPU drives portfolio equity inflows into EMEs even when there is a high level of global 
risk, but this effect is limited to countries with a low level of sovereign default risk only.  
A thorough investigation of the literature reveals that EPU not only has significant 
impacts on macroeconomic variables in the domestic economy but can also spill over to other 
economies’ EPU. Finally, as seen from the literature, the direction of EPU spillover is from the 




4.2.4 EPU spillovers and stock market 
As mentioned earlier, research on individual and overall effects of EPU is not new (see 
Marcus, 1981; Bernanke, 1983; and Rodrick, 1991). However, interest has been resurgent after 
the 2007-2008 financial crises on how EPU can influence financial markets, especially the 
stock market. Most of these studies indicate that EPU has a negative influence on the stock 
market (Pástor & Veronesi, 2012 & 2013; Brogaard & Detzel, 2015; and Bijsterbosch & 
Guerin, 2013). For example, Antonakakis et al. (2013) examine the effect of macro-policy 
uncertainty on the economy by focusing on the complex interplay between the uncertainty and 
stock market performance. According to the authors, the latest financial crisis played a crucial 
role in turning the dynamic correlation between macroeconomic policy uncertainty and stock 
market returns into positive. Furthermore, the rising volatility around both policy uncertainty 
and equity market erodes equity returns and raises uncertainty. 
Turning to the EPU spillovers for stock markets, it seems almost established that EPU 
exerts negative (positive) spillovers for aggregate market returns (volatility). For example, 
Gauvin et al. (2014) identify the spillovers of macroeconomic policy uncertainty from 
developed economies to emerging market economies through equity and bond flows. 
Antonakakis et al. (2013) find the time-varying correlation between EPU and stock-market 
returns in the US to be consistently negative over time, apart from the GFC. Furthermore, any 
increase around EPU and market volatility leads to a decline in stock market returns, but 
increase in EPU. On the other side, Ko and Lee (2015) demonstrate that EPU and stock prices 
do not always co-move for the US, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK, Spain, China, India, 
Japan, and Russia. Although the association is found generally negative, it changes over time, 




The timing of frequency shifts overlaps when US EPU co-moves with the EPU of other 
countries. A study by Bekiros, Gupta, and Majumdar (2016) highlights the importance of 
economic and firm-level uncertainty indicators in forecasting the volatility of the stock market. 
This study, however, cautions against employing linear models that are often fraught with 
misspecifications induced by parameter instability and nonlinearities. Dakhlaoui and Aloui 
(2016) also find the EPU-driven return spillovers for BRIC stock markets to be negative, while 
the volatility spillovers are found oscillating between positive and negative values. Strong 
evidence exists for a time-varying correlation between the US EPU and other stock markets’ 
volatility; these correlations are found to be highly volatile during times of global economic 
uncertainty. Using a VAR framework, Kang and Ratti (2013) demonstrate that increases in US 
EPU Granger-cause the stock market return in the US to fall. Finally, for a sample of seven 
OECD countries, Chang et al. (2015) explore the linkage between EPU and stock markets. The 
authors demonstrate that volatility in the US and UK economic policies causes stock prices to 
fall and that the US EPU also influences global oil markets. 
It is evident from the studies that the research in this area is still evolving. Though, the 
literature on the link between financial markets-namely stock and bond market-and EPU seems 
to provide mixed evidence; there are, however, some identifiable themes. For instance, it is 
evident that a time-varying correlation and spillover effects exist between domestic EPU and 
domestic and foreign stock markets; however, there is no consensus on the direction it takes, 
perhaps for it keeps fluctuating over time. Moreover, stock market volatility also depends upon 
type (i.e., component) economic uncertainty under consideration; some have a stronger link to 
stocks than others. More interestingly, no study has tried to explain spillovers across stock 




us to investigate volatility transmission (spillover effects) concerning EPU, and specific types 
of economic policy uncertainties-that are the EPU components.    
Furthermore, literature also provides several channels through which EPU can spill 
over to the stock market. To explain this mechanism at a macro-level, the studies often assert 
that macro-policy uncertainty hurts the growth and investment level of an economy. While 
awaiting the elimination of uncertainty, rational economic agents postpone their investment 
decisions that are associated with — either wholly or partially — irreversible investments. 
Furthermore, EPU can lead to heightened riskiness around financial markets, potentially by 
lowering the value of protections introduced by the government for the markets (Pastor & 
Veronesi, 2012). Finally, economic uncertainty can also have an impact on interest rates, 
inflation, and expected risk premiums (Pastor & Veronesi 2013). 
On a firm level, however, corporate investments are usually irreversible and expensive. 
For firms, the uncertainty that stems mainly from economic or political sources will have a 
significant impact on their earnings, revenues, and expenses. Any policy changes will, 
therefore, alter the business climate in which the firms are bound to operate, and hence their 
investment behaviors will be affected (Wang et al., 2014). EPU affects corporate investment 
by affecting the business cycle fluctuations, according to Baker et al. (2016). 
It is well-known in finance that every decision has to be made with the context of 
uncertainty. Provided that the arrival of new information leads financial markets to make 
prompt adjustments to asset prices, it is no doubt that this happens through the ever-changing 
beliefs of the investors who are influenced by the information available to them, which too 




affects the term structure, which in turn significantly impacts the counter-cyclical-volatility of 
stock returns. 
Theoretically, investors form their perceptions about the prevailing economic 
environment by relating asset prices to economic uncertainty. Therefore, a higher uncertainty 
around the economic landscape leads to higher fluctuations in asset prices. When face with an 
uncertain investment climate, risk-averse investors require a higher return (or risk premium) 
on their investments (see David, 1997; Veronesi, 1999). In other words, with market 
uncertainty going up, the protection level of investors gets higher as well (Bird & Yeung 2012). 
Indeed, in times of high degree of market uncertainty, investors tend to ignore the good news, 
while in times of low uncertainty, they continue to overlook bad news. 
4.3 Data 
The Thomson Reuter' DataStream is used to gather weekly data on NZ sectoral equity 
index prices31. The weekly values of US EPU are downloaded from the EPU website 
(www.policyuncertainty.com)32. The essay develops the weekly EPU index for New Zealand 
by following Baker et al. (2016)'s methodology. For this purpose, a global news database, 
Factiva33, was used to search and collect articles related to NZ EPU. Our sample period spans 
from January 1997 to December 2016. The essay follows the sectoral grouping previously 
proposed by Balli, Balli, and Louis (2013), and Balli, Balli, and Luu (2014); a summary of this 
grouping is provided in Table 4-1. According to these studies, sectors belonging to the same 
 
31 To capture NZ EPU and US EPU spillover effects on the overall stock market, we add the NZ aggregate stock 
market index (NZSE) to the list of sectors.   
32 Note that the weekly index of NZ EPU reflects uncertainty for the whole week, whereas the US EPU is available 
at daily frequency and therefore represents uncertainty for a single day. Picking the value of US EPU on a given 
weekday to represent weekly US EPU would be misleading. To ensure consistency for both EPUs, we, therefore, 
take weekly average for the daily US EPU index and use this weekly series in our analysis.   




group tend to respond homogenously to foreign (or local) shocks34. One will be interested to 
see if this is the case in our results as well. 
Table 4-1 Sector groupings 
Production and Industry Group 
      Industrials 
      Oil and Gas 
      Utilities 
Consumer Goods and Services Group 
      Food and Beverages 
      Consumer Goods 
      Consumer Services 
      Health Care 
      Retail 
      Travel and Leisure 
Technology, Media, and Telecom (TMT)35 Group 
      Technology 
      Telecom 
      Media 
Financial Group 
     Financials 
     Real Estate 
     Financial Services 
Aggregate Stock Market (NZSE) 
4.4 Methodology 
Our methodology consists of two parts. The first part provides details of the news-based 
methodology36 proposed by Baker et al. (2016), which we adopted to create the weekly EPU 
index for New Zealand. The second part describes the VAR (1)-BEKK-GARCH model, which 
is employed to capture the return and volatility spillovers from NZ EPU (US EPU) to NZ 
sectors and NZSE. 
 
34 Note that, throughout the text, the term ‘group’ refers to all the sectors included in that group.  
35 TMT is the abbreviation for the Technology, Media, and Telecom group.   





4.4.1 The development of NZ EPU index 
This section provides details of the news-based methodology of Baker et al. (2016), 
which we adopted to create the weekly EPU index for New Zealand. This part follows the 
footsteps of Tsui et al. (2017) and Balli et al. (2017), which developed and used a monthly EPU 
index for New Zealand, respectively. The weekly NZ EPU index covers a period from January 
1997 to December 2016. Four major newspapers of New Zealand, namely The Waikato Times, 
The Press, The Dominion Post, and The New Zealand Herald, are selected for this purpose. In 
July 2002, The Dominion and The Evening Post were merged to form The Dominion Post. 
Thus, before July 2002, the data for The Dominion Post include both the newspapers that 
preceded it. The four newspapers are selected as a) they contain the largest number of articles 
related to EPU, and b) they have been published continuously over the entire sample period. 
The following criterion was used to search for news articles related to the NZ EPU. A 
news article carries EPU related content if it contains the terms: “economy (or variants)” and 
“uncertain (or variants)”, and at least one of the following terms or phrases: “budget (or 
variants)”, “policy (or variants)”, “legislate (or variants)”, “regulate (or variants)”, “parliament 
(or variants)”, “reserve bank” or “rbnz37”. With this being the criterion, any possible string 
characters that represent a term or phrase are classified as "variants." The variants of the term 
"economy," for example, include "economic" and "economies”. The application of this 
criterion provides us with weekly EPU-related articles from each newspaper. 
Since the weekly (raw) counts vary across both newspapers and weeks, I scale these 
counts by the total volume of articles published in that newspaper during a week and thus obtain 
 




four scaled series of weekly counts. Over the sample period, each of the four scaled series is 
standardized to a unit standard deviation; a further average across the four standardized series 
turns them into a single series. Finally, the NZ EPU index is obtained by normalizing this 
standardized series over the sample period to a mean of 100. This final EPU index is plotted in 
Figure 4-1, which appears to correspond with major political and economic events happening 
at the local and international landscape. The two most important events, 9/11 and the 2008 
GFC, for example, seem to push the EPU index to reach its highest values. Similarly, the EPU 




Figure 4-1 Weekly EPU Index for New Zealand 
Notes: 
The weekly EPU index for New Zealand is the normalized weekly counts of the news articles containing “economy (or variants)” and “uncertain (or variants)”, and at least one 
of the following terms or phrases: “budget (or variants)”, “policy (or variants)”, “legislate (or variants)”, “regulate (or variants)”, “parliament (or variants)”, “reserve bank” or 
“rbnz”. The articles Ire collected from the following four newspapers: Waikato Times, The Press, The Dominion Post, and The New Zealand Herald, over a period from January 














































4.4.2 The spillover model 
This section provides the methodological details of the spillover model. Since the 
objective of this essay is to examine the return and volatility spillovers from local and foreign 
EPUs to the NZ equity sectors and NZSE, the bivariate MGARCH model appears to be the 
most suitable approach. More specifically, the analysis relies on the VAR (1)-BEKK-GARCH 
models that explicitly incorporate the direct transmission of shocks and volatility from the 
EPUs to NZ equity sectors and NZSE. This section begins with the presentation of the 
conditional means in the bivariate framework, and then introduces the BEKK-GARCH 
specifications under consideration.  
First, the VAR model for the conditional mean specification38 is described. For the 
empirical analysis on return spillovers, it is assumed that the conditional mean of returns on 
the NZ equity market sectors and NZ EPU (US EPU) can be described by a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model. In the two-variable case, a VAR (1) model39 can be set up as 
follows: 
rt
S = 𝑐𝑆 + 𝑎𝑆rt−1
S + 𝑏𝑆rt−1
NZEPU + εt
S       (1a) 
rt
NZEPU = 𝑐𝑁𝑍𝐸𝑃𝑈 + 𝑎𝑁𝑍𝐸𝑃𝑈rt−1
NZEPU + 𝑏𝑁𝑍𝐸𝑃𝑈rt−1
S + εt
NZEPU             (1b) 
rt
S = 𝑐𝑆 + 𝑎𝑆rt−1
S + 𝑏𝑆rt−1
USEPU + εt
S       (2a) 
 
38 Our methodological approach is closely associated with Mateev (2019), which models the transmission of 
volatility across default swap and stock markets. We thank the anonymous referee for bringing this approach to 
our attention. 





USEPU = 𝑐𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑈 + 𝑎𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑈rt−1
USEPU + 𝑏𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑈rt−1
S + εt




USEPU represent the logarithmic returns of a given NZ equity 
sector, NZ EPU, and US EPU series, respectively. In Eq. (1a)-(1b), the residuals, εt
S and 
εt
NZEPU, are assumed to be serially uncorrelated, but the covariance E (εt
S εt
NZEPU) needs not to 
be zero. Similarly, in Eq. (2a)-(2b), the residuals, εt
S and εt
USEPU, are assumed to be serially 
uncorrelated, but the covariance E (εt
S εt
USEPU) needs not to be zero. Since our primary interest 
is to explore the return (mean) spillovers from NZ EPU (US EPU) to NZ equity sectors and 
NZSE, I emphasize on the coefficients those spillover effects only. In Eq. (1a) and (2a), the 
coefficient 𝑎𝑆 provide the measures of own-mean spillovers for a given sector (NZSE), 
whereas the coefficient 𝑏𝑆 measures the mean spillover from NZ EPU (US EPU) to that sector 
or NZSE.  
Now, the MGARCH models for the conditional variance are described. I model the 
dynamics of the conditional volatility and volatility interdependence between NZ EPU (US 
EPU) and NZ equity sectors and NZSE by using the full BEKK-GARCH model developed by 
Engle and Kroner (1995), which is suitable for accounting for not only volatility persistence of 
each NZ equity sector (NZSE) but also for the own- and cross-volatility spillover effects 
between NZ EPU (US EPU) and the sectors or NZSE.  
The conditional variance-covariance matrix (𝐻𝑡) of the residuals (εt
S and εt
NZEPU) in Eq. 
(1a)- (1b) is defined as follows: 










And for the residuals (εt
S and εt
USEPU) in Eq. (2a)- (2b), I follow the expression: 






USEPU.USEPU]     (4) 
In each case, 𝑡 is the (2 × 1) vector of residuals that are obtained from the VAR model 
and 𝛺𝑡−1 is the information set containing all the information available up to time (t−1). Note 
that different specifications of 𝐻𝑡 will lead to different multivariate GARCH models. For 
instance, Engle and Kroner (1995) introduce the BEKK representation of the multivariate 
GARCH models by specifying the positive definite covariance matrix. Specifically, the 
bivariate BEKK-GARCH takes the following form: 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶
′ + 𝐴 𝑡εt−1
′ 𝐴′ + 𝐵𝐻𝑡−1𝐵
′       (5) 
where C is a (2 × 2) upper triangular matrix of constants with elements 𝑐𝑖𝑗; A is a (2 × 
2) matrix of coefficients  𝑎𝑖𝑗 that capture the effects of own shocks and cross-market shock 
interactions; and B is a (2 × 2) matrix of coefficients 𝑏𝑖𝑗 that capture the own volatility 
persistence and the volatility interactions with the EPU series. In other words, 𝑎𝑖𝑗 and  𝑏𝑖𝑗 
represent, respectively, the short-run and long-run persistence effects in volatility transmission. 
The estimation of the BEKK-GARCH models is carried out by the quasi-maximum likelihood 
(QMLE) method, where the conditional distribution of 𝑡 is assumed to follow a joint Gaussian 
log-likelihood function for a sample of T observations and k = 2 in the bivariate model as 
follows: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔. 𝐿 = −
1
2









4.5 Empirical Findings 
Table 4-2 provides descriptive statistics of NZSE and NZ sector equity returns, as well 
as those of the change-rate in NZ EPU (US EPU).  
 Table 4-2 Descriptive statistics of aggregate and sector equity indices 
  Mean Std.Dev. Skew. Kurt. Q(1) Q(4) Q†(1) Q†(4) ADF 
Production and Industry Group  
Industrials 0.17 2.80 -0.48 6.76 -0.00 -0.04a 0.23a 0.13a -16.90a 
Oil and Gas 0.17 3.65 0.06 6.42 0.00 -0.03 0.07b 0.12a -33.66a 
Utilities 0.09 2.03 0.02 4.94 -0.00 0.02 0.18a 0.06a -30.87a 
Consumer Goods and Services Group  
Food and Beverages 0.02 2.97 0.23 11.31 0.00 0.04 0.06c 0.06a -34.88a 
Consumer Goods 0.10 2.90 0.02 9.71 0.00 0.03 0.07b 0.07b -32.30a 
Consumer Services 0.05 2.00 -0.24 4.97 -0.00 0.00 0.20a 0.10a -29.63a 
Health Care 0.22 2.24 0.08 4.51 0.00 0.05 0.12a 0.04a -33.31a 
Retail 0.10 2.87 -0.05 8.90 0.00 0.04 0.17a 0.03a -32.81a 
Travel and Leisure 0.10 2.83 0.02 5.21 -0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.01 -31.38a 
Technology, Media, and Telecom (TMT) Group  
Technology 0.46 5.77 1.29 9.81 -0.00 0.00 0.13a 0.00b -21.58a 
Telecom -0.05 3.33 -0.21 5.26 -0.00 0.01 0.13a 0.12a -36.86a 
Media 0.08 3.25 -0.29 6.50 0.00 -0.03a 0.18a 0.19a -25.56a 
Financial Group  
Financials 0.01 1.69 -0.78 7.75 -0.00 0.04 0.27a 0.15a -30.08a 
Real Estate 0.00 1.49 -0.18 5.48 0.00 -0.01 0.11a 0.05a -31.93a 
Financial Services 0.00 2.05 -1.46 14.96 -0.00 -0.01 0.06c 0.02 -32.03a 
Aggregate Stock 
Market (NZSE) 
0.06 1.64 -0.47 6.53 -0.00 0.05 0.15a 0.06a 
-31.18a 
NZ EPU 0.18 0.97 -0.00 3.05 -0.46a 0.02a 0.04 0.02 -13.42
a 
US EPU 0.26 0.29 0.00 3.81 -0.35a -0.01a 0.11b 0.05 -22.42
a 
Notes: The table provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for weekly returns (in percentage) of the 
sector equity indices and NZSE. The weekly average, standard deviation, kurtosis are denoted by Mean, 
Std. Dev., Skew., and Kurt., respectively. Q (1) and Q (4) indicate the autocorrelations of order 1 and 4 of 
the residual-series, respectively. Q†(1) and Q†(4) represent the autocorrelations of order 1 and 4 for squared 
residuals of the AR(1) process for each time series, respectively. ADF is the empirical statistic for the 
Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) test. The significance of the Ljung and Box (1978) test statistics and 
ADF-statistic is denoted by a, b, and c at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Both the equity returns and the EPU change-rates are calculated by taking the logarithm 
difference of two consecutive index values. Table 4-2 also includes the results of Augmented 
Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Ljung and Box (1978) tests. Note that while the Technology 
sector produces the highest amounts of average weekly return (0.46%) and standard deviation 
(5.77%), the sectors in the Financials group yield the lowest returns and standard deviations. 




skewed. Also, as suggested by Q(1) and Q(4), most of the equity return series are weakly 
serially correlated, while the NZ EPU and US EPU change-rate series exhibit a strong 
autocorrelation. The significance of Q†, however, indicates a strong second-moment 
dependence in the distribution of equity returns, suggesting the presence of conditional 
heteroscedasticity and, therefore, justifying our choice of using BEKK-GARCH specification 
for this dataset. Finally, the ADF test results reported in the last column indicate that all the 
return and EPU change-rate series are stationary at 1% level, suggesting that the series are 
suitable for the analysis.  
Now I discuss the results of return and volatility spillovers between NZ EPU (US EPU) 
and NZ equity sectors and NZSE. First, I talk about the return spillovers from NZ EPU to NZ 
equity sectors (NZSE). Table 4-3 shows the estimation results for the bivariate VAR (1)-
BEKK-GARCH models, with each model including a given NZ equity sector (or NZSE) and 
NZ EPU. Because our primary interest is to explore the return and volatility spillovers directed 
from NZ EPU to NZ equity sectors (NZSE) as well as those from within each sector, I will 
only emphasize on those spillover effects. The results of the mean equations with NZ EPU, i.e., 
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Panel A: Conditional mean  
cS 0.003a 0.002c 0.001b 0.000 0.001 0.001c 0.002a 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001c 0.001b 0.001c 0.001c 0.001a 
aS -0.033 -0.043 0.008 -0.049 0.013 0.107a -0.015 0.024 0.019 0.010 -0.119a -0.007 0.053 0.017 0.023 0.043 
bS 0.000 -0.002b 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001c -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
cNZEPU 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.014 0.006 0.000 0.011 0.008 -0.003 0.006 0.007 0.003 -0.001 0.006 0.009 
aNZEPU -0.507a -0.505a -0.495a -0.503a -0.508a -0.500a -0.502a -0.505a -0.509a -0.559a -0.508a -0.495a -0.509a -0.506a -0.501a -0.505a 
bNZEPU -0.696 0.521 -0.961 -0.189 -1.178 -0.640 1.150 -0.626 0.598 -0.456 -0.476 -0.016 -1.985 -1.307 -0.849 -1.129 
Panel B: Conditional Variance 
c11 -0.008 0.035 -0.019 -0.028 -0.027 0.018 -0.022 0.027 0.027 0.054a -0.019 -0.030 -0.007 -0.014 -0.039 -0.015 
c21 -0.101 0.037 0.009 -0.001 0.015 -0.024 -0.007 0.027 -0.003 0.045 0.052 -0.011 0.065 0.033 -0.034 0.034 
c22 0.851a 0.817a 0.832a 0.832a 0.809a 0.845a 0.816a 0.830a 0.813a 0.803a 0.812a 0.823a 0.836a 0.823a 0.811a 0.853a 
a11 0.483a -0.247a 0.329a 0.323a 0.278a -0.443a 0.237a -0.293a 0.167b -0.334a 0.447a -0.405a -0.514a -0.272a -0.044 -0.464a 
a12 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003b 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
a21 -3.408 0.078 0.309 -1.109 3.059c 0.361 -3.319c 0.392 0.543 0.475 0.391 2.335c 2.662 -2.443 0.044 -0.140 
a22 0.414a 0.500a 0.479a 0.477a 0.497a 0.454a 0.506a -0.484a -0.512a 0.554a 0.495a -0.492a 0.443a 0.491a 0.516a 0.434a 
b11 0.799a -0.001 0.000 -0.027 -0.196 0.000 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.666a 0.000 -0.777a 0.000 -0.067 0.000 
b12 -0.005 0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.009 -0.005 -0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
b21 -1.761 0.028 0.023 0.296 -2.734 -0.001 0.029 0.212 -0.002 -0.077 -2.023 0.000 -0.912 0.011 -0.329 -0.020 
b22 0.040 -0.095 0.041 -0.015 -0.119 -0.002 0.041 0.004 -0.057 0.068 -0.154 0.000 -0.173 0.021 0.002 -0.015 
Log.L 1141.53 786.63 1361.67 1078.40 1052.61 1404.75 1238.44 1073.12 1005.19 174.70 860.14 912.39 1656.73 1706.79 1022.68 1647.33 
Notes: In every pair, the superscripts S and NZEPU represent a given sector (or NZSE) and the New Zealand EPU index, respectively. The first series in our bivariate framework 
refers to the sector (NZSE). 𝑐𝑖𝑗  represents coefficients of constants. 𝑎𝑖𝑗  represents coefficients that capture the effects of own shocks and cross-market shock interactions. 𝑏𝑖𝑗  
represents coefficients that capture the own volatility persistence and the volatility interactions with the NZ EPU series. a, b, and c indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 




Note that the current returns of only Consumers Services and Telecom sectors depend 
upon their own past returns (𝑎𝑆), while those of the Oil and Gas, Consumer Services, and Media 
sectors depend upon past changes in NZ EPU (𝑏𝑆). Both Consumer Services and Media sectors 
are linked more closely to the domestic economic policies, and their returns are therefore 
significantly predicted by NZ EPU. The Oil and Gas sector, however, is generally more linked 
to the foreign policy changes, but is also one of the critical sectors of the NZ economy and thus 
is bound to be sensitive by any changes around NZ EPU. These findings indicate that short-
term predictability of returns exists for only a few NZ sectors over time. Similarly, the NZ EPU 
also seems to predict the returns of only a few sectors. Notably, the past lag of NZ EPU and 
NZSE do not predict the current returns of NZSE. Finally, a few cases of significant 𝑎𝑆 in the 
return spillover results also support the weak autocorrelation given in Table 4-2.  
As to the conditional variance equations, the results shown in Panel B of Table 4-3 
indicate that the current conditional volatility of all NZ equity sectors (except Financial 
Services) and NZSE is strongly influenced by their own past shocks (a11), while only that of 
Industrials, Telecom, and Financials sectors is determined by their past volatility (b11). On the 
other hand, there is no role of NZ EPU’s past volatility (b21) on the current volatility dynamics 
of NZ equity sectors (NZSE). Only for the Consumer Goods, Health Care, and Media sectors, 
the past shocks of NZ EPU are an essential driver of the current conditional volatility (a21). 
Since these three sectors are driven mainly by domestic demand, their volatility seems tightly 
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Panel A: Conditional mean  
cS 0.003a 0.002b 0.001b 0.000 0.001 0.001b 0.002a 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002c 0.001b 0.001b 0.001c 0.001a 
aS -0.034 -0.042 0.010 -0.044 0.017 0.103a -0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 -0.132a -0.024 0.043 0.004 0.013 0.037 
bS 0.000 -0.006c -0.003c -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 -0.003b -0.002c -0.004 -0.002 
cUSEPU -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.009 -0.003 
aUSEPU -0.385a -0.386a -0.389a -0.392a -0.381a -0.380a -0.385a -0.376a -0.388a -0.337a -0.380a -0.382a -0.385a -0.385a -0.377a -0.388a 
bUSEPU -0.738b -0.291 -1.322c -0.668c -0.490 -1.141b -0.412 0.166 -0.504 -0.621a -0.661b -0.482c -0.561 -0.402 0.063 -1.567a 
Panel B: Conditional Variance 
c11 0.007 0.019a -0.017a 0.027a 0.028a -0.005 -0.021a 0.027a 0.028a 0.016a -0.021a -0.011a 0.002a -0.008c -0.039a -0.004a 
c21 0.017 -0.083c -0.021 -0.020 0.014 -0.155 -0.046 0.026 -0.010 0.248a 0.129b 0.116b 0.169a -0.169 0.017 0.218a 
c22 -0.235a -0.178a -0.302a -0.163a -0.151a -0.232b -0.125a -0.120a -0.177a 0.021 -0.128 -0.188a -0.127a -0.221a -0.178a -0.082 
a11 0.525a -0.344a 0.337a -0.448a 0.304a -0.437a 0.337a 0.345a 0.173b -0.463a 0.431a 0.359a 0.438a -0.314a 0.025 0.328a 
a12 -0.003 0.006 0.007c 0.010b 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 0.011c 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.012a -0.001 -0.002 -0.006b 
a21 -0.591 -1.056b -1.276 -0.987b -0.029 2.161a 0.488 0.292 -0.954 0.264 1.190a 1.208b -3.561a 4.327a 0.674b 4.343a 
a22 -0.375a 0.356a -0.397a -0.383a -0.362a -0.281a 0.326a -0.306a -0.400a 0.467a 0.399a 0.352a -0.277a 0.421a 0.410a 0.352a 
b11 0.768a -0.756a 0.001 0.035 0.003 -0.719a -0.003 0.004 0.000 -0.279a 0.640a 0.828a 0.804a 0.010 -0.068 0.814a 
b12 0.027 -0.023b 0.026 -0.001 0.008 0.027b 0.010 0.005 -0.003 -0.159a 0.009 0.028a -0.012a -0.035a 0.001 0.019a 
b21 1.609c 0.703b -0.007 -0.230 0.059 -1.774c 0.167 0.020 -0.035 0.338 3.216a -1.126b 1.466a -0.052 0.001 -1.782a 
b22 -0.574a -0.712a -0.063 -0.780a -0.813a -0.427b -0.856a -0.876a -0.741a 0.266a -0.644a 0.634a 0.703a 0.302c -0.736a 0.579a 
Log.L 2191.68 1830.52 2412.79 2130.92 2097.72 2456.49 2291.51 2120.15 2052.02 746.21 1911.45 1958.53 2706.51 2751.71 2070.22 2702.75 
Notes: In every pair, the superscripts S and USEPU represent the sector (NZSE) and the EPU index of the United States, respectively. The first series in our bivariate framework refers 
to the sector (or NZSE). 𝑐𝑖𝑗  represents coefficients of constants. 𝑎𝑖𝑗  represents coefficients that capture the effects of own shocks and cross-market shock interactions. 𝑏𝑖𝑗  represents 
coefficients that capture the own volatility persistence and the volatility interactions with the US EPU series. a, b, and c indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard 





Now I turn to the return and volatility spillover effects between US EPU and NZ equity 
sectors and NZSE. Table 4-4 presents these results. Once again, our key focus will remain on 
the return and volatility spillovers directed from US EPU to NZ equity sectors (NZSE), as well 
as those from within each sector (NZSE). Panel A of Table 4-4 contains the results of mean 
equations with US EPU, i.e., the VAR system of Eq. (2a) and Eq. (2b). Just like Table 4-3, the 
current returns of only Consumers Services and Telecom sectors depend upon their own past 
returns (𝑎𝑆), while, in contrast, those of the Oil and Gas, Utilities, Financials, and Real Estate 
sectors depend upon past changes in US EPU (𝑏𝑆). Just like Table 4-3, the short-term 
predictability in NZ sectoral returns through time is only limited to Consumer Services and 
Telecom sectors. The short-term predictability of the US EPU is, however, present for four 
sectors, namely Oil and Gas, Utilities, Financials, and Real Estate. Since these sectors are 
relatively more vulnerable to global economic policy changes, the predominant role of US EPU 
in predicting their returns is quite intuitive. Here again, the past lag of US EPU and NZSE do 
not predict the current returns of NZSE.   
Regarding the conditional variance equations, the results shown in Panel B of Table 4-
4 indicate that the current conditional volatility of all the equity sectors (except Financial 
Services) and NZSE is strongly influenced by their own past shocks (a11). Thus, the short-run 
persistence in sectoral (NZSE) volatility due to their own shocks is found to be pronounced for 
almost all the sectors (NZSE). On the other hand, for Industrials, Oil and Gas, Consumer 
Services, Technology, Telecom, Media, and Financials sectors, as well as NZSE, the current 
conditional volatility is influenced by their own past conditional volatility (b11). The past 
shocks in US EPU are important for driving the current conditional volatility of the sectors like 
Oil and Gas, Food and Beverages, Consumer Services, Telecom, Media, Financials, and Real 




irrelevant for the current conditional volatility of NZ sectors, the past conditional volatility of 
US EPU seems to drive the current conditional volatility of some NZ sectors of an aggregate 
equity index (b21). Specifically, the past volatility of US EPU significantly drives the current 
conditional volatility of Industrials, Oil and Gas, Consumer Services, Telecom, Media, 
Financials, and NZSE. 
Interesting groupings emerge from the sectoral analysis with regards to the EPU effects. 
Each sector in the Consumer Goods and Services group, apart from Consumer Services, 
experiences either nothing or only volatility spillovers from just one EPU. Like, Retail and 
Travel and Leisure sectors are hurt by none of the EPUs. Consumer Goods and Health Care 
(Food and Beverages) sectors receive volatility spillovers from NZ EPU (US EPU) shocks 
only. It is only the Consumer Services sector that is exposed to both EPUs; it experiences return 
spillover from NZ EPU and volatility spillovers from US EPU. Relatively large exposure of 
this sector from US EPU can be understood from the fact that this is the only sector in the group 
that deals in non-essential services, which the consumers can easily avoid without having 
severe consequences for their well-being, especially when faced with uncertain economic 
conditions. 
Moreover, US EPU’s driving effect on the volatility of the Consumer Services sector 
might be because many of the consumer services, besides their domestic use, are exported to 
the US. Excluding this sector, however, the Consumer Goods and Services group appears to be 
the most resilient group among all sector groups. This may be because most of the sectors 
included this group deal in public utilities and essential items, whose output demand generally 
remains stable, even during economic conditions that are highly uncertain, lending stability to 
their income streams. The stable nature of these sectors’ returns makes them relatively less 




In contrast, the sectors composing Production and Industry, TMT, and Financial groups 
are more vulnerable to US EPU. In the Production and Industry group, Oil and Gas appear to 
be the sector most susceptible to US EPU (even though it experiences return spillover from NZ 
EPU), while Utilities and Industrial sectors are only prone to volatility spillovers from US EPU, 
respectively. Similarly, in the TMT group, while the Technology sector is exposed to none of 
the EPUs, Telecom and Media sectors receive strong volatility spillovers from US EPU, even 
though the Media sector experiences return and volatility spillovers from NZ EPU. Clearly, the 
sectors in the Financial group are hit only by US EPU. Financials and Real Estate sectors are 
exposed to both return and volatility spillovers from US EPU, whereas the Financial Services 
sector’s volatility shocks only driven by US EPU. Finally, the NZSE experiences a significant 
amount of volatility spillovers from US EPU but shows no sensitivity to the local counterpart-
as witnessed from Table 4-3.  
Another important aspect of our findings relates to the coefficient signs of volatility 
spillovers. As mentioned earlier, ideally, the coefficients of return spillovers should be 
negative, and those of volatility spillovers be positive (Pastor and Veronesi, 2012). While all 
the significant return spillovers have negative coefficients in our case, there are some instances 
where the coefficients of volatility spillovers have turned out to be negative. For instance, the 
coefficient of volatility spillover directed from US EPU’ shocks to the aggregate NZSE is 
negative. The negative coefficient can occur perhaps because a higher US EPU has negative 
impacts on the US economy and financial markets, which could be perceived as a “good news” 
for the New Zealand stock market. Obtaining such “good news” investors operating in the NZ 
stock market may exhibit positive attitudes towards their domestic stock markets, and this may 
lead to lower market volatility. With this explanation in mind, some recent studies have 




example, Dakhlaoui and Aloui (2016) found a volatility spillover effect from US EPU to BRIC 
stock markets to oscillate between positive and negative values. Similarly, Su, Fang, and Yin 
(2019) found the effect of US EPU on the volatility of emerging-market economies to be 
negative, indicating that a higher US EPU is associated with lower volatility. Regarding 
sectoral analysis, the negative coefficients of volatility spillovers are also consistent, although 
to a limited extent, with Yu et al. (2018) and Yu et al. (2017) with US context.  
Overall, the findings suggest that NZ equity sectors and NZSE receive relatively 
stronger and pronounced spillover effects from US EPU as compared to the local counterpart 
(NZ EPU). While return spillovers from both EPUs are somewhat similar, yet limited, to a few 
sectors, the impact of US EPU on NZ sectors’ volatility well surpasses that of the NZ EPU. In 
general, for volatility spillovers, the domestically oriented sectors are vulnerable to NZ EPU, 
while the export/import oriented sectors are susceptible to US EPU. Based on the findings of 
this essay, investors, financial analysts, and policymakers should remain vigilant in their 
decision-making processes regarding the impact of local and foreign EPUs on the various 
sectors of the New Zealand stock market. 
4.6 Concluding remarks 
This research helps to understand the responsiveness of various sectors of the New 
Zealand stock market to both local and foreign EPUs. Going one step further from the 
examinations that generally relate the aggregate equity index with the domestic or US EPUs, I 
explored the spillovers of local and foreign EPU on sectoral equity indices. As our results 
suggest, the performance of New Zealand's stock market is mainly linked to US EPU, implying 




induced by US EPU, thereby manifest their EPU-driven sentiments in the form return and 
spillovers of volatility.  
Upon considering New Zealand's economic ties with the United States, the results 
appear to be quite intuitive. The US is not only one of New Zealand's largest trading partners, 
but it is also the second-highest contributor of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the country 
after Australia. It seems that due to the strong economic linkages, equity investors are more 
concerned about EPU around the US economy than they are about New Zealand. That might 
be the reason why the three sector-groups, namely Production and Business, TMT, Financials, 
are predominantly vulnerable to US EPU. The fact that the Financials group is most affected 
could be an indication of the fact that nearly one-third of New Zealand's inbound FDI goes to 
the financial sector. 
Our findings carry implications for equity investors, particularly for those institutional 
investors aiming to exploit diversification opportunities by simultaneously investing in the 
financial sectors (and aggregate market indices) of both countries. The finding that the US 
stock market is strongly responsive to US EPU shocks (Baker et al., 2016; Pástor & Veronesi, 
2012 & 2013) may be considered while sorting the investment vehicles that are associated with 
the aggregate stock market. Because the present essay also noted that New Zealand's aggregate 
equity market is highly vulnerable to US EPU, any potential for diversification between the 
two stock markets may be restricted. Therefore, institutional investors taking simultaneous 
portfolio positions in both the stock markets should be cautious. Similarly, close attention 
should also be paid when investing in the financial sectors of both countries, as Yu et al. (2017) 
found out that US EPU strongly drives the market risk of the US financial sector. Lucrative 




Zealand stock market, such as Retail, Travel and Leisure, and Technology sectors due to their 
resilience against both local and US EPU. 
Future research may consider expanding to include other small open economies. 
Following Stockammar and Österholm (2016), a sample of small open economies such as 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, and Mexico may be considered for this 
purpose. Based on our findings and considering the small-open nature of these economies, the 
countries having a stronger (weaker) economic linkage with the US would be expected to 




5 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
This last chapter of the thesis includes three sections. The first section provides a 
summary of the key findings from each of the three essays and highlights the contribution that 
each essay provides to the current body of literature. This section also includes the implications 
that each essay offers to the policymakers and investors. The second section lists the limitations 
of the three essays, while the last section points to some of the potential avenues for further 
research in this area.   
5.1 Key findings, contributions, and policy implications 
5.1.1 Essay one 
Based on the conflict contagion literature, which has often reported the role of 
information flows in spreading geopolitical conflicts across borders, the first essay estimates 
the transmission of GPU across 19 countries and discusses the bilateral and country-specific 
drivers of this transmission. To this end, the news-based GPU indices for 18 emerging 
economies and the United States, constructed by Caldara and Iacoviello (2018), were used. The 
spillover model of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) was employed for this purpose. A graphic 
description of the spillover results was achieved through Gephi – an open-source graphics 
visualization software. The exploration of the potential drivers of GPU transmission was 
undertaken via a cross-sectional regression framework. Finally, the total GPU transmission is 
split into short- and long-term components by employing the recently introduced frequency-
connectedness model of Barunik and Krehlik (2018). The short- and long-term, pairwise GPU 




The key findings of the first essay follow. A considerable amount of GPU transmission 
has been observed across our sample countries. In general, countries that send more GPU 
shocks to others are also the ones that receive more, while the amounts of transmission being 
slightly higher than those of reception. The United States, Russia, Brazil, China, and Saudi 
Arabia appear to be the largest contributors (receivers) of GPU shocks to (from) the rest of the 
countries. The graphic description of the spillover results suggested that geographic clustering 
is present among the GPU of sample countries. With a few exceptions, a higher amount of GPU 
transmission is observed among countries located in the same geographic region. The amount 
of GPU transmission is even higher for the neighboring countries. In general, the closer 
(farther) the countries, the higher (lower) the amount of GPU transmission among them. Most 
notably, countries with larger geographical sizes play a leading role in the transmission of GPU. 
Interestingly, aside from the pacific benefits of trade found in the literature (Oneal & Russett, 
1999), the first essay suggests a higher magnitude of GPU transmission between trading 
partners.  
The emergence of geographic clustering from the GPU transmission results required 
further explanation of these results. Under a gravity model framework, the pairwise GPU 
transmissions are explained through a cross-sectional regression. This empirical exercise 
indicates the critical role played by bilateral and country-specific factors in transmitting GPU 
shocks from one country to another. Specifically, bilateral trade and border sharing 
significantly increase the transmission of GPU shocks between two countries, while this 
transmission appears to be decreased by the common distance. Further, a transmitting country's 
fiscal imbalance and geographical size, as well as the debt burden of both countries, tend to 




The total GPU transmission is divided into short-and long-term components using the 
frequency connectedness model of Barunik and Krehlik (2018). Although the results obtained 
for short- and long-term GPU transmission are somewhat similar to those for total GPU 
transmission, the division exercise reveals some additional features. First, the total and pairwise 
estimates for short-term GPU transmission are remarkably higher than those for the long-term, 
indicating that the GPU transmission becomes weaker as we move from short- to long-term 
time horizons. Second, as the magnitude of GPU transmission weakens, the bilateral and 
country-specific drivers also become less critical. Third, while the indicator of geographic 
proximity (border sharing and common distance) are important drivers of overall and short-
term GPU transmissions, they appear to be irrelevant for the transmission of GPU over the 
long-term horizons. 
The first essay contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the essay 
suggests another viewpoint by examining the transmission of GPU in the form of information 
flows directly emerging from geopolitical conflicts. This viewpoint is slightly different from 
the existing literature that so far has considered information flows responsible for the 
propagation of physical conflicts (Beiser, 2013; Hill & Rothchild, 1986; Weidmann, 2015). On 
the other hand, this research concludes that the information content of news-articles is 
responsible for the transmission of geopolitical uncertainty across borders, without explaining 
whether that uncertainty would lead to the spread of physical conflicts. Second, although the 
primary interest of this research pertains to the factors that determine the transmission of GPU 
across countries, one may be tempted to utilize the suggested factors for forecasting the 
direction of GPU transmission from one country to another. While those factors could prove 
helpful in such predictive endeavors, they may not provide much utility for predicting the actual 




made to the interstate-conflict studies which offer dichotomous or probabilistic predictions on 
individual conflicts, and which also aim to suggest conditions most conducive to geopolitical 
conflicts (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Glaser, 2000; Huth, 2009; Powell, 2004). Third, rather than 
using a latent variable such as cross-country incidents signifying the transmission of 
information, this essay tracks real-time information flows via news-based GPU indices 
developed by Caldara and Iacoviello (2018). The GPU indices will likely increase the 
estimation accuracy of GPU transmission by resolving the data imperfections that were 
typically found in the previous interstate-conflict studies (e.g., Chadefaux, 2014). Fourth, 
contrary to the previous studies (e.g., Chadefaux, 2014), which aimed at predicting wars by 
relying on a measure of geopolitical tensions, this essay indicates the bilateral linkages and 
country-specific driving the transmission of GPU, and thus provides a better explanation of the 
phenomenon.  
The results of the first essay have important implications for policymakers, investors, 
and corporations operating in a multi-country context. Institutional investors and multinational 
corporations take the decisions often involve making assumptions and projections about the 
geopolitical complexities of a country, region, or even the international environment. The 
geographical clustering of GPU suggested by this essay could be particularly insightful for 
these global players. By understanding the way countries are related to one another within a 
cluster, the dominant players within each cluster, as well as the countries that are source/target 
of geopolitical uncertainty, would help them make well-informed decisions. The understanding 
gained through regional clustering would allow them to formulate methods for risk 
management and thereby better evaluate investment decisions. Guided by the geographical 
clustering suggested by this essay, for instance, the managers and investors could buy political 




a high concentration of GPU and hence could well protect their investments. The bilateral 
linkages and country-specific indicators suggested in this essay may also be useful for them in 
predicting the course of GPU transmission between the two countries. These factors may also 
help improve the assessments about a country’s susceptibility or resilience against external 
GPU shocks. 
Policymakers may also refer to this work while designing national security policies or 
taking counter-terrorism initiatives. This essay asks policymakers of a country to remain 
attentive to the geopolitical events taking place in their neighborhood as well as those involving 
their trading partners. GPUs triggered by such events can have adverse consequences on their 
own country's geopolitical landscape. Since it is almost impossible to shrink bilateral trade 
or/and manipulate geographic factors, improve fiscal imbalances, reduce debt burdens, and 
strengthen the domestic economy may be a few measures that can be taken to foster the 
resilience of a country against international GPU shocks.   
5.1.2 Essay two 
Studies in the extant literature have examined the impact of US uncertainty on 
international stock markets without paying much attention to the correlation between the US 
and other stock markets. The second essay examines the role of US uncertainty in driving the 
US stock markets spillover to global stock markets, after controlling for market correlation. To 
this end, a wide range of stock markets around the world, as well as three news-based 
uncertainties from the US, namely, EPU, EMU, EMV, have been considered. The essay found 
that the US uncertainties significantly cause the spillovers from the US to global stock markets. 
This causality from US uncertainties depends upon certain country-characteristics. 




when those target countries have a higher degree of financial openness, trade linkage with the 
US, and vulnerable fiscal position. Improved levels of stock market development in the target 
countries, however, mitigate their stock markets’ vulnerability to the US uncertainty shocks.  
This essay provides the following contributions to the broader debate that connects 
foreign and local uncertainties to domestic stock markets (see, e.g., Boutchkova et al., 2012; 
Pastor & Veronesi, 2012 & 2013; and Smales, 2016). First, global evidence is provided on how 
US uncertainties drive spillovers between the US and other stock markets; the evidence goes 
well beyond individual stock markets and regions, which was the focus of previous research. 
The second contribution of the essay addresses how uncertainties in general, and US 
uncertainties, in particular, cause movements in international stock markets. In contrast to 
previous research which pays little attention to the correlation between the stock markets while 
investigating the impact of uncertainty on a given stock market (Li & Peng, 2017; Sum, 2012; 
Colombo, 2013; Dakhlaoui & Aloui, 2016), this essay considers the effect of US uncertainties 
on global stock markets after controlling for the time-varying correlation between the US and 
a given stock market.  
Another contribution of this essay is to explore the link between news-based measures 
of uncertainty and asset markets. While numerous studies are available that relate news-based 
EPU to stock market returns and volatility (e.g., Hammoudeh & McAleer, 2015), and stock-
bond market correlations (Li, Zhang, & Gao, 2015), such studies are often conducted within a 
domestic context. Furthermore, although EPU partly captures the uncertainty surrounding the 
US stock market, efforts have been made recently to develop news-based measures of 
uncertainty that track uncertainty in the US stock market more precisely and are therefore 




along with EPU, have been considered to provide international evidence on the power of US 
print for global stock markets.  
Finally, and most importantly, this essay moves the US uncertainty-global stock market 
nexus literature (for instance, Phan et al., 2018) one-step further by indicating the potential 
factors that explain the transmission of uncertainty shocks within this nexus. Specifically, this 
essay provides evidence that country-specific macroeconomic/financial indicators, such as 
trade and financial openness, fiscal imbalance, and stock market development, determine the 
vulnerability of global stock markets to US uncertainty shocks. Trung (2019) documents 
similar country characteristics as the determinants of a given economy’s vulnerability to US 
EPU shocks, yet the relevance of those characteristics for the stock market vulnerability 
remained unexplored. The essay fills this gap. 
The findings of the second essay carry significant implications for investors and 
policymakers. It has been argued in the literature (Trung, 2019) that countries with a higher 
degree of trade openness are likely to grow faster. However, a country’s trade openness with a 
specific partner country could make the country’s economy, and thus its financial markets, 
more integrated with those of the trading partner. In this regard, our results suggest that despite 
academic evidence of potential gains to the overall economy, trade openness with a specific 
country, and particularly with a large economy such as the US, could well amplify the stock 
market spillovers induced from economic and financial uncertainty of the partner country. This 
implies that when it comes to trade openness, countries should strive for trade diversification 
to avoid their bilateral trade becoming too concentrated on a few trading partners. In this way, 
trade diversification could allow countries to preserve the benefits of trade while minimizing 




Our findings also suggest a similar amplification role played by higher levels of 
financial openness and fiscal imbalances (though only significant in the case of spillover 
vulnerability due to EPU) in the countries. Increased financial openness is related to more 
effective financial regulation and more transparent financial markets. Capital markets with 
such attractive features draw large amounts of capital from around the world. Empirical 
evidence shows that uncertainty is a source of volatility in global capital flows (Converse, 
2018) and that capital flows serve as a potential channel through which uncertainties may cause 
global stock market spillovers (Gauvin, McLoughlin, & Reinhardt, 2014). Investors and 
policymakers should, therefore, take into account the degree of financial openness in a 
country's financial system, as well as the capital flows coming from the US to that country, 
since these two factors could well combine to potentially amplify the uncertainty-generated 
stock market spillovers from the US to the stock markets of such a country.  
Similarly, weak fiscal imbalances reflect poor economic governance, which is likely to 
translate into uncertainty around macro-economic policies. Consequently, stock markets of 
countries with more uncertain macro-economic conditions are more vulnerable to uncertainty-
generated stock market spillovers from the US. Investors and policymakers should, therefore, 
consider the exacerbating character of a host country's fiscal imbalances for stock market 
spillovers that are due to uncertainty-related shocks in the US equity market, and thus take 
appropriate actions to mitigate this impact. 
Finally, the finding that developed stock markets appear to be resilient against 
uncertainty-driven spillovers is quite intuitive. Developed stock markets typically have 
measures in place with regards to investor protection and capital controls, which increase their 




investing in developed stock markets, policymakers should continue to take steps towards stock 
market development.     
Overall, this essay asks international investors and policymakers to pay close attention 
to the finding that after controlling for the correlation between the US and a given country’s 
stock market, the driving effect of US uncertainties for the stock market is linked to specific 
features of the host country such as the trade openness with the US, financial openness, fiscal 
imbalance, and the degree of stock market development.   
5.1.3 Essay three 
The third essay introduces a weekly index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) for 
New Zealand and examines the return and volatility spillovers from New Zealand (local) and 
US (foreign) EPU on aggregate (NZSE) and sectoral indices of New Zealand stock market. 
The multivariate VAR (1)-BEKK-GARCH model is employed for this purpose. Overall, the 
findings suggest that NZ equity sectors and NZSE receive much stronger and more pronounced 
spillover effects from US EPU compared to the local counterpart (NZ EPU). While the return 
spillovers from both EPUs are somewhat similar yet limited to just a few sectors, the volatility 
spillovers from US EPU on NZ sectors outstrip those from the NZ EPU. For volatility 
spillovers, the domestically oriented sectors are relatively more vulnerable to NZ EPU, while 
those having export/import concentration with the US are mainly susceptible to US EPU. These 
findings may be useful to investors seeking sectoral diversification opportunities across New 
Zealand and the US.  
The essay contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it introduces a 




EPU index for the country has already been created and used by Tsui, Balli, Tan, Lau, and 
Hasan (2017) and Balli, Uddin, Mudassar, and Yoon (2017),  a weekly NZ EPU index has its 
own utility for academic explorations, especially for studies that rely on weekly data in order 
to avoid the noise involved in daily data. The essay thus contributes to the ongoing efforts 
aimed at developing EPU indices of individual countries (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010; Baker 
et al., 2016; Alexopoulos & Cohen, 2015). To the best of our knowledge, this research is not 
only the first to develop a weekly EPU index for New Zealand, but also the first to create a 
weekly EPU index for any country. The essay’s second contribution is to the literature that 
examines EPU spillovers on stock markets (Pástor & Veronesi, 2012 & 2013; Antonakakis, 
Chatziantoniou & Filis, 2013; Brogaard & Detzel, 2015; Bijsterbosch & Guerin, 2013; Liu & 
Zhang, 2015; Ko & Lee, 2015). Unlike most of this literature, which considers the spillover 
effects of local and foreign EPU on the domestic stock market separately, this essay 
simultaneously looks at the spillover effects of both EPUs on the stock market of a country. 
Furthermore, the extant literature typically analyses EPU spillovers on the aggregate stock 
markets of some large economies of Europe or those of a few emerging economies. However, 
it remains unclear whether the nature of such spillover effects for different equity sectors of a 
small open economy. Considering New Zealand as the sample country, this essay provides 
evidence of EPU spillovers for the equity sectors of a small open economy and thereby 
contributes to the literature. 
Within the literature that explores the EPU-equity sector nexus, the current research is 
linked closely to Yu et al. (2018) and Yu et al. (2017). While these studies, respectively, 
analyze the effects of EPU on the return-volatility and long-run betas of various sectors, both 
studies take the US stock market as their backdrop. Also, both analyses are limited to 10 US 




large economy. In their examinations, the authors relied on the GARCH-MIDAS framework 
(Engle, Ghysels & Sohn, 2013) and the DCC-MIDAS framework (Colacito, Engle, & Ghysels, 
2011), respectively. This essay builds on their investigations by exploring the return and 
volatility spillovers directed from NZ EPU (US EPU) to 15 NZ equity sectors and NZSE. This 
essay thus provides a sharp contrast between how the equity sectors of two very different 
economies respond to policy uncertainty; clearly, New Zealand is a small open economy, and 
the US is a much larger economy. 
Finally, by considering NZ equity sectors, the third essay makes a specific contribution 
to the literature that links US EPU with asset markets of small open economies. As mentioned 
above, two earlier investigations have been conducted on New Zealand's stock market from 
this perspective; they include the works by Kamber et al. (2016) and Stockammar and 
Österholm (2016).  While both studies provide the basis for this analysis by setting the potential 
course of spillover effects from the US to small open economies (one of which is New 
Zealand), the focus of their analyses remained on how macroeconomic and financial variables, 
such as GDP and stock market index, in those economies responded to US EPU. Even when 
evaluating the stock market reaction to US EPU, both studies relied solely on the aggregate 
stock market index of New Zealand, with paying little attention to the sensitivity of stock 
market sectors. Moreover, the effect of local EPU on the performance of the aggregate stock 
market was entirely ignored by the two reports. By analyzing the New Zealand's stock market-
EPU nexus, this essay captures the sensitivity of NZ equity sectors to international (US) EPU 
and local EPU (NZ). It thus fills the gaps left by the two studies. In other words, unlike the two 
studies, this essay not only considers the spillover effects of local EPU along with US EPU but 
also examines these effects at the disaggregated level of the New Zealand stock market, moving 




Upon considering New Zealand's economic ties with the United States, the results 
appear to be quite intuitive. The US is not only one of New Zealand's largest trading partners, 
but it is also the second-highest contributor of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the country 
after Australia. It seems that the presence of strong economic linkages with the US makes 
equity investors more concerned about EPU around the US economy than they are about New 
Zealand. This might be why the three sector-groups, namely Production and Industry, TMT 
(Technology, Media, and Telecom sectors), and Financials, are predominantly vulnerable to 
US EPU. The fact that the Financials group is most affected could be an indication of the fact 
that nearly one-third of New Zealand's inbound FDI goes to the financial sector. 
The findings of this essay carry significant implications for equity investors, 
particularly for those institutional investors aiming to exploit diversification opportunities by 
simultaneously investing in the financial sectors (and aggregate market indices) of both 
countries. The finding that the US stock market responds strongly to the movements around 
US EPU shocks (Baker et al., 2016, Pástor & Veronesi, 2012 & 2013) may be considering 
while sorting the investment vehicles that are associated with the aggregate stock market. 
Because the present essay also noted that New Zealand's aggregate equity market is highly 
vulnerable to US EPU, any potential for diversification between the two stock markets may be 
restricted. Therefore, institutional investors taking simultaneous portfolio positions in both the 
stock markets should be cautious. The investors should also be watchful while making 
investments in the financial sectors of both countries, as Yu et al. (2017) found out that US 
EPU significantly drives the market risk of the US financial sector. Lucrative diversification 
opportunities may, however, exist across less competitive sectors of the New Zealand stock 
market, such as Retail, Travel-and-Leisure, and Technology sectors, due to their resilience 




5.2 Avenues for future research  
First essay 
An obvious limitation of the first essay is that it relies on GPU data of 18 Emerging 
Economies and the US only. Since Caldara and Iacoviello (2018) have developed the GPU 
indices only for these 19 countries so far, the first essay ought to be limited to these countries 
only. This investigation presented in the first essay may well be broadened to a global level by 
including more countries should the GPU indices for a wide range of countries had been 
available. Secondly, although the essay tried to estimate GPU transmission, these estimations 
are primarily cross-sectional, static, based on news information, and limited to a set of 
emerging economies and the US. Several questions remain and demand further investigations. 
For instance, future research may be aimed at investigating the dynamics of GPU transmission 
in terms of speed, volume, or even time. Researchers may examine the time-varying behavior 
of pairwise and total GPU transmissions. This may be achieved by applying the time-varying 
spillover models of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) and Barunik and Krehlik (2018). Moreover, 
this research has strictly relied on the gravity model framework and the factors specific to that 
framework. There is, however, an exhaustive list of factors and approaches that may be utilized 
to explain this phenomenon more deeply than this research did. 
This essay neither identifies any transmission mediums such as the internet, phone calls, 
television, or radio that usually facilitate the transmission of GPU nor it points out the types of 
geopolitical conflicts from where GPU could emanate. Future research may be conducted to 
identify the role of transmission mediums in GPU transmission. This question may be answered 
by extending the investigation of Weidmann (2015), which linked conflict spread to 




be answered by creating news-based indices that can capture the GPU of individual conflicts, 
and then by using these narrow indices along with the approach used in this study. 
Second essay 
The second essay examines how uncertainty spills over from US uncertainties to 
international stock markets. The essay strictly relies on three news-based uncertainty indicators 
of the US, namely EPU, EMU, and EMV, in order to compute the uncertainty spillovers. While 
results are quite informative, they are limited to uncertainty driven from economic policies, 
equity market, and equity market volatility. There are many other indicators of uncertainty that 
may be considered for future research on this topic. Even policy uncertainty has been split into 
several sub-policy categories, and several indicators of category policy-uncertainty have been 
developed recently and are made available on the EPU website. For instance, future research 
may extend the investigation proposed by this essay to consider news-based uncertainty 
indicators associated with monetary policy, fiscal policy, healthcare policy, national security 
policy, trade policy, and financial regulation policy. In particular, the spillovers from trade-
related uncertainty in the US to the stock markets of the US’s major trading partners might be 
interesting to study.  
Third essay 
The third essay has examined the spillover effects from local and foreign EPUs on the 
equity sectors of New Zealand - a small open economy.  Future research may consider 
expanding to include other small open economies. Following Stockammar and Österholm 
(2016), for example, a sample of small open economies such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, 




findings and considering the small-open nature of these economies, the countries having 
stronger (weaker) economic linkages with the US would be expected to experience stronger 
(weaker) spillovers from the US EPU as compared to the local EPU.  
Another potential avenue for future research could be to investigate the impact of local 
and foreign EPUs on individual stocks listed on the New Zealand stock market. In this vein, 
the EPU spillovers on corporate investments may be explored by following Wu, Zhang, Zhang, 
& Zou (2020), or it may even be interesting to see whether local and foreign EPUs are priced 
in the cross-section of New Zealand stocks – this may be achieved by following Bali, Brown, 
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